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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王宏文(Hong-Wung Wang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ying-Chieh Lai | en |
dc.contributor.author | 賴映潔 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T21:05:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-01 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T21:05:04Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2011-07-28 | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2011-07-06 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 中央選舉委員會,http://www.cec.gov.tw/。
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/10142 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 2005 年我國將立法委員選舉制度由「複數選區單記非讓渡選票制」改為「單一選區制兩票制」,同時重新劃分選區,並確定於第七屆立委選舉時開始實施。第六屆立委在面臨新選制及新選區,並為了最大化其連任機率,他們會如何改變其分配行為是本研究的主要研究目的。
本研究比較第五屆及第六屆立委之分配行為,並以「創造城鄉新風貌計畫」分配至各選區的補助金額為分析對象,研究發現選區政治勢力集中度越高者,該選區所獲得的人均補助款也較多,這可能是因為選區政治勢力集中度越高,代表有立委在該選區較具優勢,因此選民對立委有較高的期待、監督、與課責,使立委之肉桶立法動機較強。此外,本研究也發現政治勢力集中度較高的選區,第六屆會比第五屆獲得更多的補助款,特別是政黨勢力集中度對補助款分配的影響力在第六屆大增,甚至超越個人政治勢力集中度的影響,這可能是因為政治人物已預期到政黨競爭將是第七屆立委選舉的主要面向,且希望以補助款的分配來鞏固政黨既有的地盤。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In 2005, Taiwan Legislative Electoral System, SNTV, was replaced by single-district, two vote system. Based on distributive policy theory, this paper aims to explore how 6th legislators reacted and changed their pork barrel behaviors in order to maximize the probabilities to be reelected when facing the coming electoral rule.
By comparing 5th and 6th Legislators’ pork barrel behaviors, using “Creating Townscape Model Plan” as data, this paper has two findings. First, the analysis shows that the more the political power in an electoral district concentrates the more grants it gets. The reasonable explanation might be that when the political power in an electoral district is oligopolistic or even monopolistic, there exist a dominant representative, who has to take on more anticipation and accountability from the electorate than other electoral district, where political power are less concentrative, and thus the representatives in the higher concentrative electoral district has stronger motives to bring the pork home. Also, this paper finds that the higher concentrative electoral districts receive more grants in the term of 6th legislators than in 5th; especially the party political power in an electoral district has more influence on grant distribution in 6th than in 5th. The reasonable explanation might be that the political behaviors had anticipated that party competition would be the core divergence in the following electoral campaign, and thus grants were distributed based on part domain so as to consolidate their own electoral bases. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T21:05:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98322028-1.pdf: 537391 bytes, checksum: 76e2f4c9daeaba962084d4e144b5c123 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書.............................................I
中文摘要.................................................II 英文摘要..................................................III 第一章 緒論................................................1 第一節 研究背景與動機........................................1 第二節 研究問題.............................................2 第三節 研究範圍.............................................3 第四節 研究限制.............................................3 第五節 研究架構與章節安排.....................................4 第二章 文獻探討與理論假設.....................................6 第一節 分配理論之意涵........................................6 第二節 影響分配政策之因素探討..................................7 第三節 選舉制度對分配政策之影響................................9 第四節 研究假設.............................................12 第三章 研究設計與方法........................................15 第一節 研究對象.............................................15 第二節 分析單位.............................................17 第三節 研究方法與變數測量.....................................18 第四章 研究結果.............................................27 第一節 資料描述與敘述分析.....................................27 第二節 統計分析.............................................32 第五章 研究貢獻、結論與建議...................................36 第一節 研究貢獻.............................................36 第二節 結論與建議...........................................36 參考文獻...................................................38 附錄......................................................43 附錄一 創造城鄉新風貌計畫資料編碼表.............................43 附錄二 選區個人選票集中度之衡量................................53 附錄三 選區政黨選票集中度之衡量................................57 附錄四 各選區個人選票集中度...................................61 附錄五 變數相關係數以及淨相關(Partial correlation)係數.........66 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 台灣立法委員選舉制度改變對補助款分配之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Impact of the Legislative Electoral System Change on Grant Distribution in Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 羅清俊(Ching-Jyuhn Luo),洪永泰(Yung-tai Hung),王鼎銘(Ding-Ming Wang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 分配政策,補助款,立委選制改革,創造城鄉新風貌計畫,選票集中度,賀芬達爾指數, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | distributive policy,distributive theory,pork barrel,grant,electoral system,Herfindahl index, | en |
dc.relation.page | 68 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2011-07-06 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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