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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 曾智揚(Chih-Yang Tseng) | |
dc.contributor.author | Wei-Che Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃偉哲 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T18:13:42Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2012-06-27 | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2012-06-16 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16411 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 高階經理人之獎酬是否合理,公司董事會及薪酬委員會依照何種標準敘薪?是根據會計績效、市場績效亦或其他?創新研發能力為企業成長與市場競爭力的指標,根據過去相關文獻指出,當企業存在短視問題時,高階經理人傾向透過盈餘管理或刪減裁量性支出,以達到美化財務報表或極大化個人利益的目的,由於不易為投資人所察覺,故高階經理人常採行之。公司董事會及薪酬委員會在決定高階經理人獎酬之際,有無運用薪酬誘因契約誘導高階經理人捨棄不當之短視行為?過去不少文獻分析 CEO 薪酬敏感度與研發支出間之關聯性,結果顯示在短視問題狀況下,CEO 薪酬變動與研發支出變動呈現正相關,然大多數研究以美國上市公司為對象,本研究則以國內上市櫃公司為對象,檢驗前述關聯是否仍然適用,並且有以下發現:
由於臺灣企業之總經理兼任董事長的情況甚為普遍,董事長由監督的角色轉成公司管理者,以致公司存在獲利輕微衰退或損失等短視問題時,無法制衡總經理不當降低研發費用及廣告費用等裁量性支出。 當公司存在獲利輕微衰退或損失等短視問題時,廣告費用支出與總經理薪酬間的關聯性較研發支出與總經理薪酬間的關聯性更為負向,此發現支持:在台灣企業與總經理間薪酬契約的鼓勵下,由於廣告未來效益的不確定效較研發為高,但投入時間的延續性遠較研發為短,故總經理會優先刪減廣告費用支出以進行其短視行為。 公司治理是否良窳,對於總經理薪酬與研發及廣告等裁量性支出的關聯性影響並不大,原因有可能是本研究賦予所採用的公司治理指標相同權重,而未依據公司型態加以調整,也許可能是採用的公司治理指標尚不夠具代表性,當然不排除因為本研究所引用之學說之有所不同而引起,該結果可做為往後相關研究選擇公司治理指標時之參考。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In the face of earning decline or small loss, a CEO might engage in myopic actions, such as cutting discretionary expenditures. The myopic action increases the firm’s near-term earnings while sacrifice the firm’s long-term profitability. For example, to boost the current earnings, a CEO could cut the current R&D expenditures on developing new products, whereas reduce the firm’s possibility of introducing profitable products in the future.
Cheng (2004) documented the US evidence that, when CEOs have myopia incentives, the firms’ CEO compensation is positively related to R&D expenditure, suggesting a possible incentive contract to prevent the CEOs from myopic actions through the cut of spending on R&D. To check whether the same incentive contract exists in Taiwanese firms, this thesis applies Taiwanese data to Cheng (2004)’s test settings. In addition, a firm’s expenses on advertisement are also under the CEO’s discretion for possible myopic actions. Thus, this study also tests whether a compensation contract exists to prevent CEO’s from myopia in cutting advertising expenditures. The empirical findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1. With CEO’s incentives for myopia, Taiwanese data shows that both R&D and advertisement spending are negatively related to the CEO’s compensation, which is contrary to the conclusion in Cheng (2004). Instead of preventing the CEO’s myopic actions, the incentive contracts among Taiwanese firms might encourage the CEO’s myopia problems. 2. Comparing to R&D expenditures, the advertisement spending is more negatively related to the CEO’s compensation when the CEO has myopia incentives. This finding suggests that the compensation contracts among Taiwanese firms might provide more incentives for the CEOs’ myopic action through the reduction in advertisement spending than R&D expenditure, since the future benefits of expenditure on advertisement is more uncertain than that on R&D. 3. When the CEOs have incentive for myopia, the corporate governance in Taiwanese firms has little impact on the association between CEO compensation and R&D/advertisement expenditure. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T18:13:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R99722002-1.pdf: 926901 bytes, checksum: 54ab19c76aafc790a71ffc77a1aa284f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 序言 iii
摘要 iv Abstract v 目錄 1 表目錄 2 第一章 前言 3 第一節 短視問題形成的原因 4 第二節 短視問題對公司從事研究發展的影響 5 第三節 公司治理與短視問題 6 第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 8 第一節 CEO 投機性裁減裁量性支出的短視誘因 8 第二節 CEO薪酬 與裁量性支出間之關聯性 10 第三節 公司治理與短視誘因間之關聯 13 第三章 研究方法 15 第一節 資料來源及樣本選擇 15 第二節 變數衡量 20 第三節 實證模型 23 第四章 實證結果 25 第一節 敘述性統計結果(參見表三) 25 第二節 相關性分析結果(參見表四) 28 第三節 迴歸分析結果 (參見表五) 30 第四節 加強測試(參見表六及表七) 36 第五章 結論與建議 41 參考文獻 43 附錄 49 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 研發及廣告費用與總經理獎酬關聯性分析:短視問題之中介效果 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The intermediary effect of myopia on the relation between R&D/Advertisement expenditure and CEO compensation | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻,楊炎杰 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 短視問題,薪酬誘因契約,公司治理,CEO 薪酬敏感度,研發支出,廣告支出, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | myopia problem,compensation contract,corporate governance,CEO compensation sensitivity,R&D expenditure,advertisement expenditure, | en |
dc.relation.page | 49 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2012-06-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
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