動態供需契約與長期產能策略之整合研究

Abstract

本研究探討供應鏈下游客戶具備自有產能時，供應鏈上下游廠商間之動態供應契約設計與長期產能投資決策。當下游廠商擁有製造技術並進行生產時，上下游的產能利用率將受到市場需求的不確定性影響而重新分配，具備自有產能之下游客戶能優先以自有產能滿足市場需求，需求不足的部分才向上游訂購，導致下游產能利用率變動不大，並將需求風險轉嫁給上游供應商，使上游產能利用率變異增加，產能規劃之困難度也相對提高。 本研究以上游供應商的角度，探討利用二階選擇權契約來因應下游廠商擁有自有產能之能力所帶來的市場風險轉嫁。透過契約並結合現貨市場可增加交易彈性之能力，對價格策略及產能投資策略做長期的研究。研究結果顯示下游建立自有產能後，對供應鏈廠商的決策及利潤有顯著的影響，藉由二階選擇權契約，使下游先出資保留部分產能，並給付實際使用的需求量，現貨市場再消耗剩餘產能，上游利用三段式收費，以減少自有產能對利潤的變異性及產能投資決策的影響。

This research studies supply contract design and long term capacity decision problem in a two-echelon supply chain under downstream retailer in-house capacity considerations. After building in-house capacity, the retailer fulfills market demand by its own capacity in priority and order from the supplier when in-house capacity is insufficient. The capacity utilization will be reallocated between supplier and retailer because of uncertain demand. The supplier will suffer more from the risk of demand and the variance of the capacity utilization. It is also more difficult for supplier to make decision in capacity programming. This research takes the supplier’s point of view and discusses the supplier has higher market power to decide price and capacity investment by taking advantage of the contract design with the retailer and the flexibility selling in spot market. Our results suggest that profit sharing between supplier and retailer is heavily affected by in-house capacity level of the retailer. The supplier adapts the two-part option contract to let the retailer pay the reservation and execution fee for capacity and sells the remaining capacity in spot market. With these profits, the supplier reduces the profit variances and the effects on capacity investment while the capacity utilization is affected by downstream retailer.