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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ming-Ya Cheng | en |
dc.contributor.author | 鄭名雅 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T23:43:50Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2014-08-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2014-07-15 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16694 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究係探討總法務經理對於公司實質盈餘管理和應計盈餘管理的影響。Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 研究指出當訴訟風險高漲時,管理階層可能會選擇比較穩健的會計政策。總法務經理會為了股東的利益來監督公司經理人是否有不尋常之行為。故本研究欲探討公司總法務經理的存在是否會影響公司盈餘管理之程度。
本研究以一群較有可能使用盈餘管理來提高盈餘的公司為樣本,主要研究發現為,有總法務經理的公司實質盈餘管理的程度較低。當總法務經理身兼秘書時,會進一步減少的實質盈餘管理程度。 此外,本研究未發現有總法務經理的公司在會計年度結束日後會利用應計盈餘管理來彌補實質盈餘管理的不足。但本研究進一步測試發現,當總法務經理同時身兼秘書時,在會計年度結束日後,會減少用應計項目去彌補實質盈餘管理的不足。此結果顯示,當總法務經理權責愈大時,愈會考慮訴訟風險,因此反而會減少用應計項目去彌補實質盈餘管理的不足。有趣的是,本研究發現當總法務經理未兼職秘書時,較會妥協於其他管理階層利用應計項目去彌補實質盈餘管理的不足之決策。而這些公司的法律顧問角色較傾向於促進者(facilitator)。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the impact of general counsel on real activities earnings management and accrual earnings management. Prior evidence suggests that, when facing the heightened litigation risk, managers may choose conservative accounting choices (Bushman and Piotroski 2006). General Counsels (GCs) play a role in monitoring CEO’s unusual behavior against shareholders’ interest. Therefore, this paper examines whether general counsel affect firms’ earnings management strategies.
Using a sample including firms that are suspected to have conducted earnings management, I find that GC firms engage less in real activities earnings management. Furthermore, when a GC has an additional title of corporate secretary, s/he will exert greater influence on firm’s real activities earnings management strategies. Additional tests show that there is no significant evidence to support that GC firms adjust the amount of accrual earnings management after real activities manipulation is realized. Dividing GC sample into firms whose GCs also serve as corporate secretary and firms whose GCs do not serve as corporate secretary, this study finds that firms whose GC has an additional title of secretary will use fewer amount of accrual earnings management after real activities manipulation is realized. This study attributes this finding to GCs’ litigation risk consideration when he/she is granted with more power. More interestingly, firms whose GCs have no additional corporate secretary title use more accruals to adjust the amount of earnings after real activities manipulation is realized. This suggests that these GCs are easier to compromise with other managers, and they are more like a facilitator within the organization | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T23:43:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R01722046-1.pdf: 848176 bytes, checksum: 096e60d4772856d241bcb11a5400578b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 #
誌謝 i 摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii Index v LIST OF TABLES vii 1.Introduction 8 2.Literature Review 11 2.1 Earnings Management 11 2.2 General Counsel 14 3.Hypothesis Development 17 4.Research Design 20 4.1 Real Earnings Management Estimation Models 20 4.2 Identification of suspect firm-years 21 4.3 The Correction for Potential Sample Bias 21 4.4 Estimation models 22 4.5 Sample Selection 26 5.Results 31 5.1 Estimation model—Heckman First-Stage Results 31 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 33 5.3 Estimation model—Heckman Second-Stage Results 37 5.4 Additional Test 42 6.Conclusions 49 REFERENCE 50 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 總法務經理對公司實質盈餘管理和應計盈餘管理的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Real activities and accrual earnings management in firms with General Counsel in top management | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 曾怡潔(Yi-Jie Tseng),洪聖閔(Sheng-Min Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 總法務經理,實質盈餘管理,應計盈餘管理, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | general counsel,real activities earnings management,accrual earnings management, | en |
dc.relation.page | 52 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2014-07-16 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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