從Derrida《法律的力量》一文探討法與正義的關係

Abstract

Jacques Derrida於1960年代提出解構（deconstruction）之思考方式，挑戰西方哲學及文學批評之傳統，引起廣大的注意及爭議。其中一項批評即質疑解構思想缺乏對實踐上政治、倫理問題的關注，流於艱澀的哲學語彙及文字遊戲。1989年，Derrida發表《法律的力量：“權威的神祕基礎”》一文，對此項批評作出初步回應，說明解構看待法律及正義問題的態度，及解構所觀察到的法律與正義為何。 就法律與正義之關係，若由哈特的法實證主義，則正義是評價法律或其適用的一種特殊的道德判斷，不影響法之效力，亦即法律之符合正義為偶然而非必然。但現實中存在著「法律應該實現正義」的說法，應如何加以解釋？是否有某種理論或基礎可以支持人們要求法律追求正義？本文之目的即在透過《法律的力量》一文理解Derrida如何架構及描繪法律與正義之關係，提供上述問題一種可能的回答。 Derrida所描繪的法律與正義關係可視為基於一項暴力的行動產生的排除與對立關係。在其觀察下，法律的建立是一項語言行動，構成了法律的意義封閉性，此即法律根本的暴力結構。正義則是被法律排除的他者，是溢出法律意義範圍的他異性，或謂外於法律有限性的無限性事物。Derrida認為，法律必須突破既有意義界限，朝向法外之他者接近，才能宣稱擁有法之正義，解構就是協助法律接近他者的一種方法。 Derrida的正義觀深受Emmanuel Levinas之倫理思想所影響，在對Levinas的批判中更深入思考人類語言及認識活動的暴力性。暴力指的是造成區分及差異的力量，即造成延異作用（differance）的力量。延異性力量固為暴力，但也是人類的立法活動、語言活動、認識活動的可能性條件，究其極端，時空也是延異作用的產物，在時空架構下人們得以認識現象、進行判斷、創造可操作的法律語彙，但在時空化的作用下，現在�顯現（presence）不斷成為非現在�非顯現的事物，成為現在的他者，因此他異性是無法透過一次性的認識或判斷而完全解消的。換言之，只要法律無法擺脫時空，就必須面對無法解消的他者，亦無法宣稱完全實現正義。這是法律的困境，卻也是解構思考的據點，唯有不斷提醒法律自身的歷史性、有限性、暴力性，才能促使法律不斷思考如何正確對待他者，以求接近正義。

Since 1960s, derridian deconstruction has been challenging dogmas and the dichotomy in western literary and philosophical tradition. In 90s, Jacques Derrida delivered many works on ethico-political issues, among which an important speech and later on published work “Force of law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, marking the so-called ethico-political turn of deconstruction. Through a close reading of “Force of Law” and tracing its connection with Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of other, this essay attempts to present how deconstructive thinking of law could sustain a claim demanding justice to be realized in law. In chapter 2 and 3, the paradoxical relation of law and justice in “Force of Law” is pictured. Law is taken as a language system with a closure of meaning. That which is beyond the horizon of legal knowledge falls into the horizon of justice. Law and justice seems to form a pair of opposites, however, they are at the origin formed as such by a differentiating force, indeed a violent force, which makes law and justice obscurely mutual-dependent.

In chapter 4, main ideas of Levinas’ ethics of other are discussed in order to show how Derrida’s law-justice relation turns to be an ethical relation in which law is obliged to be responsive to the demand of justice. Furthermore, differentiating forces or the violent structure within political organizations, linguistic systems, human knowledge formation, even in time-space framework is also discussed. Chapter 5 gives a tentative try on introducing deconstructive reading methods into legal interpretation and decision. What deconstructive reading could benefit is its focus on the limit of legal notions and the aporias in legal activity. Working on these cites of deconstruction may help with the transformation of law. In conclusion, deconstructive thinking of law asks for vigilance of law’s finitude, historicity, and its violent structure. Even if the law may not fully realize justice itself under the infinite movement of temporalization, this vigilance at least will keep law away from the worst violence of non-difference, and help it stay in the right way towards justice.