http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/113 2026-03-10T12:47:35Z 2026-03-10T12:47:35Z Yuan-Lin Chen 陳苑霖 http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54198 2021-06-16T02:44:18Z 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z

標題: 高階經理人薪酬與限制員工權利新股; Named Executive Officers Compensations and Restricted Shares 作者: Yuan-Lin Chen; 陳苑霖 摘要: 本研究主要介紹並分析台灣甫通過相關法令之薪酬工具：限制員工權利新股，並進一步以個案分析之方式探討宏碁高階經理人薪酬結構與績效之關聯性。 首先，先探討台灣2011年6月修法完成之薪酬工具：限制員工權利新股。透過比較台灣限制員工權利新股與美國已行之有年的選擇權及限制型股票之現況，包含了兩國之企業使用比例、既得條件是否以時間條件或為績效提件、績效條件是否以財務指標或非財務指標、績效條件是否選取標竿樣本，以及既得期間長短之差異，對於未來台灣企業在發行限制員工權利新股時，提出可以加強其激勵效果之薪酬結構。 接著，為了更深入了解單一公司實際薪酬設計的細節，我藉由個案分析之方式，以宏碁公司做為分析對象，介紹其公司成立背景並深入探討宏碁近期高階經理人之薪酬結構，同時以華碩與戴爾做為國內外之比較公司，比較三者之間高階經理人薪酬結構之差異及其薪酬績效關聯性之強弱。綜觀台灣美國市場分析，以及同產業的公司分析，我提出對宏碁薪酬制度之建議。; The objective of this research is to analyze the practice of restricted shares in Taiwan, which was launched by Corporation Law in 2011. I first constrast the current structures of restricted shares in Taiwan with the structure in the US (where restricted shares have already been used for a long time) in four aspects: the vesting condition in terms of time and performance, the performance criteria in terms of financial performance and non-financial performance, the benchmark of performance in terms of absolute performance and relative performance and the performance horizon. To shed further lights on the practice in an individual firm, I then conduct case analyses on Acer Inc. I analyze the compensation structure of its executive compensation, and compare its practice with two international peers, ASUS Inc., and Dell Inc. Based on the analyses for the overall market in the USA and Taiwan, along with the industry peer analyses, I form my suggestions to ACER Inc.

2015-01-01T00:00:00Z Kuan-Lun Yu 游冠倫 http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/46199 2021-06-15T04:57:45Z 2010-01-01T00:00:00Z

標題: 高階經理人薪酬與企業績效：類神經網路之應用; A Neural Network Model for Executive Compensation and Firm Performance 作者: Kuan-Lun Yu; 游冠倫 摘要: 基於代理理論所衍生出的代理問題，高階經理人的薪酬被認為是能夠將經理人與股東間的利益一致，使得經理人能夠付諸股東所企盼的行動。但可惜過去的實證研究，皆只在薪酬與績效間找到微弱的關聯性。而本研究主要目的在於透過不同以往的研究方法，以類神經網路預測模型驗證高階經理人薪酬與企業經營績效的關聯性。結果顯示在高達七成以上預測率的模型中，薪酬變數對於預測模型的重要性都相當高，故可推論薪酬與企業績效具有一定程度的關聯性。且我們亦發現在不同績效指標上，各薪酬的重要性亦各有不同，諸如紅利與會計績效，選擇權與市場績效間的連結。除此之外，時間區段的更迭，也發現各薪酬重要性有一致的變化。最後，此研究結果亦能提供企業未來訂定高階經理人薪酬的方針。; The conflict of interest between the shareholders and the executives is known as the principal-agent problem. If the shareholders have complete information, they can easily design a contract (or incentive plan) that encourages the actions they want. However, the literature suggests weak or statistically insignificant relation between executive compensation and firm performance. In order to overcome the limitation in prior empirical or analytical studies, this paper investigates the association between executive incentive plans and firm performance by using an artificial neural network. Our results show that, overall, we can accurately associate the executives' incentive plan with the firm's performance 63% of the time. For the best and the worst performing firms, the accuracy rate is about 70%. Our findings also suggest that (1) the importance of the component of the incentive plan changes over time, (2) accounting-based performance measure is associated with EPS while market-based performance measure is associated with the market-to-book ratio, and (3) when firms with higher uncertainty, they rely less on stock/option incentives. Finally, the simplicity of the model can help firms better design or change the compensation scheme of the executives.

