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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 商學研究所
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97566
完整後設資料紀錄
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dc.contributor.advisor許鉅秉zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorJiuh-Biing Sheuen
dc.contributor.author林彧龍zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorYu-Long Linen
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-02T16:29:42Z-
dc.date.available2025-07-03-
dc.date.copyright2025-07-02-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.date.submitted2025-06-16-
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Bettadapura, K. (2018). How online merchants can win amazon’s buy box. Forbes. Ac- cessed: 2024-12-15.
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Brandt, R. L. (2011). One click: Jeff Bezos and the rise of Amazon. com. Penguin.
Claussen, J., Kretschmer, T., and Mayrhofer, P. (2013). The effects of rewarding user engagement: The case of facebook apps. Information Systems Research, 24(1):186– 200.
Diestre, L. and Rajagopalan, N. (2012). Are all `sharks'dangerous? new biotechnol- ogy ventures and partner selection in r&d alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 33(10):1115–1134.
Diestre, L. and Rajagopalan, N. (2014). Response to mason and drakeman’s commentary on“fishing for sharks: Partner selection in biopharmaceutical r&d alliances". Strategic Management Journal, 35(10):1566–1568.
Donovan, B. (2025). Amazon steers third-party seller share to all-time high. Accessed 7 June 2025.
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Gans, J. S. and Stern, S. (2003). The product market and the market for“ideas": commer- cialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research policy, 32(2):333–350.
Gawer, A. (2002). Platform leadership: How intel, microsoft, and cisco drive industry innovation.
Gawer, A. and Henderson, R. (2007). Platform owner entry and innovation in comple- mentary markets: Evidence from intel. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 16(1):1–34.
Hallen, B. L., Katila, R., and Rosenberger, J. D. (2014). How do social defenses work? a resource-dependence lens on technology ventures, venture capital investors, and cor- porate relationships. Academy of Management Journal, 57(4):1078–1101.
Huang, P., Ceccagnoli, M., Forman, C., and Wu, D. (2013). Appropriability mechanisms and the platform partnership decision: Evidence from enterprise software. Management Science, 59(1):102–121.
Iansiti, M. and Levien, R. (2004). The Keystone Advantage: What the new dynamics of business ecosystems mean for strategy, innovation, and Sustainability. Harvard Busi- ness School Press.
Jiang, B., Jerath, K., and Srinivasan, K. (2011). Firm strategies in the “mid tail"of platform-based retailing. Marketing Science, 30(5):757–775.
Kalpanik, S. (2011). Seattle adventures–seattle memoirs inspired by my stint at amazon. com. Createspace, Seattle.
Kang, H. Y. (2017). Intra-platform envelopment: The coopetitive dynamics between the platform owner and complementors. In Academy of Management Proceedings, volume 2017, page 11205. Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510.
Kapoor, R. (2014). Collaborating with complementors: What do firms do? In Collaboration and competition in business ecosystems, volume 30, pages 3–25. Emer-ald Group Publishing Limited.
Katila, R., Rosenberger, J. D., and Eisenhardt, K. M. (2008). Swimming with sharks: Technology ventures, defense mechanisms and corporate relationships. Administrative science quarterly, 53(2):295–332.
