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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 國際企業學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15627
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor李吉仁
dc.contributor.authorYi-Lan Wangen
dc.contributor.author王奕嵐zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-07T17:49:02Z-
dc.date.copyright2013-02-21
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.submitted2013-02-05
dc.identifier.citation參考文獻
一、中文部分
中華徵信所,2012,台灣地區大型集團企業研究,台北:中華徵信所。
江逸之,2012,四十一年老店如何無縫接班,天下雜誌507期:142-146,10月3日。
李樸良譯,2003,菲奧莉娜逆勢出擊,台北:商周出版。譯自Peter Burrows, 2003. Backfire: Carly Fiorina Packard, Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons.
黃昭勇,2012,接班三部曲曲曲都難唱,天下雜誌492期:128-133,3月7日。
經濟日報,1995,走過半世紀昂首再出發跨業投資永豐餘邁向國際,3月1日,C7版。
經濟日報,2009,永豐餘靈活控股內外合擊,11月29日,S08版。
蔡鴻青,2012,華人家族企業關鍵報告,董事會評論1期:19-25。
鄭崇華口述,張玉文採訪整理,2010,實在的力量,台北:天下遠見出版。
二、英文部分
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A. and Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68:263–85.
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17:99–120.
Berle, A., and Means, G., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, NY:Harcourt, Brace, & World.
Bloch, A., N. Kachane. And Stalk, G. 2012. What You Can Learn From Family Business. Harvard Business Review. Nov. 103-106.
Castanias, R.P. and Helfat. C.E. 2001. The managerial rents model: theory and empirical analysis. Journal of Management.27:661–678.
Cronqvist, H., Nilsson, M. 2003. Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.38:695–719.
Davis, J. H., R. Schoorman, L. Donaldson. 1997.Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review. 22(1): 20–47.
Davis, J., Schoorman, R., Mayer, R., & Tan, H. 2000. The trusted general manager and business unit performance. Strategic Management Journal.21:563–576.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Lazzara-Kitana, M. and Makri, M. 2003.The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations.Academy of Management Journal.46:226–237.
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics .3:305–360.
Johnson, M. W. & Christensen, C. M. & Kagermann, H. 2008. Reinventing Your Business Model. Harvard Business Review. December: 51-59
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Salines, F. L. and Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance.54:471–517.
Le Breton-Miller, I. and Danny Miller. 2011. Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses. Orgnization Science. 22(3):704-721.
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. 2006. Family governance and firm performance: agency, stewardship, and capabilities. Family Business Review.19:73–87.
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. 2007.Kicking the habit: broadening our horizons by studying family business. Journal of Management Inquiry.16:27-30.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I. and Scholnick, B. 2008. Stewardship vs stagnation: an empirical comparison of small family and non-family business. Journal of Management Studies.45:51–78.
Minichilli, A., Corbetta, G. and MacMillan, I. 2010. Top management teams in family-controlled companies: familiness, faultlines, and their impact on financial performance. Journal of Management Studies.47:205–222.
Nahapiet, J., S. Ghoshal. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review.23(2):242–66.
Perold, André. 2002. Ford Motor Company’s Value Enhancement Plan. Harvard Business School Case. #9-201-079.
Schulze, William S. and Eric R. Gedajlovic. 2010. Whither Family Business? Journal of Management Studies. 47:191-204
Villalonga, Belén . 2007. The Pitcairn Family Heritage® Fund. Harvard Business School Case, #9-208-07.
Villalonga, Belén. 2011. Growing , financing and managing family and closely held firms: Overview of the course, Harvard Business School Case . #9-209-137.
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. 2006. How do family ownership, control, and management affect firm value. Journal of Financial Economics.80:385–417.
Villalonga, Belén, and Christopher Hartman. 2008. The New York Times Co.,. Harvard Business School Case, #9-207-113.
Villalonga, Belén, Daniela Beyersdorfer, and Dessain, V. 2009. Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG. Harvard Business School Case, # 9-208-096.
Villalonga, Belén, Dwight Crane, and James Quinn. 2005. Spyder Active Sports––2004, Harvard Business School Case ,#9- 206-027.
Ward, J., 2004. Perpetuating the family business. Marietta: Family Enterprise Publishers.
Westhead, P., Howorth, C. and Cowling, M. 2001. The development of family companies: management and ownership issues. Family Business Review.14:369–416.
