轉型經濟中的家族治理與外部治理： 以制度基礎理論為例

Abstract

本研究立基於制度基礎理論（Institution-based Theory），旨在探討家族治理機制與外部治理機制於轉型經濟體系中之互補關係。透過分析家族企業在制度轉變過程中的適應行為，本文試圖釐清內部治理架構如何與新興外部治理規範產生交互作用。在比較個案分析方面，本研究選取三星（Samsung）作為成功因應制度轉型之代表企業，並以大同（Tatung）作為面臨治理困境之對比案例，藉此提出一系列命題，說明家族控制與外部治理壓力間之動態平衡。 研究結果顯示，家族企業若能及早建構穩健之政治與財務關係、引進專業經理人制度，並積極回應監管規範，將有助於促進治理整合，提升組織合法性與韌性。此一治理策略不僅有助於家族企業在制度轉型過程中維持其競爭優勢，亦為制度環境下之企業調適行為提供具體實證依據與政策參考。本文之研究發現，對家族企業治理實務與轉型經濟中之制度設計，皆具有一定啟示意涵。

The study in question examines the complementary relation between family governance mechanisms and corresponding external governance mechanisms in transitional economies from the perspective of institutional-based theory. Through an assessment of the way family firms adjust to institutional changes, the research seeks to examine how internal family governance systems interplay with the demands of nascent external governance during an economic transition. By way of comparative case studies exploring one firm's successful adaptation to economic transformation (Samsung) while it was faced simultaneously with transitional dilemmas (Tatung), propositions were formulated concerning the fine balance between assisting family control and succumbing to the pressures of external governance. Our findings decisively emphasize the importance of fostering harmony through constructing political and financial ties, professional management, and cooperation with regulators from an early stage. This study offers some idea on how family firms might sustain competitive advantage and yet effectively adjust institutionally in a transitional economy, simultaneously making some policy and family business practitioner-oriented contributions.