企業之盈餘門檻落差、董事會改選與實質盈餘管理操縱的關聯

Abstract

本文研究企業盈餘門檻差異、董事會改選與實質盈餘操縱的關聯。從ISS 2016董事會實踐研究表明，自2009年以來採用分期分級董事會制度企業大幅下降。採非分期分級董事會制度之董事成員任期較短(通常為一年)，董事會成員每年皆必須接受股東對其的要求與評鑑，然實質盈餘管理手段實則傷害企業未來的績效表現，因此有別過去文獻本文欲研究在此趨勢下，企業是否僅在預期無法達成盈餘門檻目標時執行實質盈餘管理，探討盈餘門檻和董事會改選是否能解釋企業執行實質盈餘管理動作。 本論文以2011年至2018年於北美地區所有公司為研究對象，採用Roychowdhury （2006）、Cohen, Dey, and Lys（2008）定義衡量實質盈餘管理操縱，納入前兩期平均董事會替換率、前兩期平均實質盈餘管理使用量、和前一期達到盈餘門檻作為調節變數，區辨影響實質盈餘管理操縱的動機。實證結果發現：（1）過去董事會替換率越高，會提升對任期內業績表現超越正盈餘門檻和前期盈餘門檻的壓力，因此董事為避免未達盈餘門檻遭到替換，距離達到門檻越遠之企業越積極執行實質盈餘管理。（2）以三年董事會改選峰期的設定下，董事會大幅改選時分析師盈餘門檻為企業最為重視的門檻，大幅改選前一年為避免未達分析師盈餘門檻積極執行實質盈餘管理（3）股東會因企業利用現金流量和裁決性支出實質盈餘管理美化財務報表而降低其票選現任董事的意願。

This study is aimed at exploring correlations between difference to meet earnings threshold’s, board director reelection, and real earning management. Do gap from earnings thresholds and board reelection explain real earning management? Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), this study uses abnormal cash flow from operating, abnormal discretionary expense, and abnormal production cost to proxy real earnings management. Moreover, this study incorporates the turnover of directors in the previous board director election, the amount of real earnings management used in the previous period, the dummy variable reaching earning threshold in the previous period as moderating variables to distinguish the motives of manipulating real earning management. Using a sample of North America companies over the period of 2011 to 2019, the empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the higher the turnover of directors in the previous board director election, the greater the real earnings management during the tenure period, perhaps to achieve threshold of positive profits and threshold of sustain recent performance. Thus, in order to avoid being replaced, a firm that has its earnings significantly less than the threshold more actively manipulates upward its earnings. Second, for the peak year of the three-year reelection cycle, threshold of meeting analysts’ expectation is the threshold that companies value most when the board is re-elected substantially. Third, the shareholders appear to be less willing to vote for the incumbent directors of the firm that adopts real earnings management via abnormal cash flow from operating and abnormal discretionary expense.