請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16379完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wen-Chun Lin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 林玟君 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T18:12:10Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-07-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-06-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, M. Stanford-Harris, 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77: 867-890.
Ahmed, A., S. Duellman, 2011. Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions. Accounting and Finance 51: 609-633. Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, D. M. Reeb, 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2003): 263-285. Ball, R., A. Robin, G. Sadka, 2008. Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies 13(2–3): 168-205. Ball, R., L. Shivakumar, 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: Comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1): 83-128. Baker, T., S. J. Griffith, 2007. The missing monitor in corporate governance: The directors’ & officers’ liability insurer. The Georgetown Law Journal 95: 1795-1842. Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and asymmetric timelines of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: 3-37. Beatty, A., J. Weber, J. J. Yu, 2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting & Economics 45(2–3): 154-74. Boubakri, N., M. Boyer, N. Ghalleb, 2008. Managerial opportunism in accounting choice: evidence from directors’ and officers’ liability insurance purchases. Working paper, University of Montreal. Boyer, M. M., 2005. Directors’ and officers’ insurance and shareholder protection. Working paper, University of Montreal. Chalmers, J. M. R., L. Y. Dann, J. Harford, 2002. Managerial opportunism? Evidence from directors’ and officers’ insurance purchases. Journal of Finance 57: 609-639. Chen, T., C. Pang, 2008. An analysis of determinants of the corporate demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. National Taiwan University Management Review 18: 171-196. Chen, Z., O. Li, H. Zou, 2011. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the cost of equity capital. Working paper, City University of Hong Kong, National University of Singapore, City University of Hong Kong. Chung, H.H., Wynn, J.P., 2008. Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46: 135-153. Core, J. E., 1997. On the corporate demand for directors’ and officers’ insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance 64: 63-87. Fama, E. F., K. R. French, 1995. Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns. The Journal of Finance 50(1): 31-155. Fama, E., M. Miller, 1972. The Theory of Finance. Dryden Press, Hinsdale, IL. Francis, J., X. Martin, 2010. Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49(1–2): 161-178. Guay, W. R, 2008. Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 175-180. Heckman, J., 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47:153-161. Holderness, C. G., 1990. Liability insurers as corporate monitors. International Review of Law and Economics 10: 115-129. Huang, C. A. 2011. The independence and competence of directors, directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and restated financial statement. Working paper, National Changhua University of Education. Jayaraman, S., L. Shivakumar, 2012. Agency-based demand for conservatism: evidence from state adoption of antitakeover laws. Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming. Jensen, M. C., W. H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. Khan, M., R. L. Watts, 2007. Estimation and validation of a firm-year measure of conservatism. Working Paper, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge. Kim, I. Y., 2006. Directors’ and officers’ insurance and opportunism in accounting choice. Working paper, Duke University. Klock, M. S., S. A. Mansi, W. F. Maxwell, 2005. Does corporate governance matter to bondholders? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40(4): 693-719. Kothari, S., K. Ramanna, and D. Skinner, 2009. What should GAAP look like? A survey and economic analysis. Working Paper, MIT Sloan School of Management, Harvard Business School and University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Lafond, R., S. Roychowdhury, 2008. Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism, Journal of Accounting Research 46(1): 101-135. Lai, J. F. 2011. The Association among agency problem of controlling shareholders, directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, and earnings persistence. Working paper, National Changhua University of Education. Lehn, K., A. Poulsen, 1991. Contractual resolution of bondholder-stockholder conflicts in leveraged buyouts. Journal of Law and Economics 34: 645-673. Lin, H. L. 2010. Influence factors of directors and officers liability insurance : Ownership structure and personnel changes. Working paper, National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology. Lin, C., M. Officer, H. Zou, 2011. Directors’ and Officers’ Liability insurance and acquisition outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics 102: 507-525. Lin, C., M. Officer, R. Wang, H. Zou, 2012. