請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳家麟 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Chia-Lin Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 周衣絜 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Chieh Chou | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-06-24T16:32:37Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2026-06-25 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2026-06-24 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2026-06-12 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 英文文獻
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SAGE Publications. 中文文獻 [1] 伍善真(2018)。半導體晶片設計廠商事業發展策略分析:以輝達為例。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [2] 鄒惠宇(2021)。乘勢而上的半導體設計廠經營發展策略。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [3] 周達儒(2021)。大敵當前的半導體整合元件製造商經營發展策略:以 Intel 為例。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [4] 簡子偉(2022)。人工智慧晶片設計公司營運模型一個案研究。陽明交通大學管理學院科技管理學程。 [5] 游博仰(2023)。資料中心 GPU 廠商策略發展分析:以輝達為例。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [6] 高迎萱(2024)。獨立顯卡產業之併購策略分析:以 NVIDIA 和 AMD 為例。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [7] 何翊慈(2024)。GPU 晶片設計商創新商業模式探討:以 NVIDIA 為例。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所。 [8] 曹安傑(2025)。榮耀王者:運算晶片 GPU 設計廠商的競爭與發展策略 — NVIDIA 公司案例分析。台灣大學進修推廣學院事業經營碩士在職學位學程。 企業年報 [1] NVIDIA Corporation. (2018–2025). Annual report. Retrieved from https://investor.NVIDIA.com/financial-info/annual-reports-and-proxies [2] NVIDIA Corporation. (2018–2025). Investor Day presentation. Retrieved from https://investor.NVIDIA.com/events-and-presentations [3] Intel Corporation. (2018–2025). Annual report. Retrieved from https://www.intc.com/filings-reports/annual-reports [4] Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (2018–2025). Annual report. Retrieved from https://ir.amd.com/financial-information/financial-results 產業報告與法說會 [1] TSMC. (2025, October). Q3 2025 earnings call transcript. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. [2] SK Hynix. (2025, October). Q3 2025 earnings call transcript. SK Hynix Inc. [3] Micron Technology. (2025). Earnings call transcript. Micron Technology, Inc. [4] TrendForce. (2025, October). DRAM market analysis and HBM supply report. TrendForce Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.trendforce.com [5] IDC. (2026, February). AI accelerator memory supply chain structural analysis. International Data Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.idc.com [6] Electronic Times. (2025). HBM4 16-Hi manufacturing challenges and commercialization outlook. Retrieved from https://www.etnews.com 英文電子網站資料 [1] Supply Chain Digital. (2025, November 4). NVIDIA: Chip supply chains in the era of export restrictions. Retrieved from https://supplychaindigital.com/news/trump-barred-china-NVIDIAs-blackwell-ai-chips [2] Financial Content. (2026, February 6). Silicon sovereignty: China's strategic pivot away from NVIDIA's H200 sparks global AI power shift. Retrieved from https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/tokenring-2026-2-6-silicon-sovereignty-chinas-strategic-pivot-away-from-NVIDIAs-h200-sparks-global-ai-power-shift [3] Tom's Hardware. (2025, December 23). NVIDIA prepares shipment of 82,000 AI GPUs to China as chip war lines blur. Retrieved from https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/NVIDIA-prepares-h200-shipments-to-china-as-chip-war-lines-blur [4] Digitimes. (2026, February 26). NVIDIA constrained in China as local AI players strengthen market position. Retrieved from https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20260226VL212/NVIDIA-chips-china-market-2026.html [5] TrendForce. (2026, January 6). 2026 outlook: NVIDIA strategy & China AI autonomy. Retrieved from https://www.trendforce.com/research/download/RP260106RB3 [6] Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). The consequences of exporting NVIDIA's H200 chips to China. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/consequences-exporting-NVIDIAs-h200-chips-china [7] American Compass. (2025, November 4). Stop selling the rope. Retrieved from https://americancompass.org/stop-selling-the-rope/ [8] Deloitte Insights. (2026, February 11). 2026 semiconductor industry outlook. Retrieved from https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/technology/technology-media-telecom-outlooks/semiconductor-industry-outlook.html [9] Financial Content. (2025, October 3). The enduring squeeze: AI's insatiable demand reshapes the global semiconductor shortage in 2025. Retrieved from https://markets.financialcontent.com/wral/article/tokenring-2025-10-3-the-enduring-squeeze-ais-insatiable-demand-reshapes-the-global-semiconductor-shortage-in-2025 [10] Tom's Hardware. (2026, March). Chinese chip industry leaders admit the country lags five to ten years behind in AI data center chips. Retrieved from https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/chinese-chip-industry-leaders-say-ai-demand-is-straining-equipment-and-talent-supply [11] Expert Network Calls. (2026, January 27). Semiconductor market outlook: Key trends and challenges in 2026. Retrieved from https://expertnetworkcalls.com/93/semiconductor-market-outlook-key-trends-and-challenges-in-2026 [12] Artificial Intelligence News. (2026, January 6). 