分立政府下行政部門回應窒礙難行法案之研究

Abstract

本研究以2024年中華民國總統與立法委員選舉後，所產生的分立政府格局為背景，探討行政部門如何回應立法院通過，但在執行上窒礙難行的法案。當前台灣面臨「朝小野大」、「三黨不過半」的新國會局面，在此政黨分立的憲政體制下，政策推動與法案執行遭遇高度政治對立與制度瓶頸。本文以「就業服務法」第46條修正案、與「原住民族保留地禁伐補償條例」為核心研究個案，分別代表特定社會政策型與補償型肉桶法案，分析行政部門在無預算保障、法制配套不足或政治主張差異的情境下，如何運用延遲施行細則、消極執行、尋找法規解套或重新修子法等方式回應立法及執行壓力。 本研究結合文獻回顧、次級資料分析與深度訪談，揭示在分立政府下，行政部門除須依法行政外，亦須回應高度民粹化或政治動員導向之法案所帶來的治理壓力。研究發現，行政部門在面對窒礙難行法案時，傾向採取雙軌並進的因應策略，即在不違背法案主體精神的前提下，透過技術性手段與程序緩解執行的困境。而在修法通過後，有涉及新增預算支出，行政機關於預算編列上採取消極應對的策略，並未主動提出常規預算，而是選擇透過其他特別預算項目進行「預算繞道」處理。此舉不僅反映行政部門對於立法內容的實質抵抗，也意在重申其對法案內容或決策程序的不滿。

This study examines how executive agencies in Taiwan respond to legislation passed by the Legislative Yuan that proves difficult to implement in practice, against the backdrop of a divided government following the 2024 presidential and legislative elections. The current political landscape is characterized by a minority presidency and a legislature where no single party holds a majority-a “three-party no-majority” configuration. Under this partisan division within Taiwan’s constitutional framework, policy advancement and legislative execution face significant political opposition and institutional gridlock. This research focuses on two controversial legislative cases during the 11th Legislative Yuan: the amendment to Article 46 of the Employment Service Act and the draft Act on Compensation for Logging Bans in Indigenous Reserved Lands. These cases, which represent targeted social policy and compensatory pork-barrel legislation respectively, are used to analyze how the executive branch responds to legislative mandates in contexts where there is no secured budget, insufficient legal frameworks, or conflicting political agendas. The executive responses identified include delaying the promulgation of implementing regulations, passive enforcement, exploiting legal loopholes, or initiating counter-legislation. By integrating literature review, secondary data analysis, and in-depth interviews, this study reveals that under divided government, executive agencies not only must act in accordance with the law but also contend with intense governance pressure arising from populist-driven or politically mobilized legislation. The findings suggest that when faced with unworkable laws, the executive tends to adopt a dual-track strategy: while upholding the core intent of the legislation, it simultaneously employs technical and procedural tools to mitigate implementation challenges. In cases involving additional fiscal expenditure, executive agencies often respond passively by avoiding the submission of formal budget proposals and instead diverting funding through alternative special budget mechanisms. This "budget circumvention" not only reflects substantive resistance to the legislative content but also serves as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with the policy substance or legislative process itself.