基金參與公司治理之研究 —以被動型基金為中心

Abstract

隨著被動型基金於全球與我國資本市場中快速崛起，其在公司治理中所扮演之角色與責任日益受到關注。由於其追蹤指數、低費用結構與資源配置侷限等特性，使其在治理參與上面臨誘因不足與執行困難等結構性挑戰，實務上亦常表現出形式化與消極的治理行為。本文從基金制度與公司治理理論出發，分析基金參與公司治理時所面臨的誘因結構與代理問題，並探討我國現行法制於制度設計上是否能有效回應被動型基金於參與公司治理時可能面臨的困境。進一步透過與美國法制比較，指出現行制度未充分反映主動與被動型基金在治理能力與投資策略上的結構性差異，導致被動基金參與治理流於形式，弱化制度監督功能。本文認為，若一體適用主動基金治理責任至被動基金，恐無法有效實踐治理目的。故建議我國可審慎評估是否應就主被動基金間區分治理責任，以回應其策略定位與治理能力之差異；然考量現行制度架構與市場實務限制，短期內宜自降低治理成本出發，調整投票決策機制，並推動治理資源共享機制，以逐步形塑更符合基金特性之治理參與模式。

With the rapid rise of passive investment funds in both global and Taiwanese capital markets, increasing attention has been paid to their evolving roles and responsibilities in corporate governance. Due to their characteristics — such as index-tracking strategies, low-cost structures, and constrained resource allocation — passive funds face structural challenges in governance participation, including insufficient incentives and limited execution capacity. In practice, their governance behavior often appears formalistic and passive. This thesis begins with an analysis of fund structures and corporate governance theories, examining the incentive dynamics and agency problems faced by funds in governance roles. It then assesses whether Taiwan’s current legal framework adequately responds to the unique challenges posed by passive funds’ participation in corporate governance. Through a comparative analysis with the U.S. legal system, this study highlights how Taiwan’s existing regulations fail to reflect the structural differences in governance capacity and investment strategy between active and passive funds, leading to superficial engagement, misalignment of resources, and weakened supervisory functions. The thesis argues that imposing active fund governance responsibilities uniformly on passive funds may undermine the original purpose of corporate oversight. Accordingly, it suggests that Taiwan should carefully evaluate whether governance responsibilities should be differentiated between active and passive funds, in light of their strategic positioning and governance capacities. Given current institutional and market constraints, the study further recommends starting with cost-reduction measures and enhancing regulatory flexibility, including adjustments to voting mechanisms and the promotion of shared governance resources, to gradually shape a governance model better aligned with the characteristics of passive funds.