Yin , R. K 2004. The Case Study Anthology. Thousand Oaks. CA:Sage Publications
三、網站部分
公開資訊觀測站
http://mops.twse.com.tw/index.htm
今周刊
http://www.businesstoday.com.tw
台達電子工業股份有限公司
http://www.delta.com.tw/ch/
永豐餘集團:
http://www.yfy.com
財訊雜誌
http://www.wealth.com.tw/
商業週刊
http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/
遠見雜誌
http://www.gvm.com.tw/
TEJ資料庫 
http://www.tej.com.tw/twsite
四、其他資料
台達電子 2011 年報
台達電子 2011年董事會重要決議
永豐餘造紙股份有限公司 2011年報
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15627-
dc.description.abstract家族企業在世界各國的經濟活動中均占有重要的地位,過去文獻也顯示出,家族企業與股權分散的一般企業有非常大的不同。家族企業之影響力乃透過所有權、控制權與經營權表彰。而因為該配置會影響企業的最終價值,家族企業面臨傳承問題時,如何及早規畫、安排所有權、控制權與經營權,避免傳承過程中企業及家族價值減損,是家族企業的一大議題。
本研究首先以管家理論與代理成本探討家族企業不同於非家族企業的價值來源;並藉由六個歐美的家族企業個案,探討家族企業在傳承上,於所有權、控制權與經營權上的佈局作法;另外,由於台灣之家族企業,正是面臨世代傳承的時機,加上本身文化及產業等外部因素,與歐美不盡相同,故本研究又以兩個台灣家族企業傳承的個案,希望結合歐美及台灣經驗,提供台灣家族企業面臨當前傳承問題時,可供思考的通則。
綜合各個案,本研究發現三個主要家族企業在傳承規畫上的結論:
一、家族價值定位決定家族是否須做企業傳承佈局,只有家族追求家族企業價值極大化時才需要做所有權、控制權及經營權的傳承規畫,否則僅須對家族財富做出最適配置即可。
二、家族須決定以高股權控制或以低股權控制企業,高股權控制,家族擁有高所有權,自然獲得相對應之控制權;低股權控制,因家族所有權少,則須搭配控制權強化機制,獲取足以控制企業之控制權。
三、家族依企業及家族背景決定介入經營權的方式。被動式經營,家族在經營權上僅需對策略規劃上做出大方向的決定;主動式經營,家族成員則必須深入參與公司營運活動中。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractFamily-owned companies play a significant role in the world economies. Despite its importance, previous literature paid little attention on how family-owned companies build up their institutional framework for their succession, especially the institutional arrangements on ownership position, corporate control, and business operations. The purpose of the present research is to undertake a case-based qualitative study on these issues so that we could draw implications for Taiwanese companies that is going to face succession issues soon.
To achieve this goal, we first review and apply stewardship theory and agency theory to unravel reasons of how family-owned companies create differential values with regard to their counterparts.. We then undertook six family-owned company cases pertaining to the European and American context to inductively conclude their heritance practices. Then, two Taiwanese cases that are recently undergoing succession announcement are detailed studied and compared with those western companies.
Combined the study from the cases, we have the following conclusions:
1. Family value orientation would be the key factor for whether a family needs to plan the inheritance for the family-owned company.
2. A family should define the level of its ownership and control appropriately. If high level control is required while its ownership level is low, some control-enhancing mechanism shall be adopted.
3. A family should decide how to involve in the management system based on the company and family background. Active management means that a family member will need to deeply involve in the company operation while passive management means that a family member will only need to make sure the strategy and key decisions of the companies are in line with family expectations.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:49:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-102-R99724021-1.pdf: 616507 bytes, checksum: cbffe05deb9bb07080209a84a10f6bed (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2013
en
dc.description.tableofcontents目錄
致謝 i
論文摘要 ii
Thesis Abstract iv
圖目錄 ix
表目錄 x
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 2
第三節 研究方法 3
第四節 論文架構 6
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 家族企業定義 8
第二節 家族企業與管家精神 10
第三節 家族企業與代理成本 14
第四節 小結 17
第三章 家族企業的傳承布局 19
第一節 歐美個案 19
一、Jacob 家族(Spyder Active Sports) 19
二、The Pitcairn Family(PPG) 21
三、The Augstein 家族(Spiegel) 22
四、Ford 家族(福特汽車公司) 24
五、Sulzberger 家族(紐約時報) 26
六、Hewlett家族(惠普) 28
第二節 歐美個案所有權、控制權及經營權 29
第三節 小結 33
第四章 台灣家族企業個案 37
第一節 永豐餘集團 38
第二節 台達電子集團 55
第三節 永豐餘與台達電子之個案比較 70
第四節 歐美與台灣家族企業的個案比較 74
第五章 結論 76
第一節 研究結論 76
第二節 研究建議 78
第三節 研究限制 79
參考文獻 80
附件一:台達電子2012董事會決議 86
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.subject經營權zh_TW
dc.subject家族企業傳承zh_TW
dc.subject所有權zh_TW
dc.subject控制權zh_TW
dc.subjectOwnershipen
dc.subjectBusiness Operation&#8195en
dc.subjectCorporate Controlen
dc.subjectFamily-owned Company Inheritanceen
dc.title家族企業傳承所有權、控制權與經營權之探索研究zh_TW
dc.titleAn Explorative Study on the Inheritance of Family Business, Ownership, and Management Controlen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear101-1
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee陳俊忠,吳相勳
dc.subject.keyword家族企業傳承,所有權,控制權,經營權,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordFamily-owned Company Inheritance,Ownership,Corporate Control,Business Operation&#8195,en
dc.relation.page91
dc.rights.note未授權
dc.date.accepted2013-02-05
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept國際企業學研究所zh_TW
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