Skip navigation

DSpace

機構典藏 DSpace 系統致力於保存各式數位資料(如:文字、圖片、PDF)並使其易於取用。

點此認識 DSpace
DSpace logo
English
中文
  • 瀏覽論文
    • 校院系所
    • 出版年
    • 作者
    • 標題
    • 關鍵字
    • 指導教授
  • 搜尋 TDR
  • 授權 Q&A
    • 我的頁面
    • 接受 E-mail 通知
    • 編輯個人資料
  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 國際企業學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98352
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor莊正民zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorCheng-Min Chungen
dc.contributor.author陸佳瑩zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorChia-Ying Luen
dc.date.accessioned2025-08-04T16:08:03Z-
dc.date.available2025-08-05-
dc.date.copyright2025-08-04-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.date.submitted2025-07-25-
dc.identifier.citation洪世章(2022)。創新六策:寫給創新者的關鍵思維(第二版)。聯經出版公司。

Achrol, R. S., & Gundlach, G. T. 1999. Legal and social safeguards against opportunism in exchange. Journal of Retailing, 75(1): 107-124.

Anderson, E. 1985. The salesperson as outside agent or employee: a transaction cost analysis. Marketing Science, 4 (summer): 234-254.

Anderson, S. W., & Dekker, H. C. 2005. Management control for market transactions: the relation between transaction characteristics, incomplete contract design and subsequent performance. Management Science, 51(12): 1734-1752.

Anderson, J. C., & Narus, J. A. 1990. A model of the distributor’s firm and manufacturer firm working partnerships. Journal of Marketing, 54: 42-58.

Antia, K.D., & Frazier, G. L. 2001. The severity of contract enforcement in interfirm channel relationships. Journal of Marketing, 65: 67-81.

Argyres, N. S., Bercovitz., J., & Mayer, K. J. 2007. Complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions: an empirical study of IT services contracts. Organization Science, 18(1): 3-19.

Argyres, N. S., & Mayer, K. J. 2007. Contract design as a firm capability: an integration of learning and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 32(4): 1060-1077.

Arve, M., & Martimort, D. 2016. Dynamic procurement under uncertainty: optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts. American Economic Review, 106(11): 3238–3274.

Aulakh, P. S., Kotabe, M., & Sahay, A. 1996. Trust and performance in cross-border marketing partnerships: a behavioral approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5): 1005-1032.

Avnet, T., & Higgins, E. T. 2006. How regulatory fit affects value in consumer choices and opinions. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(1): 1-10.

Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. 2002. Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1): 39-83.

Barney, J.B., & Hansen, M. H. 1994. Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15(Special Issue): 175-190.

Barthelemy, J., & Bertrand, V. Q. 2006. Complexity of outsourcing contracts and ex Post transaction costs: an empirical investigation. Journal of Management Studies, 43(8): 1775-1797.

Benaroch, M., Lichtenstein, Y., & Fink, L. 2016. Contract design choices and the balance of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs in software development outsourcing. MIS Quarterly, 40(1): 57-82.

Blonska, A., Storey, C., & Rozemeijer, F. 2013. Decomposing the effect of supplier development on relationship benefits: The role of relational capital. Industrial Marketing Management, 42(8): 1295-1306.

Bohns, V., Lucas, G., Molden, D.C., Finkel, E.J., & Coolsen, K.K. 2013. Opposites fit: regulatory focus complementarity and relationship well-being. Social Cognition, 31(1): 1-14.

Boulay, J. 2010. The role of contract, information systems and norms in the governance of franchise systems. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 38(9): 662-676.

Bowersox, D. J., & Cooper, M. B. 1992. Strategic Marketing Channel Management. McGraw-Hill.

Brendl, C. M., & Higgins, E. T. 1996. Principles of judging valence: What makes events positive or negative? Advances in experimental social psychology, 28: 95-160.

Brockner, J., & Higgins, E. T. 2001. Regulatory focus theory: Implications for the study of emotions at work. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86(1): 35-66.

Brousseau, E., & Glachant, J. M. 2002. The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications. Cambridge University Press.

