缺乏課責的民主？政黨規則推動的政治晉升

Abstract

在 2008 年至 2020 年間當選的立法委員中，約有 16% 中國國民黨和民主進步黨的現任立法委員在任期中有追求地方縣市首長的職位，並且近 9% 的立法委員受到各自政黨的提名。這不免讓人好奇，甚麼樣的立法委員會選擇帶職參選？選民是否會對這些俗稱「落跑」的候選人政治課責？本文以此為出發點，首先檢驗 2008 年至 2020 年間兩大黨立法委員當選人的資料（N=396），探討政治野心與政黨甄補兩個文獻脈絡下的因素孰是影響臺灣立法委員帶職參選的主要因素？而後本文執行一個實驗問卷（N=974），檢驗個人層次中民眾對於帶職參選候選人的政治課責，以理解甚麼樣的因素會影響民眾對帶職參選的政治課責。最後，本研究輔以半結構式訪談的經驗證據來解釋觀察性資料與實驗問卷結果。 本文的主要研究發現有二。首先，本文延續過去臺灣政黨的候選人選擇機制的討論，驗證了兩大黨在相同政治系統的脈絡下，發展出相似的候選人選擇機制。具體呈現在兩大黨縣市長之所以提名現任立法委員都高度反映選區開放性。就提名方式來說，本文則發現政黨在選區的政治地盤的穩固程度是導致政黨甄補候選人傾向採取初選或徵召的關鍵因素。 再者，本文也發現民眾對於帶職參選偏向負面，且帶職參選立委的黨籍和提名方式並不影響一般選民對帶職參選的看法。不過，黨派選民對帶職參選卻是呈現標準不一：他們表現出「不支持於非同黨立法委員，並忠誠於同黨立法委員」的兩面性。此外，提名方式亦會影響黨派選民的看法：黨派選民更傾向不支持非同黨立委受徵召而參選縣市長選舉，並且偏好同黨立委參與初選來爭取縣市長的提名。 總結而言，本文的研究貢獻有二。首先，本文透過混合研究法蒐集到的不同經驗資料展示：臺灣兩大政黨可以利用黨派選民對帶職參選不一致的標準，透過在優勢選區中辦理初選，並在艱困選區中直接徵召候選人，而使帶職參選成為黨內的政治晉升管道。其次，本文也在理論上揉合政治野心與政黨甄補的既有文獻，以更完整解釋為什麼候選人個人政治野心可以與政黨甄補共同存在於從臺灣立法委員到縣市長這類高層政治菁英的政治晉升過程中。

Among the legislators elected between 2008 and 2020, approximately 16% of the incumbent legislators from the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sought local county or city mayoral positions during their terms, with nearly 9% receiving nominations from their respective parties. This raises questions about which types of legislators choose to run for office while still serving their terms and whether voters hold these so-called "runaway" candidates politically accountable. This paper takes this as a starting point and first examines data on elected legislators from the two major parties between 2008 and 2020 (N=396) to explore whether political ambition or party recruitment is the primary factor influencing Taiwanese legislators to run for office while in position. Subsequently, the paper conducts an experimental survey (N=974) to examine how individuals hold these legislators accountable at a personal level, seeking to understand what factors influence public perceptions of these candidates. Finally, semi-structured interviews provide empirical evidence to explain the findings from both observational data and the experimental survey. This study presents two main findings. First, it extends the discussion on the candidate selection mechanisms of Taiwanese parties, demonstrating that the two major parties have developed similar candidate selection mechanisms under the same political system context. This is specifically reflected in how both parties highly consider the openness of electoral districts when nominating incumbent legislators for mayoral positions. Regarding nomination methods, the study finds that the stability of a party's political stronghold in an electoral district is the key factor determining whether the party prefers to hold a primary election or directly nominate a candidate. Secondly, the study finds that the public generally has a negative view of legislators running for office while in position, and the party affiliation or nomination method of these legislators does not significantly affect the general electorate's opinions. However, partisan voters are different. They tend to not support legislators from opposing parties but remain loyal to those from their own party. Furthermore, the nomination method matters for partisan voters’ political support for candidates: Partisan voters are less likely to support legislators from opposing parties who are directly nominated for mayoral elections and prefer their own party legislators to compete in primaries for mayoral nominations. In summary, this study makes two contributions. First, through a mixed-methods approach, it empirically demonstrates that partisan voters have inconsistent standards towards running-for-office legislators. This allows the two major parties in Taiwan to hold primaries in advantageous districts and directly nominate candidates in challenging districts, making running for office while in position a pathway for political promotion within the party. Second, the study theoretically integrates existing literature on political ambition and party recruitment to provide a more comprehensive explanation of why political ambitions of individual candidates can co-exist with party recruitment of high-level political elites for internal political promotion, such as elevating Taiwanese legislators to county or city mayoral positions.