陳水扁對美國國會外交之分析（2000~2008）

Abstract

本文旨在分析前總統陳水扁對美國的「國會外交」及其成敗的原因。目前討論陳水扁執政時期的學術文獻多數僅討論臺美發生齟齬的原因，而未深入探討陳水扁的對美政策，更遑論深入分析他採取的策略與手段。 本研究藉由分析陳水扁對美的國會外交以補充現有學術文獻的空白。綜觀中華民國對美的外交史，無論是扶持「中國遊說團」或聘請公關公司，國會外交一直是臺灣對美政策的工作重點，陳水扁執政時期也不例外。在其執政初期雖有開拓對美外交的企圖心，但因陳水扁對美國行政部門沒有戰略槓桿可以操作，所以只得試圖透過國會實現他的外交目標。陳水扁主要希望藉由國會獲得所謂「出口轉內銷」的外交成就，包括過境禮遇、臺美自由貿易協定以及擴大臺灣參與國際組織的空間等議題。同時陳水扁也希望可以改變美國在兩岸關係中所扮演的角色，讓美國對北京當局施壓，從而促使北京當局與扁政府對話。 陳水扁雖親自投入許多資源和精力來處理國會外交，但因總統日理萬機，因此在執行對美外交政策上他需要依靠三個「代理者」：駐美代表處、美國的公關公司以及臺灣人公共事務會（FAPA）等臺美人士的組織。這些組織幫助他在美國經營民間和精英的關係，具體表現在試圖影響美國的輿論，以及廣泛邀請國會議員及其幕僚訪臺。陳水扁的代理者透過各種管道與國會議員保持密切接觸，試圖說服他們支持陳水扁的外交議程。 至於國會外交的功效，陳水扁雖然獲得美國會議員象徵性支持，包括許多友臺發言和提案，但他最終仍無法獲得實質性的幫助。而且隨著時間推移，連象徵性的友臺發言和提案也開始銳減。陳水扁的國會外交無法如願的原因係美國國會對臺灣議題的不重視，尤其當美國外交的焦點轉移到「反恐」後更形明顯。此外，陳水扁採取「冒進路線」的負面影響，以及大陸加強對美的國會外交，在在使得國會議員對他的支持逐漸降低，致使陳水扁對美外交功敗垂成。

This thesis analyses the reasons behind the successes and failures of Chen Shui-bian’s congressional diplomacy towards the United States. This topic is important because the present scholarly literature on US-Taiwan relations under the Chen Administration only examines the reasons behind US-Taiwanese tension, not probing Chen’s policy towards the United States in any depth, much less analyze the strategies and methods he adopted. This thesis adds to the current body of scholarly work by analyzing Chen Shui-bian’s congressional diplomacy toward the United States. From the days of the “China lobby” to the present, congressional diplomacy has always been an important part of Taiwan’s policy toward the United States and the Chen administration was no exception. Chen had a number of objectives vis-a-vis the United States but lacked meaningful strategic leverage, forcing him to rely on the US Congress to exert pressure on the executive branch. Chen’s main objective was to realize symbolic foreign policy accomplishments including high profile transits on US soil, a US-Taiwan free trade agreement, and increased US support in Taiwan’s quest to participate in international organizations. Chen also hoped to change the role of the US in Cross-straits relations, having the US exert pressure on China to open talks with his administration. Although Chen personally participated in congressional diplomacy, for most parts of his policy he was forced to rely on three “agents,” including the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), US lobbying firms and the Formosa Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). These organizations helped manage relations with the American public and elites, seeking to influence public opinion as well as arranging for many members of Congress and their aides to visit Taiwan. Chen’s agents kept in close contact with members of Congress, seeking to persuade them to support Chen’s agenda. Although Chen’s policy led to some symbolic Congression support for Taiwan, the policy did not lead to any truly substantial support, and even symbolic support rapidly decreased with the passage of time. The reasons for the failure of Chen’s policy are varied, but clearly include the US Congress’ lack of interest in the Taiwanese issue, particularly after the start of the War on Terror. In addition, the negative influence of Chen’s provocative Cross-strait policy, combined with the strengthening of China’s congressional diplomacy, caused his support in the US Congress to weaken, further contributing to the failure of his policy.