新聘高階經理人前與後的企業資本結構決策風格

Abstract

本研究以2003年至2023年美國上市公司樣本，探討新任執行長與財務長對企業資本結構決策風格的影響力，分別檢驗任用偏好假說和風格承襲假說。研究模型以合宜負債比偏離程度作為資本結構決策風格的代理變數，並納入性別、年齡、兼任董事長和職涯空窗天數作為調節變數。 實證結果顯示，在任用偏好假說，執行長樣本獲得部分支持，顯示董事會傾向新聘與既有資本結構決策風格相似的執行長，且年齡越低，其任用偏好程度越強；在風格承襲假說，執行長樣本亦獲得部分支持，顯示新任執行長傾向將其過往資本結構決策風格移植至新公司，且年齡越低、職涯空窗天數越長，其風格承襲程度越強；相較之下，財務長樣本對上述兩項研究假說皆未達統計顯著水準。 整體而言，相較於財務長，執行長具備較高的職位重要性和決策自主權。在高階人事任用決策，董事會更重視新任執行長是否與既有資本結構決策風格一致，並被年齡所調節；在企業資本結構決策，執行長展現較強烈的風格承襲效果，並被年齡和職涯空窗天數所調節。

This study investigates the impact of newly appointed CEOs and CFOs on firms’ capital structure decision styles, using data from U.S. publicly listed companies from 2003 to 2023. Two hypotheses are empirically tested : the selection preference hypothesis and the style inheritance hypothesis. The research model employs deviations from the target leverage ratio as a proxy for capital structure decision style. Gender, age, duality, and career gap duration are incorporated as moderating variables. Empirical results provide partial support for the selection preference hypothesis in the CEO sample, suggesting that boards tend to appoint CEOs whose capital structure decision styles align with the firm’s existing style, especially when the CEO is younger. The style inheritance hypothesis is also partially supported for CEOs, indicating that newly appointed CEOs tend to transfer their past decision styles to the new firm. This effect is stronger for younger CEOs and those with longer career gaps. In contrast, the CFO sample does not exhibit statistically significant support for either hypothesis. Overall, the findings reveal that CEOs hold greater positional importance and decision-making autonomy than CFOs. In executive selection, boards prioritize appointing CEOs whose decision styles are consistent with the firm's existing capital structure patterns, with this preference influenced by CEO age. In capital structure decision-making, CEOs are more likely to carry forward their previous decision styles, with this tendency moderated by both age and career gap duration.