2010-01-01T00:00:00Z 王昱婷 Yu-Ting Wang http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98275 2025-07-31T16:12:05Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

標題: 高階經理人薪酬差距與成本習性之關聯性; Executive Pay Dispersion and Cost Behavior 作者: 王昱婷; Yu-Ting Wang 摘要: 本研究探討企業內部高階經理人薪酬差距與成本習性之關聯性，包含成本彈性（cost elasticity）與成本僵固性（cost stickiness）兩個面向。本研究以2010年至2018年間臺灣上市櫃非金融業公司為樣本，鑒於無法取得個別經理人薪酬數據，創新地以薪酬級距序列化方式設計了三項具行為意涵的薪酬差距指標，分別用以衡量整體離散程度、與最高薪酬的距離，以及對鄰近群體薪酬差距的感受，並進行迴歸實證分析。 實證結果顯示，薪酬差距與成本彈性呈現顯著正向關聯，亦即，較大的內部薪酬差距所帶來的激烈競爭，會促使高階主管提高變動成本比例，以便能配合需求變動迅速調整成本。另一方面，當市場需求下滑時，若高階主管間的薪酬差距較大，企業營業費用的調降幅度則顯著減少，成本僵固性加劇。這反映出，由薪酬差距所引發的激烈內部競爭，可能使管理者傾向保留資源，以維持部門績效與規模，從而抑制支出削減。進一步分析亦發現，該現象在產業競爭程度高或公司治理較弱的企業中更為顯著，顯示在社會比較壓力較大或缺乏內外部監督的情況下，薪酬差距更可能引發資源保護傾向，進而加劇成本僵固性。; This study investigates the relationship between internal executive pay dispersion and cost behavior, focusing on two dimensions: cost elasticity and cost stickiness. Using data from publicly listed non-financial firms in Taiwan from 2010 to 2018, and considering the unavailability of individual executive compensation data, this study develops three behaviorally meaningful indicators of pay dispersion by assigning ordinal levels to compensation brackets. These indicators reflect the overall level of dispersion, the gap from the top-paid executive, and sensitivity to peer-group pay differences, and are applied in regression analyses. The empirical results reveal a significant positive association between pay dispersion and cost elasticity, suggesting that greater internal pay gaps intensify internal competition, and motivate top executives to increase the proportion of variable costs, thereby enabling more agile cost adjustments in response to changes in activity levels. Moreover, when activity levels decline, firms with greater executive pay gaps tend to reduce operating expenses to a lesser extent, indicating stronger cost stickiness. This pattern implies that heightened internal competition resulting from pay disparities may lead managers to preserve departmental resources to maintain performance and scale, thus resisting cost reductions. Further analysis shows that this effect is more pronounced in firms operating in highly competitive industries or with weaker corporate governance. These findings suggest that in contexts characterized by heightened social comparison pressure or limited internal and external oversight, executive pay dispersion is more likely to trigger resource-protective behavior, which in turn exacerbates cost stickiness.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z Hung-Hua Pan 潘虹華 http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16957 2021-06-07T23:50:56Z 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z

標題: 高階經理人薪酬實證研究; Essays on Executive Compensation Research 作者: Hung-Hua Pan; 潘虹華 摘要: There are three essays in this dissertation. The first essay discusses the role of bonuses in CEO inside debt holdings. Prior literature states that the advantage of inside debt holdings is that they mitigate managerial risk-taking incentives and increase earnings quality. After considering the composition of inside debt in which pension benefits are contingent on bonus plans, my results show that once CEO inside debt holdings are related to bonus plans, the advantage of inside debt holdings may disappear. The second essay discusses that the learning process of shareholders reduces the variance of stock returns, thereby making stock return become a more direct estimate of an executive’s level of efforts. My results suggest that according to learning theory, firm age is an important factor determining executive stock-based incentives. The third essay discusses whether the presence of overlapping memberships on the compensation committee impacts the effective structure of executive compensation. Firms with the compensation committee members on other firms’ compensation committees (“external overlapping memberships”) and on the audit committees (“internal overlapping memberships”) may have different compensation structures than those without. My study provides evidence that overlapping memberships on the compensation committee influence the compensation setting process.

2014-01-01T00:00:00Z