請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 連振廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Chris Lien | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 林瑋祥 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Wei-Hsiang Lin | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-27T16:31:55Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-02-28 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2025-02-27 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-02-08 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3), 715-753.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97174 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討種族同質性對 CEO薪酬比例的影響。隨著 2008年金融危機之後，美國政府實施了一系列措施以提升金融透明度，其中包括多德-弗蘭克法案第 953(b)條款，該條款要求披露 CEO薪酬比例。儘管有這些措施，現有研究對於這些披露的有效性仍存在矛盾觀點。通過引入種族同質性作為身份變量，本研究探索其對高管薪酬差異的影響。社會心理學和神經科學的先前研究已經證實，群內偏好是一種由基因決定的自然人類傾向。因此，本研究假設種族同質性與 CEO薪酬比例之間存在正相關。實證分析顯示，在同一行業內的小型和中型公司中，董事會與 CEO之間較高的種族同質性與較低的 CEO薪酬比例相關，這與假設相矛盾。這些發現為股東通過明智的董事會成員選擇來減輕委託-代理問題提供了關鍵見解。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the impact of racial homophily on CEO pay ratios. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. government implemented a series of measures to enhance financial transparency, including Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandates the disclosure of CEO pay ratios. Despite these measures, existing research presents conflicting views on the effectiveness of these disclosures. By introducing racial homophily as an identity variable, this study explores its influence on the disparity in executive compensation. Previous research in social psychology and neuroscience has confirmed that in-group favoritism is a natural human tendency determined by genetics. Therefore, this study hypothesizes a positive correlation between racial homophily and CEO pay ratios. Empirical analysis indicates that, in small and medium-sized companies within the same industry, higher racial homophily between the board and the CEO is associated with lower CEO pay ratios, which contradicts the hypothesis. These findings provide critical insights for shareholders aiming to mitigate principal-agent issues through informed board member selection. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-02-27T16:31:55Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2025-02-27T16:31:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要................................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract............................................................................................................................ iv Table of Content................................................................................................................ v List of Table......................................................................................................................vi 1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 1 2. Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 3 3. Data................................................................................................................................8 3.1 Board Database......................................................................................................8 3.2 CEO Dataset.......................................................................................................... 8 3.3 Racial Database..................................................................................................... 8 3.4 Compustat Database.............................................................................................. 9 3.5 Data Merging....................................................................................................... 9 4. Methodology................................................................................................................11 4.1 Basic Model......................................................................................................... 11 4.2 Optimized Model................................................................................................. 12 4.3 Results Across Different Subsamples..................................................................12 5. Result and Discussion..................................................................................................13 5.1 Descriptive Statistics........................................................................................... 13 5.2 Basic Results........................................................................................................14 5.3 Main Results........................................................................................................ 17 5.4 Firm Age Stratification Results........................................................................... 18 5.5 CEO Race Stratification Results..........................................................................19 5.6 Summary..............................................................................................................20 6. Conclusion................................................................................................................... 22 6.1 Summary of Findings.......................................................................................... 22 6.2 Contributions....................................................................................................... 22 6.3 Practical Implications.......................................................................................... 23 6.4 Future Research Directions................................................................................. 24 6.5 Research Limitations........................................................................................... 24 Reference......................................................................................................................... 27 Appendix......................................................................................................................... 31 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 種族同質性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | CEO薪酬比例 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Agency problem | en |
| dc.subject | CEO Pay Ratio | en |
| dc.subject | Racial Homophily | en |
| dc.title | 種族同質性：CEO薪酬比例的影響因素 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Racial Homophily: A Factor in CEO Pay Ratio | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 113-1 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪志清;邱健嘉 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chih-Ching Hung;Jian-Jia Chiou | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | CEO薪酬比例,種族同質性,代理問題, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | CEO Pay Ratio,Racial Homophily,Agency problem, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 39 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202500399 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-02-08 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學系 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2030-02-04 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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