公司治理下之重大營業或資產交易決策機制檢討 —公司法與企併法之交錯

Abstract

本論文以公司法第185條為核心，探討重大營業或資產交易決策機制之規範困境，並分析其與企業併購法之交錯適用。研究問題聚焦於：如何在股東會決議與外部程序保障之間取得平衡，以兼顧公司治理、股東權益與交易安全。 首先，185條對「主要部分」與「重大影響」欠缺明確標準，致使司法實務見解分歧，並在違反程序之效力上呈現無效、相對無效等爭論。雖最高法院趨向採取「絕對無效說」，仍有判決為保護交易安全採取相對無效立場，導致規範可預測性不足。其次，實務上企業常採「雙軌保險」模式，即同時履行公司法決議與企併法程序，例如公告、債權人保護及異議股東股份收買請求權，以補強單純依賴185條之不足。此現象反映出台灣現行制度缺乏明確的協調與適用順序，亦增加企業操作成本。再者，從泰山、崇光與中興百貨等案例可見，法院態度日益嚴格，要求重大交易必須經股東會特別決議，但企業仍依賴企併法程序降低風險，顯示兩法在實務上形成互補而非替代。比較美、日、德經驗，則普遍採「股東會決議＋外部程序」之雙軌模式，兼顧決策正當性與外部利害關係人保護，對我國制度調整具有重要啟示。 本文建議未來修法方向包括：（一）明確化185條判斷標準；（二）建立公司法與企併法協調規則；（三）強化少數股東與債權人保護；（四）賦予特別委員會與專家意見實質效力；（五）由主管機關發布判斷指引。唯有建構「決議正當性」與「程序正當性」並重的制度架構，方能落實公司治理核心價值，並提升市場信任與交易安全。

This thesis examines Article 185 of the Taiwan Company Act in the context of major business or asset transactions and analyzes its interaction with the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (M&A Act). The central issue is how to reconcile shareholder approval requirements with external procedural safeguards to achieve corporate governance, shareholder protection, and transactional security. Article 185 suffers from ambiguity in defining “substantial part” and “material impact,” leading to divergent judicial interpretations and disputes over legal consequences. Although the Supreme Court has increasingly favored the doctrine of absolute nullity, some rulings still adopt relative voidness to protect transactional security, undermining predictability. In practice, corporations often adopt a “dual-track insurance” strategy by fulfilling both shareholder resolutions under the Company Act and procedures under the M&A Act, such as public announcements, creditor protection, and appraisal rights. This reflects the lack of clear coordination between the two statutes and increases compliance costs. Case studies, including the Taishan, Sogo, and Zhongxing disputes, show that courts have adopted stricter standards, insisting on shareholder approval for major transactions. At the same time, companies rely on M&A Act procedures to mitigate risks, illustrating that the two laws operate complementarily rather than as substitutes. Comparative experience in the United States, Japan, and Germany demonstrates a consensus toward a dual-track model that combines shareholder approval with external oversight, balancing decision-making legitimacy with the protection of stakeholders. The thesis recommends reforms: (1) clarifying the criteria for “substantial part” under Article 185; (2) establishing explicit coordination rules between the Company Act and the M&A Act; (3) strengthening minority shareholder and creditor protection; (4) granting substantive effect to special committees and expert opinions; and (5) requiring the competent authority to issue interpretive guidelines. Only by constructing a framework that emphasizes both decision-making legitimacy and procedural legitimacy can Taiwan enhance corporate governance, safeguard transactions, and build market confidence.