Brown, J. R, Dev, C. S., & Lee, D. J. 2000. Managing marketing channel opportunism: the efficacy of alternative governance mechanism. Journal of Marketing, 6(2): 51-65.

Burchell, B., & Wilkinson, F. 1997. Trust, business relationships and the contractual environment. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21: 217-237.

Cannon, J. P., Achrol, R. S., & Gundlach, G.T. 2000. Contracts, norms and plural form governance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28(2): 180-194.

Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. 2015. Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations Management, 33: 15-42.

Carson, J. J., Madhok, A., & Wu, T. 2006. Uncertainty, opportunism, and governance: the effects of volatility and ambiguity on formal and relational contracting. Academy of Management Journal, 49(5): 1058-1077.

Chao, E. 2011. Determinants of vertical coodindation in buyer-seller relations: exploratory findings from a developing economy. International Journal of Business and Management, 6(8): 25-33.

Chen, W., & Chen, X. 2019. Inter-organizational trust and relationship governance: A meta-analytic review. Industrial Marketing Management, 82: 253-265.

Chi, Y.; Zeng, F.; Dong, M. C.; & Song, Y. 2020. Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Industry Level Firm to Firm Dyad. Journal of Business to Business Marketing, 27(3): 203-219.

Claro, D. P., Hagelaar, G., & Omta, O. 2003. The determinants of relational governance and performance: how to management business relationship? Industrial Marketing Management, 32(8): 703-716.

Cornelissen, J. P., & Werner, M. D. 2014. Putting framing in perspective: a review of framing and frame analysis across the management and organizational literature. The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1): 181-235.

Crocker, K. J., & Reynolds, K. J. 1993. The efficiency of incomplete contracts: an empirical analysis of air force engine procurement. RAND Journal of Economics, 24: 126-146.

Das, T. K., & Teng, B.S. 2001. A risk perception model of alliance structuring. Journal of International Management, 7(1): 1-29.

Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. 2003. The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving performance: empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. Organization Science, 14(1): 57-68.

Dyer, J, H, & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 660-679.

Etgar, M., & Valency, A. 1983. Determinants of the use of contracts in conventional marketing channels. Journal of Retailing, 59: 81-92.

Faems, D., M. Janssens, A. Madhok, & Looy, B. V. 2008. Towards an integrative perspective on alliance governance: connecting contract design, contract application and trust dynamics. Academy of Management Journal, 51(6): 1053-1078.

Ferrin, D. L., Bligh, M. C., & Kohles, J. C. 2007. Can I trust you to trust me? A theory of trust, monitoring, and cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Group & Organization Management, 32(4): 465-499.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. 1991. Social Cognition. McGraw-Hill.

Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. 1981. Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1): 39-50.

Furlotti, M. 2007. There is more to contracts than incompleteness: A review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design. Journal of Manage Governance, 11: 61-99.

Gadde L., & Snehota, I. 2000. Making the most of supplier relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(4): 305-316.

Garbarino, E., & Johnson, M. S. 1999. The different roles of satisfaction, trust, and commitment in customer relationships. Journal of Marketing, 63(2): 70-87.

Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. 2017. Formal and informal contracting: theory and evidence. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13: 141-159.

Grandori, A. 2006. Innovation, uncertainty and relational governance. Industry and Innovation, 13(2): 127-133.

Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.

Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. 2003. Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2): 348-362.

Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 85-112.

Gulati, R. 1999. Network location and leaning: The influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 397-420.

Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. 2008. Interorganizational trust, governance choice, and exchange performance. Organization Science, 19(5): 688-708.

Gulati, R., & Singh, H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4): 781-814.

Hanke, S., Rohmann, E., & Förster, J. 2019. Regulatory focus and regulatory mode—Keys to narcissists'(lack of) life satisfaction? Personality and Individual Differences, 138: 09-116.

Harmon, D. J., Kim, P. H., & Mayer, K. J. 2014. Breaking the letter vs. spirit of the law: How the interpretation of contract violations affects trust and the management of relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 36(4): 497-517.

Hart, O., & Moore, J. 2008. Contracts as reference points. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1): 1-48.