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97566-
dc.description.abstract本研究旨在探討電子商務平台市場中,平台營運者(以Amazon為例)與第三方賣家之間的競合(Coopetition)關係,並嘗試找出在此互動關係下實現平台方、第三方賣家與消費者三贏局面的可能性。

過去相關文獻多著重於平台與賣家間的競爭或合作,較少考量消費者的相對福利變化,且部分模型設定未能充分反映實務情境。為填補此研究缺口,本文採用賽局理論作為分析工具,建立一套包含平台營運方與第三方賣家動態互動的數學模型,並改以斯塔克爾貝格模型為基礎,探討平台進入後雙方的策略行為及相對利益變化。同時,本研究亦將消費者福利納入分析架構,檢視不同市場情境(標準化產品市場與差異化產品市場)下,三方利益之互動關係與均衡結果。透過數值模擬與敏感度分析,研究結果顯示:在適當條件下,Amazon選擇進入市場銷售自營商品,並未必損害第三方賣家利益,反而可能透過外溢效果提升第三方賣家銷售表現,並改善消費者福利,實現三贏局面。此外,產品差異化程度、平台佣金比例、市場競爭程度和平台外溢效果等關鍵參數,均對競合關係及三方利益及市場局面產生顯著影響。

本研究有助於補足既有文獻的不足,並提供平台經營者在制定營運策略與政策時的參考,期望能促進平台生態系統中各方的良性互動與永續發展。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis study aims to explore the coopetition relationship between platform operators (using Amazon as an example) and third-party sellers in the e-commerce market, and to investigate the possibility of achieving a triple-win scenario among platform operators, third-party sellers, and consumers under such interactions.

Previous literature has primarily focused on the competition or cooperation between platforms and sellers, with limited attention paid to changes in consumer welfare. Moreover, some existing models fail to adequately reflect real-world market conditions. To address this research gap, this study adopts game theory as the analytical tool and constructs a dynamic interaction model between platform operators and third-party sellers, based on the Stackelberg model. The analysis examines the strategic behaviors and relative benefits of both parties after the platform's entry into the market. In addition, consumer welfare is incorporated into the analytical framework to assess the interactions and equilibrium outcomes of the three parties' interests under different market scenarios, including standardized and differentiated product markets. Through numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses, the results indicate that, under appropriate conditions, Amazon's decision to enter the market and sell self-operated products does not necessarily harm the interests of third-party sellers. On the contrary, it may enhance third-party sellers' sales performance through spillover effects and improve consumer welfare, thereby achieving a triple-win outcome. Furthermore, key parameters such as the degree of product differentiation, platform commission rates, market competition intensity, and platform spillover effects significantly affect the coopetition relationship, the interests of the three parties, and the overall market landscape.

This study contributes to supplementing the existing literature and provides a reference for platform operators in formulating operational strategies and policies, with the aim of fostering positive interactions and sustainable development among stakeholders within the platform ecosystem.
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dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-07-02T16:29:42Z
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dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員審定書 …… i
