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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yuan-Tang Tsai | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蔡元棠 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:43:43Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-08-16 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-08-11 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | References
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17797 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Abstract
Auditor industry expertise has become a popular issue in recent years. Many studies focus on the relationship between auditor industry expertise and audit quality. However, few researchers discuss the signaling function of auditor industry professionals. That is, companies hire auditor industry specialists to validate their financial reports and mitigate the investors’ concern. This study therefore tries to fill this gap. We choose related-party sales as our main test variable. First, we examine whether management prefers to hire an industry specialist when a company has a higher level of related-party sales, in order to audit its financial reports and thereby mitigate outside investors’ concern. The empirical results support this explanation and our findings are the same in both the firm and partner level. In addition, we find when a company has higher accounting information quality, its management is more likely to hire an auditor industry specialist. However, this hypothesis may be weakened if a company has independent director(s) on its board since both the roles of an independent director and a specialist are quite similar. Second, we test market reaction for hiring an auditor industry specialist. The results show when a company has higher accounting information quality and the amount of related-party sales increases, in some situations, hiring an auditor industry specialist can mitigate the negative concern from outside investors. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:43:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-D95722001-1.pdf: 1643591 bytes, checksum: ba5233c063ce69e0a5d9acd9db9a5879 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
口試委員會審定書 i 謝辭 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature review and hypotheses generation 6 2.1. Auditor industry expertise 6 2.2. Related-party sales 8 2.3. Related-party sales and auditor industry expertise 9 2.4. Accounting information quality 9 2.5. Independent directors 10 2.6. Market reaction 11 2.7. Level difference and special auditor environment in Taiwan 12 3. Research design and data collection 13 3.1. Measure of auditor industry expertise 13 3.2. Measure of accounting information quality 15 3.3. Test model 16 3.4. Data collection 22 4. Main results 23 4.1. Descriptive statistics 23 4.2. Empirical results 24 4.2.1. Signaling hypothesis 24 4.2.2. Accounting information quality 25 4.2.3. Auditor industry expertise and independent director 27 4.2.4. Market reaction 28 5. Additional tests 30 5.1. Constraint hypothesis 30 5.2. Endogeneity concern 32 5.3. Auditor specialist and Big 4 33 5.4. Operating complexity 35 5.5. Period issue 36 5.6. Firm level versus partner level and partner 1 versus partner 2 37 6. Conclusion 39 References 41 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 會計師產業專家與關係人銷貨之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relationship between Auditor Industry Expertise and Related-party Sales | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉嘉雯,林世銘,陳聖賢,戚務君 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 會計師產業專家,關係人銷貨,訊息效果,獨立董事,會計資訊品質, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | auditor industry expertise,related-party sales,signaling function,independent director,accounting information quality, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 72 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-104-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.61 MB | Adobe PDF |
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