Haws, K. L., Dhokakia, U. M. Bearden, W. O. 2010. An assessment of chronic regulatory focus measures. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(5): 967-982.

Heide, J. B. 1994. Interorganizational governance in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 58: 71-85.

Heide, J.B., & John, G. 1992. Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of Marketing, 56(2): 32-44.

Hendrikse, G., Hippmann, P., & Windsperger, J. 2015. Trust, transaction costs and contractual incompleteness in franchising. Small Business Economics, 44: 867-888.

Herzberg, F. 1968. One more time: How do you motivate employee? Harvard Business Review, 46(1): 53-62.

Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., & Snyderman, B. B. 1959. The Motivation to Work. John Wiley & Sons.

Higgins, E. T. 1998. Promotion and prevention: regulatory focus as a motivational principle. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30: 1-46.

Higgins, E. T. 2000. Making a good decision: Value from fit. American Psychologist, 55(11): 1217-1230.

Hoffmann, W. H., Neumann, K., & Speckbacher, G. 2010.The effect of interorganizational trust on make-or-cooperate decisions: Disentangling opportunism-dependent and opportunism-independent effects of trust. European Management Review, 7(2):101-115.

Hunt, S. D., & Morgan, R. M. 1994. Organizational commitment: one of many commitments or key mediating construct? Academy of Management Journal, 37(6): 1568-1587.

Inkpen, A.C., & Currall, S. 2004. The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures. Organization Science, 15(5): 586-599.

Jap, S. D., & Ganesan, S. 2000. Control mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2): 227-245.

John, G., & Weitz, B. 1989. Salesforce compensation: an empirical investigation of factors related to use of salary versus incentive compensation. Journal of Marketing Research, 26(1):1-14.

Joskow, P. L. 1988. Asset specificity and the structure of vertical relationships: empirical evidence. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(1): 95-117.

Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. 2000. Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 217–237.

Kalkanci, B., Chen, K.Y., & Erhun, F. 2011. Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information: an experimental evaluation. Management Science, 57(4): 689-704.

Kaplan, S. 2008. Framing contests: strategy making under uncertainty. Organization Science, 19(5): 729-753.

Klein, B. 2000. Fisher-general motors and the nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 43:105–42.

Klein, Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom. 2005. Trust, contract and relationship development. Organization Studies, 26(6): 813–840.

Konsynski, B., & McFarlan, F. 1990. Information partnership shared data, shared scale. Harvard Business Review, 9(10): 114-120.

Koza, K. L., & Dant, R. P. 2007. Effects of relationship climate, control mechanism, and communications on conflict resolution behavior and performance outcomes. Journal of Retailing, 83(3): 279-296.

Kumar, R., & Nti, K. O. 1998. Differential learning and interaction in alliance dynamics: A process and outcome discrepancy model. Organization Science, 9(3): 356-367.

Larson, A. 1992. Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: A study of the governance of exchange relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1): 76-104.

Lazzarini, S. G., Miller, G. J., & Zenger, T. R. 2008. Dealing with the paradox of embeddedness: the role of contracts and trust in facilitating movement out of committed relationships. Organizational Science, 19(5): 709-728.

Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gardner, W. L. 2000. The pleasures and pains of distinct self-construals: The role of interdependence in regulatory focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(6): 1122-1134.

Lee, Y., & Cavusgil, S. T. 2006. Enhancing alliance performance: the effects of contractual-based versus relational-based governance. Journal of Business Research, 59(8): 896-905.

Li, X., Zheng, Y., & Wang, L. 2020. Supply chain collaboration: The role of trust and contractual governance. Journal of Business Research, 117: 635-643.

Liu, Y., Luo, Y., & Liu, T. 2009. Governing buyer-supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: evidence from china. Journal of Operations Management, 27: 294-309.

Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. 2002. Motivation by positive or negative role models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(4): 854–864.

Luminear, F., & Malhotra, D. 2011. Shadow of the contract: how contract structure shapes interfirm dispute resolution. Strategic Management Journal, 32(5): 532-555.

Luo, Y. 2002. Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 23(10): 903-919.

Luo, Y. 2007. An integrated anti-opportunism system in international exchange. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(6): 855-877.

Macneil, I. R. 1978. Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72: 854-905.

