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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101369
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor林竣達zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorJiun-Da Linen
dc.contributor.author楊佳蓁zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorChia-Chen Yangen
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-27T16:16:51Z-
dc.date.available2026-01-28-
dc.date.copyright2026-01-27-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.date.submitted2026-01-19-
dc.identifier.citation一、英文文獻
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101369-
dc.description.abstract隨著社群媒體的快速發展,數位平台已成為形塑政治態度與公共輿論的重要場域。近年來,中國被指控透過假訊息、內容審查與政治宣傳等非暴力且具高度隱蔽性的手段,對民主國家施加影響,此類行為正是「銳實力」的具體展現。在兩岸關係高度敏感的政治脈絡下,台灣被視為中國推動銳實力的重要目標之一,而以演算法為核心、深受年輕族群喜愛的短影音平台 TikTok,也逐漸成為相關政治影響力運作的關鍵媒介。
本研究以涵化理論為理論基礎,採取質性研究方法,透過深度訪談台灣大學生,探討其在使用 TikTok 的過程中,如何感知平台上的假訊息、審查與政治宣傳等銳實力現象,並進一步分析不同使用頻率的大學生,檢視其對中國籍配偶、兩岸一家親、中國科技發展、台灣盟友選擇、中國政府形象及身份認同等議題的看法差異。
研究結果顯示,多數受訪者能察覺 TikTok 上存在政治立場鮮明或帶有特定偏向的內容。不同使用頻率的受訪者在銳實力感知與政治態度上呈現出明顯差異。輕度使用者與未使用者普遍展現較高的政治警覺性,傾向從統戰或政治滲透的角度解讀中國相關議題;相較之下,重度使用者在多數情境中則傾向採取較為務實的評估取向,對中國相關議題展現相對開放且具彈性的態度。他們較少以高度政治化或意識形態化的框架進行解讀,而是依據個人經驗、實用價值與資訊多元性進行判斷。然而,這種開放態度並不等同於政治立場的鬆動,在涉及國家認同與主權等核心議題時,重度使用者仍普遍劃清明確界線,維持自身的政治底線。
整體而言,本研究指出 TikTok 作為高度娛樂化的社群媒體平台,為銳實力提供了新的運作空間。透過台灣大學生的實際使用經驗,本研究補充了既有銳實力研究多聚焦於傳統媒體或西方社群平台的不足。研究結果有助於深化對銳實力在數位平台中運作機制的理解,並為台灣民主社會如何回應新型態的資訊滲透與政治影響,提供重要的實證基礎與政策思考方向。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractWith the rapid development of social media, digital platforms have become crucial arenas for shaping political attitudes and public opinion. In recent years, China has been accused of exerting influence on democratic countries through non-violent yet highly covert means such as disinformation, content censorship, and political propaganda—practices that exemplify “sharp power.” Within the highly sensitive political context of cross-strait relations, Taiwan is regarded as one of China’s key targets for the deployment of sharp power. Meanwhile, TikTok, a short-video platform driven by algorithms and highly popular among younger generations, has increasingly become a critical medium for such political influence operations.
Grounded in cultivation theory, this study adopts a qualitative research approach and conducts in-depth interviews with Taiwanese university students to explore how they perceive sharp power phenomena—such as disinformation, censorship, and political propaganda—while using TikTok. The study further analyzes differences in attitudes among students with varying levels of TikTok usage, focusing on issues including Chinese spouses, the concept of “both sides of the Strait as one family,” China’s technological development, Taiwan’s choice of allies, perceptions of the Chinese government, and identity.
The findings indicate that most interviewees are able to detect politically explicit or biased content on TikTok. Significant differences emerge between users with different usage frequencies in terms of their perception of sharp power and political attitudes. Light users and non-users generally demonstrate higher political vigilance and tend to interpret China-related issues through the lens of united front tactics or political infiltration. In contrast, heavy users tend to adopt a more pragmatic evaluative approach, displaying relatively open and flexible attitudes toward China-related issues. They are less inclined to rely on highly politicized or ideological frameworks, instead making judgments based on personal experience, practical value, and information diversity. However, such openness does not equate to a weakening of political positions. When it comes to core issues such as national identity and sovereignty, heavy users still tend to draw clear boundaries and maintain firm political bottom lines.
Overall, this study highlights that TikTok, as a highly entertainment-oriented social media platform, provides new operational space for sharp power. By examining the actual usage experiences of Taiwanese university students, this research addresses a gap in existing sharp power studies that have primarily focused on traditional media or Western social media platforms. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how sharp power operates within digital platforms and offer important empirical evidence and policy implications for how Taiwan’s democratic society can respond to emerging forms of information infiltration and political influence.
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dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員審定書 i
謝辭 ii
中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目次 vi
圖次 viii
表次 ix
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 5
第三節 研究貢獻 7
第四節 章節安排 8
第二章 文獻探討 10
第一節 銳實力 10
第二節 TikTok 20
第三節 涵化理論 36
第三章 研究方法 40
第一節 研究設計 40
第二節 研究參與者 42
第三節 資料處理與分析 45
第四節 研究倫理 47
第四章 研究分析和結果:銳實力的認知與經歷 48
第一節 假訊息 48
第二節 審查 52
第三節 政治宣傳 55
第四節 小結 60
第五章 研究分析和結果:銳實力與政治態度 61
第一節 對中國籍配偶在TikTok發聲的觀感 61
第二節 對兩岸一家親的感受 64
第三節 對中國科技的感受 67
第四節 對台灣盟友的選擇 70
第五節 對中國政府的態度與對台灣體制的偏好 72
第六節 對身份的認同 76
第七節 小結 79
第六章 研究結論和建議 81
第一節 研究結論 81
第二節 研究貢獻 84
第三節 研究限制 85
第四節 研究建議 86
附件一 87
附件二 89
參考文獻 90
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject銳實力-
dc.subjectTikTok-
dc.subject社群媒體-
dc.subject政治態度-
dc.subject台灣大學生-
dc.subjectsharp power-
dc.subjectTikTok-
dc.subjectsocial media-
dc.subjectpolitical attitudes-
dc.subjectTaiwanese university students-
dc.title台灣大學生對中國銳實力的感知:以TikTok為例zh_TW
dc.titleTaiwanese University Students' Perception of China's Sharp Power: A Case Study of TikToken
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear114-1-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee黃兆年;林宣佑zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeJaw-Nian Huang;Shane Hsuan-Yu Linen
dc.subject.keyword銳實力,TikTok社群媒體政治態度台灣大學生zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordsharp power,TikToksocial mediapolitical attitudesTaiwanese university studentsen
dc.relation.page108-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202600090-
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)-
dc.date.accepted2026-01-19-
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept國家發展研究所-
dc.date.embargo-lift2026-01-28-
顯示於系所單位:國家發展研究所

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