ESG與董事之受任人義務—自「強制型」與「非強制型」ESG事項之區分切入

Abstract

隨著近年之ESG熱潮，吾人更加期盼公司應重視環境、社會等非營利性之議題。在此思考脈絡下，如吾人認為公司遵循ESG理念而追求環境、社會等非營利性議題，對於公司可能有利，ESG此一概念將如何影響董事之受任人義務內容，進而增加或減少董事之受任人義務違反風險，即有探討空間。 就董事有無一般性令公司遵循ESG理念之注意義務的問題，本文認為，應將公司法第1條第2項規定中「應遵守法令及商業倫理規範」之條文內容，理解為係要求董事「應」令公司遵循「強制型ESG事項」；並將「得採行增進公共利益之行為」之條文內容，理解為董事「得」自由選擇否令公司遵循「非強制型ESG事項」。其次，就董事自身違反ESG理念是否該當注意義務違反之問題，本文認為應區分董事所違反者係「強制型ESG事項」或「非強制型ESG事項」，而異其審查方式及結論。最後，就董事監督義務與ESG之一系列問題，本文認為董事監督義務之內容應視董事所任職之公司種類、產業而有所不同；又，原則上所有ESG事項皆屬董事監督義務之客體範圍。然，「強制型ESG事項」應屬法令遵循事項，故董事應盡法律所規範之最低限度之監督義務；而「非強制型ESG事項」則屬商業風險事項，除非原告得推翻經營判斷法則之推定要件，否則就董事之一切行為決策有無違反監督義務之審查，皆應適用經營判斷法則之審查標準。

With the growing prominence of ESG in recent years, there is a growing expectation that corporations should give due regard to environmental, social, and other non-profit-oriented concerns. Within this context, if one considers that adherence to ESG principles and the pursuit of environmental and social objectives may ultimately benefit the corporation, then the question arises as to how the ESG concept may affect the substantive content of directors’ fiduciary duties, and whether it increases or decreases the risk of a breach of such duties. With respect to whether directors bear a general duty of care to ensure that the corporation adheres to ESG principles, this thesis argues that Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act should be interpreted as follows: the provision that a company “shall comply with the laws and regulations as well as business ethics” requires directors to ensure corporate compliance with mandatory ESG matters; the provision that a company “may take actions which will promote public interests” should be understood as granting directors discretion to determine whether the corporation shall pursue non-mandatory ESG matters. Furthermore, as to whether a director’s personal violation of ESG principles constitutes a breach of the duty of care, this thesis maintains that a distinction must be drawn depending on whether the violation concerns mandatory ESG matters or non-mandatory ESG matters, since this distinction determines both the applicable standard of review and the legal outcome. Finally, with respect to directors’ oversight duties and their relationship to ESG, this thesis argues that the scope of oversight should vary according to the type of corporation and the industry in which it operates. As a general principle, all ESG matters fall within the scope of directors’ oversight obligations. Nevertheless, mandatory ESG matters should be treated as issues of legal compliance, and thus directors are required to fulfill at least the minimum oversight obligations prescribed by law. By contrast, non-mandatory ESG matters should be regarded as issues of business risk; unless plaintiffs are able to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule, any judicial review of whether directors breached their oversight obligations in relation to such matters should be conducted under the standards of the business judgment rule.