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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yun-Ting Lai | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 賴運霆 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:43:57Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-08-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-08-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Albuquerque, A. 2009. Peer firms in relative performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48: 69-89.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17812 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 由於權益薪酬之使用漸趨廣泛,其相關討論增加,再加上審計委員會職責逐
漸加重等因素,促使本研究欲找出哪些因素使得公司給予其審計委員會成員權益 薪酬。研究發現代理問題較嚴重之公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。薪酬委員會中成員 同時為審計委員會成員之比例則與給予權益薪酬之可能性呈顯著正向關係。而審 計委員會中董事同時為其他公司之高階主管之比例越高則公司傾向不給予權益薪 酬。本研究期能對審計委員會成員權益薪酬之相關議題做進一步的補充,幫助釐 清採用權益薪酬之決定因素。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Due to the controversy of the rising use of equity-based compensation and enhanced responsibilities of audit committee, this study examines the determinants that affect firm’s use of stock and option to remunerate audit committee members. My results show that firms having severer agency conflicts are significantly negatively associated with the presence of equity-based compensation for audit committee. Furthermore, firms with more compensation committee members serving on audit committee are significantly more likely to adopt stock and option plans for audit committee members. Moreover, if there are more audit committee members who are also top managers of other companies, the probability of equity remuneration for audit committees will be lower. Overall, the study contributes to the research about the determinants of audit committee member’s compensation. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:43:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02722038-1.pdf: 1391579 bytes, checksum: 3a851b40ef037f8ea1da57ff43b46f09 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I
ABSTRACT II CONTENTS III LIST OF TABLES IV 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 5 2.1 BACKGROUND 5 2.2 EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 6 2.3 OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP ON AUDIT AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 9 3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 11 3.1 AGENCY CONFLICTS 11 3.2 OVERLAP OF AUDIT COMMITTEE AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS 12 3.3 AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHO ARE ALSO TOP EXECUTIVES OF OTHER COMPANIES 14 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 16 4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 16 4.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION 17 4.2.1 Proxy for agency conflict 17 4.2.2 Measure of committee overlapping 19 4.2.3 Measure of members who are also top executives 19 4.2.4 Other variables 20 4.2.5 Empirical model 21 5. RESULTS 24 5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE TEST 24 5.2 MULTIVARIATE TEST ON OCCURRENCE OF EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION TO AUDIT COMMITTEE 30 6. CONCLUSION 34 REFERENCE 36 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 審計委員會權益薪酬之決定因素 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Determinants of Equity-Based Compensation for Audit Committee Member | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 高偉娟(Wei-Chuan Kao),洪聖閔(Sheng-Min Hung) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,審計委員會,權益薪酬,代理問題,委員會成員重疊, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Corporate governance,audit committee,equity-based compensation,agency conflicts,overlapping membership, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 40 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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