以經理人股權持有準則作為CEOs獎酬合約條件對公司風險之影響

Abstract

經理人股權持有準則為要求公司高階經理人持有公司特定比例股數之政策。在公司所有高階經理人中，CEOs對公司決策擁有最顯著影響力，因此本研究將經理人股權持有準則之對象鎖定為公司的CEOs。本研究分析公司採用經理人股權持有準則後，使得風險趨避的CEOs財富不具多樣性，進而影響公司CEOs的風險胃納程度，包含公司財務及投資策略、公司本身之風險係數，以及公司是否採用避險之衍生性金融工具。本研究發現當公司採用經理人股權持有準則時，CEOs會增加資本支出此一較不具風險之財務及投資策略，降低研究及發展費用支出，降低財務槓桿比率此兩項較具風險之財務及投資策略，增加系統性風險，降低非系統性風險，因此對公司整體風險係數影響並無定論，此外，採用經理人股權持有準則後的CEOs會使公司持有更多衍生性金融工具以進行避險。

Executive stock ownership guidelines policies are corporate policies mandating executives to hold a specific amount of firms’ stocks. Among all corporate executives, CEOs have the most significant impact on firm policies. Thus, this study focuses on the executive ownership guidelines for CEOs. I examine how the adoption of executive stock ownership guidelines affects risk-averse CEOs to change corporations’ risk appetite including financial and investment strategies, risks, and hedge derivatives. My study finds that the adoption of executive ownership guidelines for CEOs is associated with more capital expenditure, fewer research and development expenditure, and a lower leverage ratio. My study also finds that the adoption of executive ownership guidelines has a positive effect on systematic risk, a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk, and thus an insignificant effect on total firm risk. Moreover, after adopting executive ownership guidelines, CEOs make corporations hold more derivatives to hedge risks.