請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 謝冠雄 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Edward Hsieh | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 油谷優太 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Yuta Abutani | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-18T16:10:50Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-07-19 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2025-07-18 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-07-16 | - |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97856 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | None | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the revitalization of Japan's semiconductor industry by analyzing two newly formed entities: Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing (JASM) and Rapidus. Once a world leader in semiconductor production, Japan has experienced a significant decline in competitiveness due to structural weaknesses, trade friction, and the rise of global competitors. This study addresses two core research questions: What is the strategic significance of JASM and Rapidus in enhancing Japan's semiconductor competitiveness? And what impact could the emergence of JASM and Rapidus have on the broader industrial ecosystem and national security? Using qualitative methodology, this study incorporates historical analysis, a literature review, and semi-structured interviews with industry experts on an anonymous basis. The main findings are that JASM, a subsidiary of Taiwan's TSMC, rather than cooperating exclusively in Japan in the past, focuses on stable supply to key customers in Japan, while Rapidus aims to commercialize its next-generation 2nm logic semiconductors through international partnerships. The comparative analysis reveals the roles of both companies: JASM contributing to supply chain resiliency, and Rapidus promoting cutting-edge R&D capabilities. Challenges include human resource development, regional infrastructure, and long-term profitability, especially in overcoming technical challenges before mass production for Rapidus. Nevertheless, both companies serve as catalysts for Japan's industrial revival and strategic self-reliance. The paper argues that JASM and Rapidus are not competitors, but rather assets that fill important gaps in the Japanese semiconductor ecosystem. The success of both companies may serve as a blueprint for other countries balancing technological sovereignty and global collaboration. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-07-18T16:10:50Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2025-07-18T16:10:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Acknowledgment i
Abstract ii Table of Contents iii List of Tables and Figures v List of Abbreviations vii Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Background and Context 1 1.2 Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 3 1.3 Scope and Limitation of the Study 3 1.4 Significance of The Study 4 1.5 Structure of the Thesis 4 Chapter 2. Literature Review 5 2.1 History of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry 5 2.2 The current semiconductor supply chain and the efforts of the Japanese government and other countries with regard to semiconductors 6 2.3 Ripple Effects on the Japanese Economy 8 Chapter 3. Methodology 8 3.1 History of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry 9 3.2 Data Collection Methods 10 Chapter 4. History of the Japanese semiconductor industry 10 4.1 The Beginnings and Breakthrough of Japan's Semiconductor Industry (1950s-1960s) 10 4.2 Market expansion in Japan and Japanese government support (1970s) 13 4.3 The Rise of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry and Trade Friction (1980s) 16 4.4 Decline of Japan and Rise of Asian countries and the U.S. (1990s) 22 4.5 Business restructuring and disappearance of Japanese national DRAM manufacturers (2000s) 25 Chapter 5. The current position of the Japanese semiconductor industry 28 5.1 The Logic Semiconductor 30 5.2 Automotive semiconductors 31 5.2 CMOS image sensor 36 5.4 DRAM and NAND Flash Memory 39 Chapter 6. Comparison of semiconductor policies in different countries 44 6.1 Japanese Government Support for Semiconductors 45 6.2 The U.S. government support for semiconductors 51 6.3 Chinese Government Support for Semiconductors 54 6.4 European government support for semiconductors 56 6.5 Taiwanese government support for semiconductors 57 6.6 Korean government support for semiconductors 59 Chapter 7. Rapidus 60 7.1 Background on the Birth of Rapidus 60 7.2 Rapidus Business Model 63 7.3 Government support related to Rapidus 66 7.4 Technology Development and International Cooperation 69 7.5 Geographical Characteristics 73 7.6 Potential Customers and Target Markets 76 7.7 Challenges and Competitors 78 Chapter 8. JASM(Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing) 83 8.1 Background on the Establishment of JASM 83 8.2 Support from the Japanese government and other countries regarding TSMC 86 8.3 Geographical Characteristics 91 8.4 Products and Customers 92 8.5 Issues and future concerns 93 Chapter 9. Impact of Rapidus and JASM on the Japanese Economy and Challenges 96 9.1 Strengthening of the Semiconductor Supply Chain and other industries in Japan 97 9.2 Japan's Positioning in the Global Semiconductor Ecosystem 100 9.3 Challenging 101 Chapter 10. Conclusion 105 References 107 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 經濟保障 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | JASM | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Rapidus | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 日本半導體產業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | JASM | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Rapidus | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 日本半導體產業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 經濟保障 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Rapidus | en |
| dc.subject | JASM | en |
| dc.subject | economic security | en |
| dc.subject | Japanese semiconductor industry | en |
| dc.subject | Rapidus | en |
| dc.subject | JASM | en |
| dc.subject | economic security | en |
| dc.subject | Japanese semiconductor industry | en |
| dc.title | 提升日本半導體產業競爭力: JASM與Rapidus的意義、潛力與挑戰 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Improving the Competitiveness of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry: The Significance, Potential, and Challenges of JASM and Rapidus (Case Study) | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 113-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 曹承礎 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | Seng-Cho Chou | en |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳建錦;杜志挺 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chien Chin Chen;Du Timon | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | JASM,Rapidus,日本半導體產業,經濟保障, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | JASM,Rapidus,Japanese semiconductor industry,economic security, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 121 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202501748 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-07-17 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 企業管理碩士專班 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | N/A | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA) | |
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| ntu-113-2.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 3.42 MB | Adobe PDF |
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