商議空間：「促進民間參與」的地上權開發

Abstract

本文探討BOT與地上權標售這兩個廣義「促進民間參與公共建設」政策概念下的地上權開發制度。我沿用組織與經濟社會學的觀點，以台北市主辦的案例為對象，將地上權開發視為一個以交易與延續的關係運作(relational work)為主軸的場域，藉由分析地上權商品的歷史與當代特質，以及場域中政府、廠商、民代與常民之間的組織形式、技術與互動腳本，來建構一幅空間政治上「政商關係」動態圖像。 研究發現，這幅圖像與既有資本積累或都市政權理論的預測不同，也與在地都市研究普遍發現的尋租結構有別。地上權開發制度源自後威權時期財政、發展與公共性三者構成的挑戰之下，傳統發展型國家擴大需求政策的延伸；其於台北市運作的特色，則是由高度自主且具專業認同的行政官僚與廠商形成了鬆散勾連(loosely coupled)的「距離感連帶」(arm’s-length embeddedness)，透過制度化的緩衝機制與契約所象徵的夥伴關係，有意無意間打造出一個尋租可能並不普遍、但政治上能有效排除異議的體制。在這套體制中，官僚與廠商對制度環境的釋義(sensemaking)及其資源動員的能力，是引致變革的重要基礎；相對地，由於常民被排除在距離感連帶之外，制度參與與資源動員的管道亦十分有限，所以很難挑戰既有的場域秩序。

I develop an institutional analysis of BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) and Superficies Auction, both of which a form of public land development under the “Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects”—a “public-private partnerships” (PPPs) policy in Taiwan. Applying insights from organizational theories and economic sociology, I view the institution of superficies development inaugurated by Taipei City government as a field consists of transactions and relational works through which the actors, including the bureaucrats, consulting and construction companies, citizens and their representatives, routinely interact with each other via certain organizational forms, techniques and scripts. A brief history and dynamics of the field is also provided. Findings are to the surprise of the theory of capital accumulation and urban regime, nor do they support the rent seeking structure found in many other cities in Taiwan. The institutionalization of superficies development reflects the fiscal, developmental and legitimate needs of the post-authoritative KMT government since the late 1980s, through which a kind of loosely coupled “arm’s-length embeddedness” has emerged between the highly autonomous Taipei City government and construction companies. Such embeddedness is characterized by both its solidarity symbolized by contracts between the government and the construction companies and its tension that can be effectively reduced by institutional buffers such as review committees. Therefore, order and systematic exclusion of citizens are made up, although the public and private sectors are by no means well coordinated to facilitate developmental projects and instead constantly mobilize their own resources trying to manipulate existing rules according to their sensemaking of the present agendas of the field.