習近平時期的派系政治： 中共二十屆中央政治局委員的晉升模式分析

Abstract

本論文以習近平時期的派系政治為研究核心，探討中國共產黨第二十屆中央政治局委員的晉升模式及其背後的政治邏輯。具體而言，本研究聚焦於兩個核心問題：其一，在習近平政權下，不同政治菁英群體之間的晉升是否存在顯著差異？其二，影響晉升的主要因素為何？自十八大以來，習近平逐步重組領導核心，傳統的團派與上海幫等派系影響力逐漸衰退，而與習近平有共同經歷、地緣淵源或專業背景的人物則快速崛起。本研究透過將二十屆政治局委員劃分為六大系統——軍事與科技、同鄉、清華、福建、浙滬以及中央直屬，進一步量化其與習近平的「關係分數」，並比較十八大至二十大期間的職位變遷與晉升速度。 本研究發現，在習近平政權下，不同派系之間的晉升確實有明顯差別。首先，和習近平在地方一起工作過的幹部，特別是浙滬系統的人，晉升速度普遍比其他系統快，說明「一起共事的經驗」已經成為快速晉升的重要條件。這些人能夠快速上升，和習近平在2002至2007年擔任浙江省委書記時提出的一些政策有關。當時在浙江推動的政策，後來一部分被提升為國家戰略，成為今天中國治理的重要理念。這些幹部不只是單純的執行者，而是和習近平一起規劃、一起推動政策的夥伴，所以更容易得到信任和重用。 其次，本研究也發現，晉升並不是只靠個人關係。即使和習近平的直接關係不深，有些官員因為在環境治理、科技創新或公共衛生等專業領域表現突出，也能快速升遷。這說明專業能力和能否符合政策需要，已經成為重要的選拔標準。總的來說，習近平時代的幹部流動，是「關係」和「能力」一起作用的結果。一方面，有過地方共事經驗的人更能表現忠誠和信任，是習近平鞏固權力的重要基礎；另一方面，專業能力和政策執行力可以確保治理效果，幫助政權應對經濟、環境和公共衛生等挑戰。可以看出，習近平的人事安排不只是依靠私人關係，而是同時重視戰略考量和務實效果。

This thesis centers on factional politics during the Xi Jinping era, analyzing the promotion patterns of the 20th Central Politburo members of the Chinese Communist Party and the political logic underpinning them. Specifically, the study addresses two core research questions： first, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, do promotion trajectories among different groups of political elites exhibit significant variation? Second, what are the primary factors influencing promotion? Since the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has progressively restructured the leadership core. The influence of traditional factions, such as the Communist Youth League and the Shanghai gang, has gradually diminished, while individuals who share work experience, regional connections, or professional backgrounds with Xi have ascended rapidly. This study categorizes the members of the 20th Politburo into six systems（factions）—Military and Technological, Native-Place, Tsinghua, Fujian, Zhejiang-Shanghai, and Central Organs—and quantifies their “relationship scores” with Xi, comparing career trajectories and promotion speeds between the 18th and 20th Party Congresses. The findings demonstrate that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, promotion outcomes vary markedly across factions. Cadres who had previously worked with Xi at the local level, particularly those affiliated with the Zhejiang-Shanghai system, were generally promoted at a faster pace than members of other systems. This suggests that “shared work experience” has become a critical determinant of accelerated promotion. Their rapid advancement is closely linked to the comprehensive policy initiatives advanced by Xi during his tenure as Party Secretary of Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. Several of these policies were subsequently elevated to the status of national strategies and have become integral components of China’s governance framework. These cadres were not merely passive implementers but rather practical political partners who co-designed and advanced governance initiatives alongside Xi, thereby earning heightened trust and promotion. Furthermore, the study finds that promotion is not solely determined by personal ties. Officials with limited direct connections to Xi could nevertheless advance rapidly if they demonstrated exceptional performance in professional domains such as environmental governance, technological innovation, or public health. This indicates that professional expertise and policy alignment have already become critical criteria in cadre selection. In conclusion, cadre mobility in the Xi Jinping era is shaped by the interplay of both “relationships” and “capabilities.” On the one hand, shared local work experience reinforced loyalty and trust, providing a crucial foundation for Xi’s consolidation of power. On the other hand, professional competence and policy implementation capacity ensured governance effectiveness, enabling the regime to confront challenges in the economy, environment, and public health. Xi’s personnel arrangements thus rely not only on personal networks but also emphasize strategic considerations and pragmatic outcomes.