高階經理人薪酬差距與成本習性之關聯性

Abstract

本研究探討企業內部高階經理人薪酬差距與成本習性之關聯性，包含成本彈性（cost elasticity）與成本僵固性（cost stickiness）兩個面向。本研究以2010年至2018年間臺灣上市櫃非金融業公司為樣本，鑒於無法取得個別經理人薪酬數據，創新地以薪酬級距序列化方式設計了三項具行為意涵的薪酬差距指標，分別用以衡量整體離散程度、與最高薪酬的距離，以及對鄰近群體薪酬差距的感受，並進行迴歸實證分析。 實證結果顯示，薪酬差距與成本彈性呈現顯著正向關聯，亦即，較大的內部薪酬差距所帶來的激烈競爭，會促使高階主管提高變動成本比例，以便能配合需求變動迅速調整成本。另一方面，當市場需求下滑時，若高階主管間的薪酬差距較大，企業營業費用的調降幅度則顯著減少，成本僵固性加劇。這反映出，由薪酬差距所引發的激烈內部競爭，可能使管理者傾向保留資源，以維持部門績效與規模，從而抑制支出削減。進一步分析亦發現，該現象在產業競爭程度高或公司治理較弱的企業中更為顯著，顯示在社會比較壓力較大或缺乏內外部監督的情況下，薪酬差距更可能引發資源保護傾向，進而加劇成本僵固性。

This study investigates the relationship between internal executive pay dispersion and cost behavior, focusing on two dimensions: cost elasticity and cost stickiness. Using data from publicly listed non-financial firms in Taiwan from 2010 to 2018, and considering the unavailability of individual executive compensation data, this study develops three behaviorally meaningful indicators of pay dispersion by assigning ordinal levels to compensation brackets. These indicators reflect the overall level of dispersion, the gap from the top-paid executive, and sensitivity to peer-group pay differences, and are applied in regression analyses. The empirical results reveal a significant positive association between pay dispersion and cost elasticity, suggesting that greater internal pay gaps intensify internal competition, and motivate top executives to increase the proportion of variable costs, thereby enabling more agile cost adjustments in response to changes in activity levels. Moreover, when activity levels decline, firms with greater executive pay gaps tend to reduce operating expenses to a lesser extent, indicating stronger cost stickiness. This pattern implies that heightened internal competition resulting from pay disparities may lead managers to preserve departmental resources to maintain performance and scale, thus resisting cost reductions. Further analysis shows that this effect is more pronounced in firms operating in highly competitive industries or with weaker corporate governance. These findings suggest that in contexts characterized by heightened social comparison pressure or limited internal and external oversight, executive pay dispersion is more likely to trigger resource-protective behavior, which in turn exacerbates cost stickiness.