致謝 …… ii
摘要 …… iv
Abstract …… v
目次 …… vii
圖次 …… xii
表次 …… xiii
第一章 緒論 …… 1
1.1 研究背景 …… 1
1.1.1 Amazon簡介 …… 1
1.1.2 Amazon與第三方賣家的競合關係 …… 3
1.2 研究動機及目的 …… 5
1.3 研究內容及架構 …… 6
第二章 文獻回顧 …… 8
2.1 賽局理論 …… 9
2.1.1 概述 …… 9
2.1.2 納許均衡 …… 9
2.1.3 賽局分類 …… 10
2.1.3.1 合作賽局與非合作賽局 …… 10
2.1.3.2 靜態賽局與動態賽局 …… 11
2.1.3.3 資訊完全賽局與資訊不完全賽局 …… 12
2.1.4 斯塔克爾貝格模型 …… 12
2.1.4.1 模型假設 …… 13
2.1.4.2 模型特徵 …… 13
2.1.4.3 均衡求解 …… 14
2.2 平台營運類型回顧 …… 15
2.2.1 賣家類型 …… 16
2.2.2 營運模式組合 …… 17
2.2.3 小結 …… 19
2.3 競合關係 …… 19
2.3.1 競合關係起源與定義 …… 19
2.3.2 競合關係形成因素 …… 21
2.3.3 競合關係分類 …… 22
2.3.4 基於資源驅動的競合商業模型分析 …… 25
2.3.5 小結 …… 27
2.4 平台競合相關文獻 …… 28
2.4.1 Amazon競合背景介紹 …… 28
2.4.2 Amazon平台競合機制及影響 …… 30
2.4.2.1 平台的定位及影響 …… 32
2.4.2.2 競合模式下對第三方賣家的影響 …… 33
2.4.2.3 競合模式下對消費者的影響 …… 34
2.4.3 平台競合模型回顧 …… 35
2.4.3.1 資訊不對稱下的平台進入決策模型 …… 35
2.4.3.2 進入後平台與賣家的競合互動模型 …… 36
第三章 賽局模型建構 …… 38
3.1 模型適用場景 …… 38
3.2 基本假設 …… 39
3.3 決策流程 …… 41
3.4 模型建構 …… 43
3.4.1 變數定義 …… 43
3.4.2 數學模型 …… 44
3.4.2.1 第一階段 …… 44
3.4.2.2 第二階段 …… 45
3.4.3 模型求解 …… 46
3.4.3.1 第一階段 …… 47
3.4.3.2 第二階段 …… 47
3.4.4 均衡結果 …… 48
3.4.5 均衡條件限制 …… 50
3.4.5.1 基本限制 …… 50
3.4.5.2 數量限制 …… 50
3.4.5.3 附加價值投資限制 …… 50
第四章 數值分析 …… 52
4.1 基準情境與參數設定 …… 52
4.1.1 市場類型與參數設定 …… 53
4.1.1.1 標準化產品市場 …… 54
4.1.1.2 差異化產品市場 …… 56
4.2 函數定義與計算 …… 58
4.2.1 利潤函數及福利函數定義 …… 58
4.2.1.1 Amazon不進入市場 …… 58
4.2.1.2 Amazon進入市場 …… 59
4.2.2 相對利潤及相對福利定義 …… 60
4.2.3 利潤函數及福利函數計算 …… 60
4.3 敏感度分析 …… 62
4.3.1 單一參數分析 …… 62
4.3.1.1 標準化產品市場 …… 63
4.3.1.2 差異化產品市場 …… 70
4.3.1.3 小結 …… 78
4.3.2 雙參數分析 …… 79
4.3.2.1 標準化產品市場 …… 80
4.3.2.2 差異化產品市場 …… 83
4.3.2.3 小結 …… 86
第五章 結論與展望 …… 88
5.1 結論 …… 88
5.2 管理意涵 …… 90
5.3 展望 …… 91
參考文獻 …… 93
附錄 1 — 均衡推導 …… 98
1.1 第一階段 …… 98
1.2 第二階段 …… 99
1.2.1 Amazon不進入市場 …… 99
1.2.2 Amazon進入市場 …… 99
附錄 2 — 利潤函數極值解之數學驗證 …… 101
2.1 利潤函數極大化之充分性證明 …… 101
2.1.1 第一階段:僅有第三方賣家 …… 101
2.1.2 第二階段:Amazon不進入市場 …… 102
2.1.3 第二階段:Amazon進入市場 …… 102
2.1.3.1 第三方賣家 …… 102
2.1.3.2 Amazon …… 103
2.1.4 總結 …… 104
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject斯塔克爾貝格模型zh_TW
dc.subject消費者福利zh_TW
dc.subject賽局理論zh_TW
dc.subject三贏局面zh_TW
dc.subject平台競合關係zh_TW
dc.subjectConsumer Welfareen
dc.subjectPlatform Coopetitionen
dc.subjectTriple-Win Scenarioen
dc.subjectGame Theoryen
dc.subjectStackelberg Modelen
dc.title平台市場的三贏局面:Amazon、第三方賣家之間的競合關係與策略分析zh_TW
dc.titleThe Triple Win Scenario in Platform Markets: Coopetition and Strategic Analysis Between Amazon and Third-Party Sellersen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear113-2-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee陳穆臻;郭人介zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeMu-Chen Chen;Ren-Jieh Kuoen
dc.subject.keyword平台競合關係,三贏局面,賽局理論,斯塔克爾貝格模型,消費者福利,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordPlatform Coopetition,Triple-Win Scenario,Game Theory,Stackelberg Model,Consumer Welfare,en
dc.relation.page104-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202500947-
dc.rights.note未授權-
dc.date.accepted2025-06-17-
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept商學研究所-
dc.date.embargo-liftN/A-
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