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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 何耕宇(Keng-Yu Ho) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hsin-Yu Lai | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 賴欣妤 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:33:43Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-01 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-06-18 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15396 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Jensen（1986）提出公司發放股利可避免公司自由現金流量遭濫用，進而降低股東與公司經營者間的利益衝突。後續研究延續其論點蓬勃發展，探討解決股東與公司經營者之間代理問題的機制。機構投資人對公司影響力通常較大，其中投信機構投資人的投資決策相對較獨立且專業。本研究目的為探討投信機構投資人與公司股利政策之關聯性，以我國非金融業之上市上櫃公司2009年至2018年的資料進行實證分析。實證結果顯示投信機構投資人持股比例與公司股利發放率及公司獲利表現具顯著正向關係，而其他金融機構投資人持股比例則與公司股利發放率無顯著關係。整體而言，我國投信機構投資人對於公司的股利政策有重要影響力。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | According to Jensen (1986), a firm’s dividend payouts can reduce the free cash flow problem and the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. The mechanisms of solving the agency problem between shareholders and managers have been widely studied. Institutional investors normally have much more influence on firms; among them, mutual funds are relatively independent and professional. As a result, the main purpose of this study is to explore the relation between mutual fund and corporate dividend policy, based on the listed non-financial firms in Taiwan from 2009 to 2018. The empirical results show that the mutual fund ownership has a significantly positive effect on firms’ dividend payouts and performance, while the financial institution ownership does not. The evidence suggests that mutual funds play an important role in firms’ dividend policies in Taiwan. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:33:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1806202015493600.pdf: 3849639 bytes, checksum: 4eec256e2dd33487adbfae566330afe7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝詞 1 摘要 2 Abstract 3 目錄 4 第一章 緒論 7 第二章 文獻回顧及假說建立 10 第三章 研究方法與模型 13 第一節 資料來源與變數意義說明 13 第二節 模型架構 16 第三節 敘述統計 19 第四章 實證結果 20 第一節 基本分析結果 20 第二節 本國與外國專業機構投資人分析結果 22 第三節 穩健性測試－兩階段迴歸 23 第五章 研究結論與未來研究建議 25 第一節 研究結論 25 第二節 未來研究建議 26 參考文獻 27 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 公司獲利 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股利政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 機構投資人 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投信機構投資人持股比例 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 金融機構投資人持股比例 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Institutional Investor | en |
| dc.subject | Dividend Policy | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Profitability | en |
| dc.subject | Financial Institution Ownership | en |
| dc.subject | Mutual Fund Ownership | en |
| dc.title | 機構投資人持股與公司股利政策之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relation between Institutional Ownerships and Corporate Dividend Policies | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林姿婷(Tzu-Ting Lin),張景宏(Ching-Hung Chang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 股利政策,機構投資人,投信機構投資人持股比例,金融機構投資人持股比例,公司獲利, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Dividend Policy,Institutional Investor,Mutual Fund Ownership,Financial Institution Ownership,Corporate Profitability, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 45 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001046 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-06-19 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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