裁量性應計項模型修正──應用於檢測企業盈餘操縱行為

Abstract

本研究藉由將公司經理人對於支付供應商貨款的裁量權，納入現有的裁決性應計項目估計模型考量中，試圖改善原本模型在公司面對盈餘門檻時的盈餘管理偵測能力。文中以裁決性應計項目（discretionary accruals）作為盈餘管理衡量基準，再用迴歸與T檢定等方法檢驗修正後的模型在公司面對不同盈餘管理誘因時的偵測能力是否獲得改善。 研究貢獻是（1）提出考量支付供應商貨款裁量權的裁決性應計項目的修改模型，（2）探討模型修改前後對盈餘門檻的偵測能力（3）檢測公司在面對何種盈餘管理誘因時，會傾向利用對存貨及應付帳款的裁量權來做盈餘管理。 實證結果發現：經由本研究的模型修改，可改善對於公司在面對負債比率以及「避免損失」盈餘門檻的盈餘管理偵測能力，但在公司面對「避免盈餘減少」的盈餘門檻時，未有顯著提升，此結果符合Degeorge, Patel and, Zeckhauser (1999)的公司經理人在面對下限壓力時，首重報導獲利。

This study aims to improve discretionary accrual (DA) models by taking managers’ discretionary power over the firm’s payment to suppliers into consideration. Specifically, we make changes on cross-sectional version of Modified Jones model and Modified Jones Model with ROA (Kothari et al. 2005) in order to enhance the power of identifying earning management of these models. The regression analysis and t-tests are used to examine whether our revisions for discretionary accrual models help improving its detecting power for companies that may face different earning management incentives. This study adds to the literature in that (1) it proposes adjustment for discretionary accrual estimation model to capture the effect of managers’ discretionary power over payment to the suppliers, and (2) it explores the difference between my proposed modified models and the original ones in detecting earnings increasing schemes of the companies with high debt ratio or near earnings thresholds. Empirical results are consistent with the notion that company managers, facing earnings thresholds, are concerned about the of avoiding losses instead of avoiding earning decreases. First, our revisions for discretionary accrual models appear to improve the effectiveness of the DA models when companies face high debt ratio or earning threshold of avoiding losses. Second, our proposed modifications appear to add insignificant power to the DA models for the companies that face the threshold of avoiding earnings per share decreases.