傷害之後，法律如何動起來？——臺灣油症公害的法律與社會研究（1979-2016）

Abstract

於當代臺灣社會，法律如何「動」起來？法律如何成為策略、為人們所訴說？法律的角色與意義，對於不同行動者、在不同脈絡下，如何可能不同？本論文以臺灣油症事件所催發、橫跨1979年至2016年的一連串法律行動為觀察對象，探討一公害所引發的法律動員行動主體、法律動員態樣、結果如何多元；人們運用法律之意願、方式與結果，是否受何政治社會脈絡因素影響；法律動員的主體又如何可能反過來影響法律機會結構；以及特定法律動員取徑是否具有何近用門檻。本論文的研究方法兼採史料分析與深入訪談，透過交互比對公開、非公開史料，加以對行動者的訪談結果，試圖描繪並分析不同時代脈絡下的油症法律動員動態。 本論文從探討油症事件如何成為一個需要動用法律改變處境的紛爭談起。作者援用法社會學的「紛爭形成過程」三階段理論框架：「命名（Naming）」、「咎責（Blaming）」、「主張（Claiming）」來分析油症事件成為紛爭的過程，以油症紛爭形成過程為經驗基礎，延伸既有理論，指出傷害之命名過程，可細分為「開啟命名」與「正式命名」兩階段，並強調在毒物侵權公害紛爭發展過程中，國家可能扮演主導紛爭之角色：不論是開啟命名到正式命名的時間差、咎責對象之形塑、行動者之訴求，皆與國家的介入密切相關。 本論文對油症事件爆發當下自救行動的觀察，除呼應先行研究對近用法律的經濟、專業知識門檻的論點外，亦指出：經濟與知識門檻，不是影響受害者是否近用法律的唯二因素；以及，即便沒有在機構內使用法律，受害者亦可能有其他在機構外運用法律的可能。本研究發現，1980年代油症受害者傾向於透過地方民意代表提出陳情、請願，亦可能是行動者衡量所欲達成之目標與最適手段下的結果；戒嚴時期地方議會的民意正當性，亦是使受害者與縣議會、省議會議員容易開啟合作的因素之一。而早期油症自救行動者在請願書中提出的「國家賠償」主張，則可以用來說明，威權脈絡下受害行動者，如何在法院外援用法律作為要求具體醫療照護的籌碼。 油症傷害後，亦促發具有法律專業資源的組織為行動主體的訴訟動員。本論文探討消基會組織「多氯聯苯法律服務團」協助油症受害者向加害廠商提起附帶民事賠償訴訟之過程，並深入分析油毒傷害進入法院後，遭逢的難題，包括：民事法院對因果關係之認定標準，如何使原告訴訟請求聚焦於「精神上慰藉金」，並因此承受法院恣意酌減額度的風險；法院對「過失責任主義」之強調，如何影響訴訟之勝敗；法扶制度闕如，如何衍伸出「即便勝訴也無法受償」的困境。本論文從更廣闊的脈絡反思油症訴訟的困境，藉梳理1970年代臺灣法界關於公害民事救濟之論述，指出：早在油症爆發的十年以前，突破公害訴訟瓶頸的可能已出現；但進一步指出，該些改革論述往往不對臺灣本土的公害民事救濟實況提出直接改革訴求，而是作為翻譯、評析外國制度的知識性論述存在。本論文認為，上述言論傾向，反映威權體制下法律人提出改革的策略，但也致使其實際促動改革的效果極其有限。 油症訴訟動員的困境，促發一波立法契機。本論文探究消基會成立後的組織行動，指出：作為消基會組織一大立法動員成果，《消費者保護法》立法倡議的醞釀與訴求，與油症密不可分；消費者保護立法倡議行動，實是油症訴訟動員遺緒之一支。一來，消基會提出倡議的時間點，在油症訴訟遭遇制度瓶頸之際；二來，消基會的立法倡議訴求，例如無過失責任、民間團體檢驗公布權、消費者專庭、免擔保金之假扣押等等，皆源自行動者在油症訴訟中所體驗的限制。本論文進而分析橫跨1981年到1994年的消費者保護法立法倡議，指出：在威權體制下，消基會主要透過溫和遊說主管機關立法的方式進行，動員成果「有進有退、動態平衡」；解嚴後，在民意政治的契機下，消基會的動員方向，轉為訴諸草根與國會遊說、提出「民間版草案」，即便曾反制聲浪檯面化，卻也在立法院備受重視，最後以近於消基會目標的結果完成立法。 然而，本研究進一步指出，消費者保護法立法倡議，雖然源自油症傷害與訴訟動員瓶頸，其成果對深陷油症傷害的受害者而言，是無感的。本論文爬梳國家三十年間被動而有瑕疵的醫療照護、社會長期對油症患者的歧視，指出，油症累加的傷害，並不因政治民主化或前階段的法律動員成果而緩解。本論文進而探討2000年以降觀照受害者經驗的組織法律動員，指出：凝聚受害者經驗與感受，是行動能貼近受害者訴求的必要基礎。然透過比較「多氯聯苯中毒者聯誼會」與「台灣油症受害者支持協會」的組織與動員成果，本論文亦指出，只有受害者自發，不易達成法律動員成效，法律動員行動是否開展，仍與行動者能否動員法律專業資源相關。 本論文探討2009年成立的「台灣油症受害者支持協會」的組織法律動員，分析支持協會如何凝聚各種專業人際網絡、如何透過立法權從事行政遊說、如何研擬出「油症受害者救濟法」並展開一連串立法倡議。本論文對支持協會立法倡議的研究發現：立法訴求進入立法院後的動態，受限於立法機構不成文的議事文化，使熟稔立法院議事（潛）規則，成為倡議動員之必要。又立法動員縱有成果，始終有其侷限：立法倡議雖促進油症患者的「權益」，但涉及國家義務之規定，倡議行動者則無置喙空間。