Macneil, I. R. 1980. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. Yale University Press.

Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. 2002. The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(3): 534-559.

March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. 1958. Organizations. Wiley.

Mayer, K. J., & Argyres, N. S. 2004. Learning to contract: evidence from the personal computer industry. Organization Science, 15(4): 394-410.

Mayer, K. J., & Bercovitz, J. 2003. The influence of legacy and appropriability on contractual choice: Evidence from information technology consulting. Organization Science, 14(6): 696-713.

McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. 2003. Trust as an organizing principle. Organizational Science, 14(1): 91-103.

Mellewigt, T., Madhok, A., & Weibel, A. 2007. Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships - substitutes and complements. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28: 833-847.

Miller, R. J., Munoz, L., & Mallin, M. 2021. Acquaintances or friends? Exploring the effects of contracts, trust and ethical level on opportunism in manufacturer-distributor relationships. The Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 36(1): 137-149.

Mooi, E., Wang, Q., Seggie, S., & Jap, S. 2024. The show must go on: The role of contract frames in safeguarding relationship continuity. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 52: 1842-1858.

Muris, T. J. 1985. Opportunistic behavior and the law of conduct. Minnesota Law Review, 65: 521-590.

Muthusamy, S. K., White, M. A., & Carr, A. 2007. An empiricalexamination of the role of social exchanges in alliance performance. Journal of Managerial Issues, 19(1): 53-75.

Ness, H., & Haugland, S. A. 2005. The evolution of governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies in fixed-duration interfirm relationships. Journal of Business Research, 58: 1226-1239.

Nooteboom, B. 2000. Learning by interaction: absorptive capacity, cognitive distance and governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 4: 69-92.

Nooteboom B, Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N. G. 1997. Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. Academy of Management Journal, 40(2): 308-338.

Palay, T. M. 1985. Avoiding regulatory constraints: contracting safeguards and the role of informal agreements. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1(1): 155-175.

Pham, M. T., & Chang, H. H. 2010. Regulatory focus, regulatory fit, and the search and consideration of choice alternatives. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(4): 626-640.

Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. Journal of Management, 12(4): 531–544.

Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8): 707-725.

Poppo, L., & Zhou, K.Z. 2014. Managing contracts for fairness in buyer-supplier exchanges. Strategic Management Journal, 35(10): 1508-1527.

Poppo, L., Zou, K. Z., & Rhu, S. 2008. Alternative origins to interorganizational trust: an interdependence perspective on the shadow of the past and the shadow of the future. Organization Science, 19(1): 39-55.

Post, J. E., & Griffin, J. J. 1997. Managing reputation: pursuing everyday excellence: corporate reputation and external affairs management. Corporate Reputation Review, 1: 165-171.

Puranam, P., & Vanneste, B. S. 2009. Trust and governance: untangling a tangled web. Academy of Management Review, 34(1): 11-31.

Reuer, J. J., & Ariño, A. 2002. Contractual renegotiations in srategic alliances. Journal of Management, 28(1): 47-68.

Reuer, J. J., & Ariño, A. 2007. Strategic alliance contracts: dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3): 313-330.

Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. 1997. Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future, The Journal of Marketing, 61(4): 30-54.

Ring, P.S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1992. Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 13(7): 483-498.

Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. 1998. Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3): 393-404.

Schwartz, A. 2004. The law and economics of costly contracting. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 20: 2-31.

Selviaridis, K., & Van der Valk, W. 2019. Framing contractual performance incentives: effects on supplier behavior. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 39(2): 190-213.

Shahzad, K., Ali, T., Kohtamäki, M., & Takala, J. 2020. Enabling roles of relationship governance mechanisms in the choice of inter-firm conflict resolution strategies. The Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 35(6): 957-969.

Sirdeshmukh, D., Singh, J., & Sabol, B. 2002. Consumer trust, value, and loyalty in relational exchanges. Journal of Marketing, 66(1): 15-37.

Sitkin, S., & Bies, R. 1994. The Legalistic Organization. SAGE Publications.

Song, H., Zhu, F., Klakegg ole, J., & Wang, P. 2018. Relationship between contractual flexibility and contractor’s cooperative behavior: The mediating effect of justice perception. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 11: 382-405.

