戰爭威脅如何形塑發展型國家？ 臺灣與韓國的國防工業與重化工業發展（1960s-1990s）

Abstract

1960年代晚期，臺灣與韓國皆因地緣政治壓力而發起自製武器計劃，並嘗試將其結合重化工業發展。然而，兩者發展成果迥異：韓國成功建立具備生產及出口實力且研發能力較佳的國防工業，並帶動重化工業的蓬勃發展；臺灣則未達成相同的成果。本文旨在探討此差異之成因。透過運用歷史檔案、日記、回憶錄及二手文獻，本文指出差異的關鍵在於軍方與經建官僚之間的權力分配模式的不同。 在臺灣，軍隊作為蔣介石與蔣經國核心權力來源，他們傾向將掌管國防工業的權力賦予軍方，從而形成一套視軍事目標為優先的發展體制，並使軍方掌控研發機構、生產工廠、資金以及採購與銷售權。即使在1979年臺美斷交後，軍方試圖加強與經建官僚及公民營資本合作，然因「軍事優先」制度未受根本挑戰，導致國營企業配合國防投資時面臨嚴重虧損，民營企業則因缺乏資金、市場與技術支持而不願配合，最終導致「軍經合作」的失敗，形成難以擺脫的負向循環。相較之下，由於朴正熙無法徹底掌控韓國軍方內部派系，遂將國防工業的主導權移交予青瓦台第二經濟秘書室，大幅削弱軍方權力，形成「軍經協調」的發展模式。經建官僚主導掌控著研發機構、生產工廠、資金以及採購與銷售權，並透過競爭性的金融政策，激勵財閥投入武器生產與大量出口，同時由國防科學研究院提供技術支援與共同研發。獲得軍用技術的財閥，得以在企業內部進行技術轉移，並自主投入武器研發，形成正向循環。 建立在上述經驗發現，本文的理論貢獻如下：首先，本文提倡將國家視為目標彼此衝突的多重行動者的集合體，並以此將軍方帶回發展敘事中。透過將軍方帶入，本文以國家內部行動者的權力動態，將Tilly等人與發展型國家理論連結起來，以此解釋戰爭威脅如何影響國家的產業政策與發展路徑。最後，關注權力分配的行動者中心視角，為臺韓重化工業轉型差異，提供不同於國家與社會關係視角的解釋。

In response to increasing war threats in the late 1960s, South Korea and Taiwan initiated a series of programs aimed at building self-reliant defense industries based on civilian industrial capabilities. However, South Korea succeeded in integrating its defense and heavy-chemical industries into a civilian foundation, while Taiwan maintained a separation between its defense sector and civilian-based heavy-chemical industries. Why, under similar circumstances, did Taiwan and South Korea take different paths? Drawing on newly declassified archival data, diaries, memoirs, and relevant research, this article contends that these divergent outcomes stem from different power dynamics between the military and economic bureaucrats within each state. In Taiwan, where the ruling regime's power base rested upon the military, authoritarian leaders prioritized the coercive apparatus in controlling the defense industry, establishing a "military-first" regime. This structure granted the military authority over research institutions, core technologies, arsenals, and the procurement and distribution of weaponry. Even after the severance of diplomatic ties with the United States, which necessitated some interaction between the military and economic bureaucrats, the military continued to prioritize national defense over broader industrial development. Conversely, facing challenges in consolidating control over factions within the military, South Korean President Park Chung-hee opted to empower economic bureaucrats with authority over both defense and heavy-chemical industries. This empowered position enabled South Korean economic bureaucrats to coordinate state resources and the chaebol, fostering a "military-economic coordination" model that effectively integrated the defense and heavy-chemical sectors. Consequently, while Taiwanese economic bureaucrats struggled to leverage the defense industry for broader industrial development, their South Korean counterparts successfully maximized the defense sector's spillover effects on civilian industries. By examining internal power relations, this article contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, instead depicting it as composed of diverse institutions with distinct logics and varying connections to civil society, thereby bringing the military back into the narrative of development. Second, it bridges the developmental state theory with Charles Tilly’s perspective, suggesting that war threats can involve the army and the economic bureaucrat in the struggle over industrial policy. Finally, this study offers an alternative explanation of South Korea and Taiwan's divergent trajectories of industrial development, which are attributed to differences in state-society relations by previous research.