2025's AI chip wars: What enterprise leaders learned about supply chain reality. Retrieved from https://www.artificialintelligence-news.com/news/ai-chip-shortage-enterprise-ctos-2025/ | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/102476 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 2023 年,H100 GPU 的等待時間一度超過 52 週,全球雲端大廠競相採購,卻難以即時取得貨源,當時的瓶頸並非來自輝達的晶片設計能力,而是先進封裝產能無法跟上需求爆發。台積電 CoWoS 月產能約為 1.3 萬片,難以支撐生成式 AI 帶來的算力需求急速擴張,與此同時,美國出口管制持續收緊,迫使輝達不斷調整產品規格與市場配置,當需求成長與政策限制同時發生,供應鏈韌性已不再只是後端的成本管理問題,而是直接影響輝達能否穩定出貨、維持市場主導地位的關鍵能力。
本研究以2022至2025年輝達AI晶片供應鏈為個案,採質性個案研究法,輔以自建供應鏈韌性評估框架(SCRA),從「地理集中度」、「供應商替代性」與「技術壟斷性」三個維度,系統評估晶圓製造、先進封裝(CoWoS)、HBM記憶體與系統組裝等關鍵節點的韌性策略與改善幅度。研究分析輝達如何在需求急速擴張與政策環境持續變動的雙重壓力下,透過產能鎖定、多供應商布局與技術路線調整,推動供應鏈由高度集中走向有限度分散。 跨時間點的節點評估結果顯示,各類韌性策略的改善幅度與節點技術特性高度相關:在技術壁壘相對較低、供應商替代性較高的環節,韌性已有明顯改善;但在晶圓製造與CoWoS前段等技術門檻最高的節點,短期內可行的結構調整仍相當有限。本研究據此歸納出輝達韌性提升的結構性路徑,並提出後續在供應鏈配置與政策風險管理上的研究方向與實務啟示。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In 2023, lead times for NVIDIA's H100 GPU extended beyond 52 weeks as hyperscalers competed for supply they could not secure. The constraint was not chip design, but packaging Ssigns and market reconfigurations. Together, these pressures elevated supply chain resilience from a back-office concern to the central variable shaping NVIDIA's ability to ship at scale and hold its market position.
This study examines NVIDIA's AI chip supply chain from 2022 to 2025 using a qualitative case study approach, supplemented by a self-constructed Supply Chain Resilience Assessment framework (SCRA) across three dimensions: geographic concentration, supplier substitutability, and technological monopolization. The study analyzes how NVIDIA pursued structural diversification through capacity locking, multi-supplier arrangements, and technology roadmap adjustments across key nodes including wafer fabrication, advanced packaging, HBM memory, and system assembly. Findings show that resilience improvements were inversely correlated with technological barriers. Back-end packaging and system assembly saw meaningful gains, while front-end wafer fabrication and CoWoS remained highly concentrated in Taiwan through 2025, with limited structural change. The study identifies structural pathways for resilience improvement and outlines directions for future research. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2026-06-24T16:32:37Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2026-06-24T16:32:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iii Abstract iv 目次 v 圖次 vii 表次 ix 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機 1 1.2 研究對象與目標 2 1.3 研究方法與限制 4 1.4 研究流程 6 第二章 文獻探討 9 2.1 供應鏈韌性的定義與演進 9 2.2 供應鏈韌性的構面分析 12 2.3 動態能力理論與供應鏈治理 17 2.4 理論框架與本研究的連結 19 第三章 輝達AI晶片供應鏈現況 23 3.1 AI晶片產業概況與競爭格局 23 3.2 公司概況與商業模式 34 3.3 上游關鍵零組件現況 40 3.4 下游封裝、組裝與測試現況 46 3.5 供應鏈地理集中現況 56 3.6 2022年後的外部環境變化 57 3.7 輝達AI晶片供應鏈現況彙整 62 第四章 輝達AI晶片供應鏈韌性策略分析 64 4.1 分析框架建立 64 4.2 輝達韌性策略的框架分析 67 4.3 SCRA框架分析:2022與2025年比較分析 80 第五章 結論 86 5.1 主要研究發現 86 5.2 邁向 2030:輝達供應鏈的韌性重構與競爭挑戰 91 5.3 後續研究建議 96 參考文獻 98 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | NVIDIA | - |
| dc.subject | 台積電 | - |
| dc.subject | AI晶片 | - |
| dc.subject | 供應鏈韌性 | - |
| dc.subject | 先進封裝 | - |
| dc.subject | NVIDIA | - |
| dc.subject | TSMC | - |
| dc.subject | AI chips | - |
| dc.subject | supply chain resilience | - |
| dc.subject | advanced packaging | - |
| dc.title | AI晶片供應鏈韌性策略評估-以NVIDIA為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Analyzing NVIDIA's AI Chip Supply Chain Strategic Transformation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 114-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 林家振 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | Jia-Zhen Lin | en |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 余峻瑜 ;簡睿哲 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Jiun-Yu Yu;Ruey-Jer Jean | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | NVIDIA; 台積電; AI晶片; 供應鏈韌性; 先進封裝 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | NVIDIA; TSMC; AI chips; supply chain resilience; advanced packaging | en |
| dc.relation.page | 103 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202601231 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2026-06-15 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | N/A | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 | |
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