Susarla, A., Subramanyam, R., & Karhade, P. 2010. Contractual provisions to mitigate Holdup: evidence from information technology outsourcing, Information Systems Research, 21(1): 37-55.

Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness. Administrative Science, 42: 35-67.

Vlaar, P. W. L. 2008. Contracts and Trust in Alliances: Discovering, Creating and Appropriating. Edward Elgar.

Vlachos, L. 2020. Contract design and supplier performance: an empirical investigation using multi-criteria, decision analysis. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 70(7): 1655-1681.

Weber, L., & Mayer, K. J. 2011. Designing effective contracts: exploring the influence of framing and expectations. Academy of Management Review, 36(1): 53-75.

Weber, L., & Mayer, K. 2014. Transaction cost economics and the cognitive perspective: Investigating the sources & governance of interpretive uncertainty. Academy of Management Review, 39(3): 344-363.

Weber, L., Mayer, M. J., & Macher, J. T. 2017. An analysis of extendibility and early termination provisions: the importance of framing duration safeguards, Academy of Management Journal, 54(1): 182-202.

Williamson, O. E. 1981. The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87(3): 548-577.

Winterheld, H. A., & Simpson, J. A. 2011. Seeking security or growth: A regulatory focus perspective on motivations in romantic relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(5): 935-954.

Woolthuis, R. J.A., Hillebrand, B., & Nooteboom, B. 2005. Trust, contract and relationship development. Organization Studies, 26(6): 813-840.

Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. 2005. The formation of buyer-supplier relationships: Detailed contract drafting and close partner selection, Journal of Marketing, 69: 103-117.

Yan, A., & Gray, B. 1994. Bargaining power, management control, and performance in United States–China joint ventures: A comparative case study. Academy of Management Journal, 37(6): 1478-1517.

Yang, H., Cao, E., Lu, K. J., & Zhang, G. 2017. Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 32(8): 1087-1097.

Yao, H., Chen, J., & Lu, Y. 2021. Contractual and relational enforcement in the aftermath of contract violations: the role of contracts and trust. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 14(7): 1527-1549.

Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. 1998. Does trust matter: exploring the effects of Iinter-organizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 9: 141-159.

Zaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. 1995. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 373-392.

Zhang, C., Cavusgil, S. T., & Roath, A. S. 2003. Manufacturer governance of foreign distributor relationships: do relational norms enhance competitiveness in the export market? Journal of International Business Studies, 34(6): 550-566.

Zhang, L., Fu, Y., & Lu, W. 2021. Contract enforcement for claimants’ satisfaction with construction dispute resolution: moderating role of shadow of the future, fairness perception, and trust. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 147(2): 04020167.

Zollo, M., Reuer, J., & Singh, H. 2002. Interorganizational routines and performance in strategic alliances. Organization Science, 13: 701-713.

