宗教信仰與總經理薪酬品質

Abstract

過去研究發現，宗教可以抑制不道德的行為，且與風險規避呈正相關。以這兩種觀點為基礎，本文研究目的係探討一個地區的宗教信仰高低是否會對總經理的薪酬績效敏感性(Pay-performance sensitivity)造成影響。本文使用公司總部所在地信仰宗教人數的比例做為衡量宗教的代理變數，並以總經理的現金薪酬、權益薪酬及總薪酬為依變數。本研究發現，公司若位於宗教程度較高的地區，則總經理的薪酬績效敏感性較高，顯示宗教之規範有助於提升總經理薪酬與績效間的連結性，進而降低股東與經理人間的衝突。然而，本研究亦發現，宗教與總經理薪酬績效敏感性的顯著正相關取決於總經理的權力大小，顯著正相關只維持在總經理的權力較低時，顯示管理防禦在制定薪酬的過程扮演重要的角色。

Based on two perspectives on religiosity in inhabiting unethical behavior and lowering risk-taking, this study examines whether religious social norms affect the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. Using the level of religious adherents in a given area where firms are headquartered as a proxy for religious social norms, I find that firms in more religious areas have higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity. The results suggest that religious social norms represent a mechanism in reducing agency problem. I also find that the relationship is more pronounced in firms with lower levels of CEO power, suggesting that managerial entrenchment plays a key role in setting compensation.