戰後臺灣的黑金時代：臺灣煤礦業的發展（1950-1968）

Abstract

戰後能源對臺灣經濟發展至關重要，在缺乏外匯的情況下，國家只能依賴發展本土煤礦業以供應工業燃料。然而，即使在煤炭仍具價格優勢的情況下，煤礦業卻於1968年前後迅速走向衰退。戰後臺灣煤礦業的沒落，既反映能源結構的轉型過程，更關乎如何理解威權體制下的國家發展模式。本文旨在探討戰後1950至1968年間，國家如何在以中小型民營礦場為主的結構下，透過政策與制度推動增產，同時介入煤炭流通以保障國營事業的供應，並分析為何在1960年代末期國家的能源選擇最終由煤轉油。 在研究方法上，本文以發展型國家理論為分析框架，廣泛運用經建官僚組織、省政府與省議會的會議記錄，並輔以官僚回憶錄與新聞資料，重建煤業政策的制定與脈絡。本研究指出，煤炭具有商品與生產要素的雙重性，使國家在政策制定上面臨根本矛盾，一方面透過自由化、地質探勘與美援貸款等政策工具推動增產，由省煤調會與中煤公司具體執行，另一方面又須壓抑煤價以穩定國營事業用煤，導致「壓價—增產—過剩—礦場收縮—供不應求—再漲價」的惡性循環。在此過程中，民間資本家與立法院等政治行動者的介入，使政策執行常受牽制或變形。最終，油煤價格差距縮小及燃油發電相對可控，國家能源選擇逐步轉向燃油，臺灣煤業因此走向衰退。 在文獻層次上，本文提出四點貢獻。其一，補足過去煤業研究缺乏官僚為核心的視角，並對煤礦業衰退成因提供國家權力鬥爭的解釋。其次，拓展發展型國家理論於能源產業的適用範疇，凸顯能源發展不同於一般工業的政策邏輯。第三，本文以Evans的「鑲嵌自主性」概念，說明臺灣經濟發展中兩種典範「發展型國家」與「中小企業網絡」，本文以煤業作為案例，說明國家如何透過中層組織與民間部門建立連結，嘗試融合這兩種典範，多元化臺灣公私聯繫的機制。然而，即使存在此種機制，煤礦業仍未能發展成功，受制於國民黨力量介入，顯示「鑲嵌」關係在特定條件下亦可能產生反向效果。第四，本文指出Chibber所提出的官僚「內部一致性」無法適用於煤礦業，經建官僚並非單一、整合的國家行動者，而是在多元行動者交織的權力場域中運作，使政策推進過程充滿摩擦與協商。 本研究的分析不僅補足了煤業研究的不足，也為理解能源產業在發展型國家中的位置提供新的視角，未來更可透過與韓國、日本等東亞國家的經驗比較。

Energy was crucial to Taiwan’s postwar economic development. In the absence of foreign exchange, the state relied on the expansion of the domestic coal industry to supply industrial fuel. Yet even when coal retained a price advantage, the industry rapidly declined around 1968. The collapse of Taiwan’s coal mining sector not only reflected a transformation of the energy structure but also revealed the dynamics of state-led development under authoritarian rule. This study examines how, between 1950 and 1968, the state sought to increase coal production through policies and institutional designs that supported a predominantly small- and medium-scale private mining structure, while simultaneously intervening in coal distribution to secure supplies for state-owned enterprises. It also analyzes why the state eventually shifted its energy policy from coal to oil in the late 1960s. Methodologically, the study adopts the developmental state framework and draws extensively on archival sources, including meeting minutes of economic planning agencies, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the Provincial Assembly, complemented by bureaucratic memoirs and contemporary news reports. The analysis argues that coal possessed a dual character as both a commodity and a production input, generating a fundamental policy dilemma. On the one hand, the state promoted production through liberalization, geological surveys, and U.S. aid loans, executed mainly by the Provincial Coal Control Committee and the China Coal Company. On the other hand, it sought to suppress coal prices to stabilize energy costs for state enterprises. This produced a vicious cycle of “price suppression – overproduction – surplus – mine contraction – shortage – price hike.” Meanwhile, the intervention of private capitalists and political actors, such as the Legislative Yuan, often constrained or distorted policy implementation. As the price gap between coal and oil narrowed and oil-based power generation became more manageable, the state gradually turned toward oil, leading to the decline of Taiwan’s coal industry. At the literature level, this study makes four contributions. First, it addresses the gap in previous coal industry research that lacks a bureaucratic-centered perspective and provides an explanation of the coal sector’s decline in terms of state power struggles. Second, it extends the applicability of developmental state theory to the energy sector, highlighting that energy governance follows a policy logic distinct from that of general industrial development. Third, drawing on Evans’s concept of “embedded autonomy,” the study illustrates the two paradigms of Taiwan’s economic development—the developmental state and small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) networks. Using the coal industry as a case, it demonstrates how the state attempted to link these two paradigms through “intermediary organizations” connecting the bureaucracy and the private sector, thereby diversifying mechanisms of public–private engagement. However, even with such mechanisms in place, the coal industry failed to thrive due to the intervention of Kuomintang political power, indicating that embedded relationships can generate counterproductive effects under certain conditions. Fourth, the study argues that Chibber’s notion of bureaucratic “internal coherence” is insufficient to explain the coal sector; economic development bureaucrats were not a single, fully integrated state actor but operated within a field of multiple, intersecting actors, making policy implementation a process fraught with negotiation and friction. The analysis in this study not only fills a gap in coal industry research but also offers a new perspective for understanding the role of the energy sector within a developmental state. Future research could further explore these dynamics through comparative analysis with other East Asian countries, such as South Korea and Japan.