Zollo, M., & Winter, S. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities. Organization Science, 13: 339-351.
-
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98352-
dc.description.abstract本研究試圖運用經濟、社會、心理認知觀點,探討臺灣廠商如何在不同交易關係中運用多元治理模式去維持交易均衡運作,藉此達到有效治理。契約除了經濟運用外,也可能在心理上影響企業交流。契約框架可視為一種契約管理及設計的概念框架,可用來系統性地描述和結構化契約的關鍵要素,確保契約設計能夠有效平衡各方需求、管理風險並促進合作效率。契約框架可能引發特定情緒、行為、對組織交流和關係的看法,進而對關係設定特定的期望,而對關係治理結果產生不同的影響。本研究試圖由心理認知角度,探討影響契約框架的可能因素及契約框架在關係治理中的角色。
因為組織關係治理為一個動態流程,本研究加入程序的觀點,探討締約前的契約框架及關係治理機制設計,並分析衝突發生時的治理機制執行方式,及分析事後的治理結果。希望能透過聯合檢視組織間治理結構和治理程序,剖析關係治理實際運作情形及契約彈性。除了契約框架,也將探究關係資本對關係治理的影響,將信任區分成事先信任及事後未來信任傾向,藉此檢測信任與契約交互作用下對關係治理的影響。
本研究以機械及電子製造業為研究對象,使用問卷調查法來收集資料,資料分析單位為單筆交易關係,最後總共回收191份有效問卷進行資料分析。分析結果發現交易特質、交易風險、關係資本及關係風險相關變數可能會影響契約框架的使用,在具有關係資本的緊密關係中,使用促進型契約框架的程度會高於預防型契約框架。多元迴歸分析也發現,使用合作條款複雜度、防衛條款複雜度、延續條款複雜度、關係規範為依變數時,加入預防型契約框架和促進型契約框架變數後,都能顯著改善迴歸模型的解釋力,表示契約框架對契約複雜度及關係規範有顯著影響。
契約執行的分析結果發現,合作條款複雜度及防衛條款複雜度對執行正式契約有正向影響,而關係規範及信任對執行關係契約對正向影響。另外,預防型契約框架對信任與執行關係契約之關係存在正向調節效果。關係治理績效分析則顯示,預防型契約框架能透過正式契約而影響交易績效,促進型契約框架能透過關係規範而影響交易滿意,而事先信任則可能透過關係規範、執行關係契約而影響未來信任傾向。當存在組織信任時,交易廠商會分享彼此想法和利益資訊,採用雙方可接受的方式去處理問題,在執行契約條款時也會採行較有彈性的方式,較不會嚴格執行正式契約。
公司若能根據交易屬性選擇合適的契約框架,透過事前管理這些期望以匹配交易要求,將可以獲得更好的治理績效。因此,契約可以同時作為保障和關係管理工具,可運用它塑造雙方對交換要求及關係的期望。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis study attempts to use economic, social, and psychological cognitive perspectives to explore how Taiwanese manufacturers use multiple governance models in different transaction relationships to maintain balanced transaction operations and thereby achieve effective governance. Contracts may also have a psychological impact on inter-organizational interactions, in addition to their economic applications. The contract frame can be seen as a conceptual frame for contract management and design, which can be used to systematically describe and structure the key elements of the contract to ensure that the contract design can effectively balance the needs of all parties, manage risks and promote cooperation efficiency. The contract frame may induce specific emotions, behaviors, and perceptions of organizational exchanges and relationships, thereby setting specific expectations for relationships and having different impacts on relationship governance outcomes. This study attempts to explore the possible factors that affect the contract frame and the role of the contract frame in relationship governance from a psychological cognitive perspective.
Because the inter-organizational relationship governance is a dynamic process, this study incorporates a procedural perspective to explore the contract frame and relationship governance mechanism design prior to contracting. It further analyzes the implementation of governance mechanisms when governance conflicts arise, as well as the governance outcomes that follow. This study seeks to elucidate the actual operation of relationship governance and contract flexibility by integrating an analysis of inter-organizational governance structures and governance processes. In addition to the contract frame, the study further investigates the influence of relational capital on relationship governance. Specifically, trust is conceptualized as comprising ex-ante trust and ex-post future trust propensity, thereby testing the impact of the interaction between trust and contract on relationship governance.
This study focuses on the machinery and electronics manufacturing industries and collects data through a questionnaire survey. The unit of analysis is the individual transaction relationship. In total, 191 valid questionnaires were collected for data analysis. The analysis results show that transaction characteristics, transaction risks, relational capital and relational risk-related variables may influence the use of contract frame. In close relationships characterized by high relational capital, the degree of using promotion contract frame is higher than that of prevention contract frame. The multiple regression analysis further reveals that when the complexity of cooperative clauses, defensive clauses, and continuity clauses, as well as relational norms, are used as dependent variables, the inclusion of prevention and promotion contract frame significantly improves the explanatory power of the regression models. This indicates that contract frame has a significant impact on both contract complexity and relational norms.
