ESG 評分及高階主管薪酬相關性研究——以台灣上市公司為例

Abstract

本研究旨在探討台灣上市公司之ESG表現與高階主管薪酬之間的關聯性，並進一步分析制度變革與資訊揭露是否會對此關係產生調節效果。本文以代理理論為核心架構，認為企業可透過將ESG績效納入薪酬設計，引導高階主管重視企業長期價值，以降低代理問題。 實證部分共檢驗三項假說。首先，假說一檢視企業ESG表現是否與高階主管薪酬呈正相關，採用2017至2023年台灣上市公司為樣本，利用高維固定效果迴歸模型分析ESG整體評分對薪酬水準的影響。其次，假說二聚焦於公司治理3.0永續發展藍圖政策推動的制度衝擊，探討原先ESG表現較佳的企業，在政策實施後是否出現相對更高的薪酬增幅。此部分以2019年TESG前10%企業為處理組，採用Difference-in-Differences（DiD）方法進行實證。最後，假說三則進一步檢驗資訊揭露是否具有調節效果，分析企業若揭露高階主管薪酬與ESG指標掛鉤，是否會加強ESG表現對薪酬的影響。 實證結果顯示：一、企業 ESG 評分與高階主管薪酬水準呈現顯著正向關係，顯示部分企業已將永續績效納入薪酬制度設計，有助於強化誘因機制與永續治理；二、雖然ESG領先企業於公司治理3.0推動後之薪酬變化方向與預期一致，但DiD分析未顯示顯著差異，政策衝擊效果有限；三、當企業揭露薪酬與ESG掛鉤資訊時，ESG表現對高階主管薪酬之正向影響顯著提升，顯示資訊揭露具有顯著的激勵與監督作用。

This study examines the association between firms’ ESG performance and the compensation of top executives, with a specific focus on listed companies in Taiwan. Grounded in agency theory, the analysis explores whether ESG metrics have been incorporated into executive compensation structures as a mechanism to align managerial incentives with long-term stakeholder interests and mitigate agency problems. The empirical investigation tests three hypotheses. First, Hypothesis 1 assesses the extent to which ESG performance is positively correlated with executive compensation, employing a high-dimensional fixed effects regression model. Second, Hypothesis 2 adopts a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design and evaluates the impact of the 2020 launch of Taiwan’s “Corporate Governance 3.0—Sustainable Development Road Map” as an exogenous policy intervention. Third, Hypothesis 3 investigates the moderating role of voluntary disclosure of ESG-linked compensation. This analysis focuses on the period 2022–2023, during which firm annual reports were manually reviewed to identify the presence of ESG-performance-related compensation policies. The empirical results yield three principal findings. First, the relationship between ESG performance and executive pay is positive and statistical significance in most specifications, suggesting that ESG has been fully internalized within compensation frameworks. Second, the introduction of Corporate Governance 3.0 did not lead to a statistically significant increase in compensation among ESG-leading firms relative to their peers. Third, firms that explicitly disclose ESG-linked executive compensation exhibit a significantly stronger positive relationship between ESG performance and pay, highlighting the potential role of transparency in enhancing both incentive alignment and external governance mechanisms.