忙碌董事與成本僵固性

Abstract

本研究旨在探討忙碌董事對企業成本僵固性之影響。董事會在公司營運中扮演監督及資源提供的重要角色，然而，隨著董事職責擴大，外界對於董事兼任多家公司董事職位後能否有效履行職責產生疑慮。過往文獻在董事兼任對公司影響之實證結果上尚無一致共識。部分研究指出忙碌董事可能因時間與精力有限而削弱監督效能，另有研究則認為董事於其他公司兼任可提升其經驗並代表董事能為公司帶來豐富資源，對企業營運有正向影響。成本決策作為反映企業資源調整彈性之重要指標，涉及管理階層對於銷量變化之反應與決策品質。因此，探討忙碌董事是否會透過影響董事會功能，進而改變企業成本決策，具重要學術及實務意涵。 本文以2013年至2022年作為樣本區間，參考臺灣金管會對獨立董事之規定及Harris與Shimizu（2004）之定義衡量董事忙碌程度，以迴歸分析檢驗此樣本區間之臺灣上市櫃公司董事忙碌程度對公司成本僵固性的影響。實證結果顯示，在以董事會整體為衡量層級下，董事忙碌程度會增加成本僵固性。此外，在將帝國建立動機納入考量時，董事忙碌程度則會減緩帝國建立動機引起的成本僵固性。 本文進一步發現，將一般董事與獨立董事分開考量後，兩類董事忙碌程度對成本僵固性之負顯著結果整體相似。此外，財務背景獨立董事比例較高之公司，銷管費用僵固性會增加，且當獨立董事忙碌程度提高時，僅在財務背景比例較低的公司中，銷管費用僵固性才顯著上升。最後，考量盈餘目標壓力後發現，忙碌董事能在多數情境下，減緩此類盈餘目標壓力之代理問題對成本僵固性所造成的影響。

This study investigates the impact of busy directors on corporate cost stickiness. Boards of directors are critical in monitoring management and providing strategic resources; however, concerns persist regarding whether directors holding multiple board seats can effectively perform their duties. Prior empirical evidence on this issue remains inconclusive, with some studies suggesting that busyness impairs monitoring functions, while others highlight the benefits of broader experience and networks. Given that cost decisions embody managerial flexibility and responsiveness, examining the relationship between director busyness and cost stickiness holds substantial academic and practical relevance. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 2013 to 2022, this study measures director busyness based on regulatory definitions and Harris and Shimizu (2004), and employs regression analyses to evaluate its effects. The findings reveal that higher board-level busyness is significantly associated with increased cost stickiness. By contrast, when accounting for empire-building motives, board-level busyness appears to mitigate the cost stickiness arising from such motives. Further analysis finds consistent negative effects when distinguishing between general and independent directors. Moreover, firms with a higher proportion of financially expert independent directors demonstrate greater cost stickiness. Notably, the effect of busy independent directors on cost stickiness is significant only in firms with a lower proportion of financially expert independent directors. Finally, after considering earnings target pressures, the study finds that busy directors can mitigate the adverse agency problems such pressures impose on cost stickiness.