再探不同監管模式下中國平台商業集團的商業發展: 以騰訊集團為例

Abstract

平台商業集團模式(Platform Business Group Model, PBG Model)自 2016 年 首度被 Jia & Kenney 用來解釋中國平台企業，如騰訊與阿里巴巴相較於美國平 台企業的差異後，即被後續的政治經濟學研究廣泛應用。本研究在此基礎上結合 「政治調控理論」(Political Sterring Theory)以及「平台資本化」(Platform Captalisation)的概念，透過文獻分析法與次級資料分析法對過往研究騰訊集團相 關文獻所關注的指標與有關當局進行歷時分析與比較，以此突顯並強調長時間尺 度下騰訊集團所處的監管與社會環境、商業組成與行為變化以及外資在不同監管 時期對騰訊集團的態度。

本研究發現騰訊集團的商業組成與行為和中國總體政治社會發展有很強的關 係。更可能因應地緣政治及中國政府的治理需求，騰訊集團在 2015 年後逐漸轉 變為以「金融科技與企業服務」而非遊戲業務為主要營收來源的企業。同時也使 騰訊在遊戲業務的投資轉往歐洲，特別是英國、芬蘭與波蘭;互聯網金融業務則 著重於東南亞與印度的發展。但是以集團總體海外投資金額來看，北美、東南亞 與印度的重要性仍高於歐洲;其次，本文亦指出國家市場監管總局在「集中整改 期」內完成了對騰訊集團的常態化監管目標與數據共享機制，但可能為了平衡過 強的監管行動，尚未待「集中整改期」結束便開始放緩審查力度;最後，本文發 現主要持有騰訊集團的外資 Nasper Limited 相較於騰訊集團的盈利能力，更在意 騰訊集團面臨的國際環境與國內監管，其中對國內監管的敏感度可能又高過於國 際環境。

Since its introduction by Jia & Kenney in 2016 to explain the differences between Chinese platform companies—such as Tencent and Alibaba—and their American counterparts, the Platform Business Group Model (PBG Model) has been widely adopted in subsequent political economy studies. Building on this foundation, the present study integrates Political Steering Theory and Platform Capitalisation to conduct a long-trem and comparative analysis of previous literature concerning Tencent Group. Using document analysis and secondary data analysis methods, this study investigates the indicators emphasized by prior research and relevant regulatory authorities. The aim is to highlight and examine the evolving regulatory and social environment, changes in business composition and behavior, as well as foreign investors’ attitudes toward Tencent Group over time. This study finds that the business composition and strategies of Tencent Group are closely tied to the broader trajectory of China’s political and social development. Likely in response to geopolitical pressures and the governance needs of the Chinese government, Tencent has, since 2015, gradually shifted its primary revenue sources from gaming to fintech and enterprise services. Correspondingly, Tencent's gaming investments have increasingly targeted Europe—especially the UK, Finland, and Poland—while its internet finance operations have focused on Southeast Asia and India. However, in terms of total oversea investment volume, North America, Southeast Asia and India remain more significant than Europe. Furthermore, this study notes that during the “strict and restrictive period,” China’s State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) achieved its objective of normalizing regulatory mechanisms and establishing data-sharing practices with Tencent Group. Nevertheless, before the end of strict and restrictive period, regulatory intensity appears to have eased, possibly to balance the effects of excessive control. Lastly, the study finds that Naspers Limited, Tencent’s major foreign stakeholder, is more sensitive to the domestic regulatory environment than to Tencent’s profitability or international exposure, with a particular emphasis on navigating domestic regulatory uncertainties.