川普2.0時代臺灣企業的策略行動：以台積電、台塑為例

Abstract

川普於2025年再度執政後，美國貿易與產業政策明顯轉向更為強調經濟民族主義與國家安全導向，透過關稅、補貼、投資審查與技術管制等政策工具，重新形塑國家與跨國企業之間的互動關係。相較於過往以市場機制為主導的政策環境，川普2.0時期的政策邏輯更具排他性與強制性，使企業在全球布局與政治行動上面臨更高的結構性壓力。然而，既有文獻多聚焦於單一產業或政策工具，較少從跨產業比較的角度，系統性分析美國國家政策意圖變化如何影響企業策略選擇空間與彼此的談判地位差異。 為回應上述研究缺口，本文結合結構性權力理論、國家與企業互動的三角外交分析框架，以及企業政治行動理論，分析美國政府在川普2.0下對企業的結構性壓力，而台灣政府及企業的回應行為何如，並再從「國家政策意圖」與「產業競爭結構」兩個面向，分析川普2.0政策環境下國家與企業談判關係的動態變化。本文以台灣兩個代表性企業—台積電與台塑作為比較個案，分別對應全球型布局之半導體產業與資源加工型生產之石化與塑膠產業，探討企業在面對美國政策壓力時，其策略調整、政治行動參與方式與談判位置的差異。 研究結果顯示，川普2.0時期美國對半導體產業的政策意圖由風險控管移向建立絕對優勢，透過結合誘因與威脅的政策工具，提高企業不配合的成本，壓縮台積電的談判空間，因而強化台積電進行積極企業政治行動的需要，以此確保企業本身利基的維繫。相對而言，石化與塑膠產業雖同樣受到關稅與產業政策影響，但美國國家政策意圖轉向以市場放任為主，因而台塑在美國政策體系中的談判地位相對上升，故其對企業政治行動的積極需求較低。總體來說，本文指出，企業政治行動與談判地位之差異，係由國家政策意圖變化與產業競爭結構差異所致，此亦補充了既有文獻對於川普2.0政策環境下國家與企業互動之理解。

Following Donald Trump’s return to office in 2025, U.S. trade and industrial policies have shifted markedly toward a stronger emphasis on economic nationalism and national security. Through policy instruments such as tariffs, subsidies, investment screening, and technology controls, the U.S. government has reconfigured the relationship between the state and multinational corporations. Compared with earlier policy environments largely governed by market mechanisms, the policy logic of the Trump 2.0 period is more exclusionary and coercive, thereby imposing greater structural pressures on firms’ global strategies and political activities. However, existing studies tend to focus on single industries or specific policy tools, and relatively few adopt a cross-industry comparative perspective to systematically examine how shifts in U.S. state policy intent shape corporate strategic choices and bargaining positions. To address this gap, this study integrates structural power theory, the triangular diplomacy framework of state–firm interactions, and theories of corporate political activity to analyze the structural pressures exerted by the U.S. government on firms under Trump 2.0, as well as the corresponding responses of the Taiwanese government and corporations. From the dual perspectives of state policy intent and industry competitive structures, the article examines the dynamic evolution of bargaining relationships between states and firms in the Trump 2.0 policy environment. Employing TSMC and FPG as comparative case studies, the analysis contrasts the globally configured semiconductor industry with the natural resource value-added–based petrochemical and plastics industry, and explores differences in firms’ strategic adjustments, modes of political engagement, and bargaining positions in response to U.S. policy pressures. The findings indicate that during the Trump 2.0 period, U.S. policy intent toward the semiconductor industry shifted from risk management to the pursuit of absolute advantage. By combining incentives with credible threats, U.S. policy instruments increased the costs of non-compliance and compressed TSMC’s bargaining space, thereby increasing the firm’s need to engage more actively in corporate political activity in order to safeguard its competitive position. In contrast, although the petrochemical and plastics industry was also affected by tariffs and industrial policies, U.S. policy intent in this sector shifted toward a more market-oriented and permissive approach. As a result, FPG’s bargaining position within the U.S. policy framework improved in relative terms, reducing its need to pursue proactive corporate political activity. Overall, this study argues that variations in corporate political activity and bargaining positions are shaped by shifts in national policy intent and differences in industry competitive structures, thereby contributing to the existing literature on state–firm interactions under the Trump 2.0 policy regime.