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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林修葳 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yang-Chao Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王陽照 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:47:58Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-07-03 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-05-18 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Adams, R. and Ferreira, D. (2007) A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance, 62, 217–50.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15562 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the dual roles of boards within corporate governance as both monitor and advisor. The results not only provide empirical evidence, which is in contrast with the common notions that board composition is uncorrelated with firm performance but also explain the internal relations within the board, namely, its dual roles—a matter that is not settled in literature. Moreover, we offer an explanation for mixed results in prior studies for the optimal performance-enhancing board composition. We hypothesize and find that outside and inside directors serve different monitoring and advisory roles, which are amplified within diversified leveraged firms and R&D-intensive firms respectively, to affect firm performance. Finally, we explore the effect of the requirement for majority independent directors imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and related rules. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:47:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-D96724013-1.pdf: 1324967 bytes, checksum: df52ba399313d6b9ae43245e6429061b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction ……………………………………………………01
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses …………………………03 2.1 Roles of outside directors ………………………………03 2.2 Roles of inside directors ………………………………06 3. Data and Model …………………………………………………09 3.1 Data ……………………………………………………………09 3.2 Model specifications ………………………………………12 4. Results and Analyses …………………………………………14 4.1 Relation between board structure and firm performance …14 4.2 Robustness tests ……………………………………………20 4.2.1 Alternative measures of firm performance ………20 4.2.2 Error term dependence in panel data ………………20 4.2.3 Endogeneity problem ……………………………………22 4.3 Effect of SOX ………………………………………………26 5. Conclusion ………………………………………………………29 References …………………………………………………………32 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 沙賓法案 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司績效表現 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會組成 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 多角化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 研究與發展 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Board composition | en |
| dc.subject | Sarbanes–Oxley Act | en |
| dc.subject | R&D | en |
| dc.subject | Diversification | en |
| dc.subject | Firm performance | en |
| dc.title | 董事會的有效性：外部董事與內部董事 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Effectiveness of Boards: Outside and Inside Directors | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡聯國,楊聲勇,謝文良,陳勝源,黎明淵 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司績效表現,董事會組成,多角化,研究與發展,沙賓法案, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Firm performance,Board composition,Diversification,R&D,Sarbanes–Oxley Act, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 35 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-05-20 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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