The analysis results for contract enforcement revealed that the complexity of cooperative clauses and defensive clauses has a positive effect on the enforcement of formal contracts, while relational norms and trust were found to have a positive effect on the enforcement of relational contracts. In addition, a positive moderating effect of the prevention contract frame on the relationship between trust and the enforcement of relational contracts was identified. The analysis of relationship governance performance indicates that the prevention contract frame can affect transaction performance through formal contracts, the promotion contract frame can affect transaction satisfaction through relational norms. Moreover, ex-ante trust is found to influence future trust propensity through relational norms and the enforcement of relational contracts. When organizational trust exists, trading partners are more likely to share ideas and benefit-related information, address problems through mutually acceptable approaches, and adopt more flexible methods when implementing contractual clauses, rather than strictly enforcing formal contracts.
If a company can choose an appropriate contract frame based on the transaction attributes and manage these expectations in advance to match the transaction requirements, it will be able to achieve better governance performance. Therefore, contracts can serve as both a safeguard and a relationship management tool, which can be used to shape the expectations of both parties regarding the requirements of the exchange and their relationship.
en
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-08-04T16:08:03Z
No. of bitstreams: 0
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2025-08-04T16:08:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0en
dc.description.tableofcontents誌謝…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅰ
摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅱ
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅳ
目次……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………VII
圖次………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………IX
表次…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………X
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究問題與目的………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4
第三節 研究範圍與研究流程……………………………………………………………………………………………………5
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………7
第一節 契約框架……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………7
第二節 關係治理…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………13
第三節 雙因子理論……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
第四節 信任……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………31
第五節 契約框架對關係治理之影響……………………………………………………………………………………35
第六節 信任對關係治理之影響……………………………………………………………………………………………42
第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………47
第一節 研究架構與研究假說…………………………………………………………………………………………………47
第二節 研究變數…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………52
第三節 研究對象與資料收集…………………………………………………………………………………………………59
第四節 信度與效度檢定…………………………………………………………………………………………………………62
第四章 研究結果………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………65
第一節 契約框架之影響因素分析………………………………………………………………………………………65
第二節 契約框架對關係治理之影響…………………………………………………………………………………76
第三節 關係資本對關係治理之影響…………………………………………………………………………………90
第四節 小結……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………95
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………99
第一節 研究結果討論………………………………………………………………………………………………………………99
第二節 理論與實務貢獻…………………………………………………………………………………………………………104
第三節 研究限制與未來研究建議………………………………………………………………………………………106
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………110
附錄一 不同公司別的契約框架分析…………………………………………………………………………………………122
附錄二 研究問卷…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………124
-
dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject契約框架zh_TW
dc.subject契約設計zh_TW
dc.subject契約執行zh_TW
dc.subject關係資本zh_TW
dc.subject關係治理zh_TW
dc.subjectrelational capitalen
dc.subjectrelationship governanceen
dc.subjectcontract frameen
dc.subjectcontract enforcementen
dc.subjectcontract designen
dc.title關係資本、契約框架及跨組織關係治理之研究zh_TW
dc.titleThe Study of Relational Capital, Contract Frame and Inter-Organizational Relationship Governanceen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear113-2-
dc.description.degree博士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee方世杰;譚丹琪;黃國峯;林志斌zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeShih-Chieh Fang;Tan-Chi Tan;Kuo-Feng Huang;Chih-Pin Linen
dc.subject.keyword關係資本,契約框架,關係治理,契約設計,契約執行,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordrelational capital,contract frame,relationship governance,contract design,contract enforcement,en
dc.relation.page128-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202502392-
dc.rights.note同意授權(限校園內公開)-
dc.date.accepted2025-07-28-
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept國際企業學系-
dc.date.embargo-lift2025-08-05-
顯示於系所單位:國際企業學系

文件中的檔案:
檔案 大小格式 
ntu-113-2.pdf
授權僅限NTU校內IP使用(校園外請利用VPN校外連線服務)
1.61 MBAdobe PDF
顯示文件簡單紀錄


系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。

社群連結
聯絡資訊
10617臺北市大安區羅斯福路四段1號
No.1 Sec.4, Roosevelt Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. 106
Tel: (02)33662353
Email: ntuetds@ntu.edu.tw
意見箱
相關連結
館藏目錄
國內圖書館整合查詢 MetaCat
臺大學術典藏 NTU Scholars
臺大圖書館數位典藏館
本站聲明
© NTU Library All Rights Reserved