共同基金追加募集對基金績效之影響：以臺灣共同基金為例

Abstract

本研究以台灣共同基金市場特有的「追加募集」制度為研究出發點，探討基金在追加募集前後之績效變化與其潛在成因。相較於國際市場的開放式基金多無募集額度限制，台灣制度設計提供一個可明確界定的事件時點，具備良好實證分析價值。本文運用2006年至2024年間經中華民國投信投顧公會公告資料所整理之追加募集基金樣本，分別就全體樣本、成立兩年內追募樣本，以及疫情後市場資金湧入期間之基金追募樣本進行實證分析。 研究結果顯示，整體而言，基金在追加募集後之報酬表現相對同類型平均有下滑趨勢，但影響程度依樣本特性而異。快速追募樣本與疫情期間樣本中，經理人可能因績效受矚目而出現過度自信行為，進而增加交易頻率並影響後續績效，符合行為金融學相關理論。此外，在市場資金大量湧入情境下，經理人需迅速將資金配置於市場，可能導致操作壓力與策略偏離，進一步侵蝕基金報酬。 本研究為國內少數以追加募集制度為核心進行實證分析之研究，除補足現有文獻缺口，亦可提供實務上對基金規模擴張與資金行為管理之參考依據。

This study investigates the performance dynamics of mutual funds before and after follow-on offerings (also known as “additional fundraising”), a mechanism uniquely embedded in Taiwan’s mutual fund regulation. Unlike open-ended funds in global markets that are not subject to issuance caps, Taiwan’s system mandates a declared fundraising ceiling during the fund’s initial offering, making the subsequent follow-on offering a clearly observable event for empirical analysis. Utilizing data from the Securities Investment Trust & Consulting Association (SITCA) in Taiwan between 2006 and 2024, this paper analyzes three distinct fund samples: all follow-on offering funds, those reaching the issuance threshold within two years of inception, and funds that initiated follow-on offerings during the post-COVID-19 surge in market liquidity. The empirical results reveal a general decline in fund performance relative to peer averages after the follow-on offering, though the extent varies by sample characteristics. In particular, funds that raised capital rapidly or during market overheating periods tend to experience more pronounced underperformance. The findings suggest that fund managers, under the spotlight of strong past performance, may become overconfident and increase trading frequency, thereby adversely affecting returns—consistent with behavioral finance theories. Furthermore, in the context of surging inflows, managers may be pressured to deploy capital quickly, potentially at unfavorable prices, leading to diminished post-offering performance. This research fills a gap in the literature by providing one of the first empirical examinations of Taiwan’s follow-on offering system, offering both academic insights and practical implications for fund governance and capital flow management.