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and loan spreads. Working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Loyola Marymount University, City University of Hong Kong. Li, X., 2010. Accounting conservatism and the cost of capital: international analysis. Working paper, London Business School. O’Sullivan, N., 1997. Insuring the agents: the role of directors’ and officers’ insurance in corporate governance. Journal of Risk and Insurance 64: 545-556. Watts, R. L., 2003. Conservatism in accounting, Part I: explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons 17: 207-221. Wei, M. Y. 2010. A study of the relationship among directors’ and Officer’s liability insurance, corporate governance, and capital market. Working paper, National Taichung University of Science and Technology. Wynn, J. P. 2008. Legal liability coverage and voluntary disclosure. The Accounting Review 83: 1639-1669. Zhang, J., 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 27-54. Website： Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Website. <http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/about/company/service.php> Law Source Retrieving System of Taiwan, Republic of China Stock Exchange and Futures Trading. <http://www.selaw.com.tw/new.asp> Department of Justice Canada Website<http://www.justice.gc.ca> | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16379 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文主要運用Basu (1997)的盈餘時效性不對稱模型，探討董監事責任保險是否影響我國企業會計盈餘保守性，並進一步研究債務契約的影響是否得以解釋董監事責任保險對於企業會計盈餘保守程度的差異。
董監事責任保險的道德風險問題引起經營者和相關利益者之間的代理衝突，會計盈餘保守性向來被視為是一個潛在解決代理問題的機制，會計盈餘保守性主要來自於債權持有人對於債權保護的需求，而公司為了滿足債務發行需求在會計盈餘上將更為保守。因此本研究假設，當公司購買董監事責任保險時，代理衝突的增加會產生更多的會計盈餘保守性。 實證研究結果顯示，購買董監事責任保險的企業中，承受較高外部融資壓力的公司報導更顯著的會計盈餘保守特性。本研究結果支持債務契約需求導致盈餘保守性假說，亦即會計盈餘保守性的實務需求主要來自於債權人對於降低代理衝突與促進契約效率有關。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Prior studies argue that the purchase of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance can reduce litigation risks and increase managerial opportunism. As Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that earnings conservatism can mitigate agency problems through constraining opportunistic behavior of managers, I evaluate whether this earnings conservatism holds when firms with high debt contracting demands purchase D&O insurance.
Using data on firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market during 2008-2010, and employing the Basu (1997) specification to measure earnings conservatism, I find that firms with D&O insurance and higher external demand for debts report more earnings conservatism. These results are consistent with prior studies (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003) that debtholders demand greater earnings conservatism as a means of addressing agency problems. This study also provides evidence that debtholders appear to be the primary driver of the demand for earnings conservatism. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T18:12:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R98722020-1.pdf: 717515 bytes, checksum: 871e83608a2fdda2dffc8a19d72a2583 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 #
誌謝 i 中文摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii CONTENTS iv LIST OF TABLES vi Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Institutional background and literature review 6 2.1 Institutional background 6 2.1.1 Indemnification 6 2.1.2 The D&O liability insurance 8 2.1.3 The development of D&O insurance in Taiwan 9 2.2 D&O liability insurance 12 2.2.1 D&O insurance and monitoring mechanisms 12 2.2.2 D&O insurance and managerial opportunism (moral hazard) 14 2.3 Earnings conservatism 17 2.3.1 Earnings conservatism and balance sheet conservatism 17 2.3.2 Contracting theory and earnings conservatism 17 2.3.2.1 Earnings conservatism mitigates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 18 2.3.2.2 Earnings conservatism mitigates agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders 19 2.4 Can D&O insurance reduce or increase earnings conservatism? 21 Chapter 3 Hypothesis development 24 Chapter 4 Methodology and sample 28 4.1 Earnings conservatism measure 28 4.2 Estimation models 29 4.2.1 Determinant model 29 4.2.2 Earnings-return regression (insurance purchase decision model) 31 4.2.3 Earnings-return regression (insurance amount model) 33 4.3 Sample 35 Chapter 5 Empirical Results 37 5.1 Descriptive statistics 37 5.2 Earnings-return regressions 38 Chapter 6 Additional test 41 Chapter 7 Conclusions 43 References 45 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 盈餘保守性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董監事責任保險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 債務契約 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | D&O insurance | en |
| dc.subject | Earnings conservatism | en |
| dc.subject | Debt contracting | en |
| dc.title | 董監事責任險、債務契約與盈餘保守性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Debt Contracting, and Earnings Conservatism | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),潘健民(Chien-Min Pan) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 董監事責任保險,債務契約,盈餘保守性, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | D&O insurance,Debt contracting,Earnings conservatism, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 57 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-06-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-101-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 700.7 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。