How in Taiwan is law mobilized? How does law become a tactic for people to speak after injury? For actors with legal profession or not, how might the roles and meanings of law differ? In different political contexts, for example under democratic or totalitarian government, how might the mobilizing process diverse? This study aims at discovering these questions by focusing on the 40-year legal mobilization of “Yu Cheng,” the most serious chronic polychlorinated biphenyls(PCBs) poisoning which took place in 1979 central Taiwan. The socio-legal inquiry of “Yu Cheng” begins by discovering how it transformed from an incident to a dispute. In the first section of chapter 2., this study applies the framework, “naming, blaming and claiming” from socio-legal studies to analyze the process. It is found that totalitarian state acted an active role in the emergence of “Yu Cheng” dispute. Without bureaucrats, it would not be named “PCBs poisoning,” nor would it be known to the public. Without the state’s manipulation, the injury would not be molded into a dispute that oil company should take responsibility for the whole poisoning. In the second part of chapter 2., based on studies of several self-help actions conducted by Yucheg victims in the eartly 1980s, this study suggests that besides financial capital and professional legal knowledge, other factors had been concerned before actors chose not to mobilize law, for example what the goal was and who might represent the public. Interestingly, some victims did mobilize law, while tended to use it outside the court. For example, they had written in their petitions to the government, emphasizing that they were going to suit the government according to State Compensation Law, while the purpose of this petition was to negotiate for a decent medical allowance. Disputes in the court did exist after actors with legal profession joined the movement, while the outcomes did not thus guarantee. As this study has found, even litigations of “Yu Cheng” were successfully opened with the aid of Consumer Foundation, an NGO with legal profession, Civil Code then, and the principles the court adopted such as “positive causal relationship”and positive causal relationship,” limited the claims and diverted the outcome from what the plaintiffs had wished. Based on the findings of “Yu Cheng” case study, this study suggests that public nuisances in the 1980s like “Yu Cheng” did not see justice through court movement due to disadvantageous legal opportunities such as conservative principles in practice or lack of systematic protection of procedural right for the victims. This fact however, does not mean there were no possibility to “rewrite” the history, as this study has found, claims to reform the limit of public nuisance had already existed in the 1970s, ten years before “Yu Cheng” litigation. Nevertheless, a challenge to one route, an opportunity it might be to another. This study suggest that the advocacy of Consumer Protection Act was a strategic turn of Consumer Foundation from the predicament of “Yu Cheng” litigations. Only shortly after the lawyers learned the predicament of “Yu Cheng” litigation did they make public the new movement agenda to lobby Consumer Protection Act. Besides, key claims lied in the bill then, such as “liability without fault,” “Consumer litigation,” and the missions of consumer advocacy groups to conduct test and publication, came from the difficulty Consumer Foundation had been faced with in “Yu Cheng” litigations. This study then analyzes the history of the lobbying, and suggests that the end of the enforcement of Martial Law in 1987 did not create this advocacy but opened up new tactics for actors to mobilize law, such as cosigning and congress lobbying. Considered a symbol of Legislative Yuan to value public opinion, Consumer Protection Act was successfully legislated in 1994, close to the bill Consumer Foundation submitted in 1989. Ironically, as this study has found, even if key claims of Consumer Protection Act were based on the frustration the actors experienced in “Yu Cheng” litigation, the achievement of this movement cure little pain or loss “Yu Cheng” victims have endured for thirty years. This is the background of post-2000 “Yu Cheng” legal mobilization, with two wings of movement, the 2nd wave self-help action in 2004 and the one organized by “Taiwan Yucheng Victims’ Support Association,” from 2009. In this section, this study has found that while victims’ experience is important to achieve legal mobilization for the injury, resources to exercise legal tactic and to negotiate with the government are necessary. However, by looking at legislation of “Yu Cheng Patients Health Care Services Act,” the successful result the Association achievement, the limit of legal mobilization is demonstrated. Even if the Act has coined the interests of “Yu Cheng” victims, there is little space for actors to negotiate in institution government’s duty to ascertain the interests.