詮釋《哲學研究》的張力

Abstract

本文旨在釐清維根斯坦在《哲學研究》中處理哲學問題的哲學方法。筆者將在治療式詮釋的基礎上，進一步探討維根斯坦如何藉由對語言表達的語法澄清，解消困擾他的哲學問題。治療式詮釋中的主流觀點認為，我們應避免將書中有關語言的評論視為維根斯坦的語言哲學理論，然而筆者主張，雖然維根斯坦在《哲學研究》中確實沒有給出一般性的哲學理論，不過，他的哲學方法仍以其語言觀點為前提，因此，我們必須試圖探索這些觀點在什麼意義上是正確的，以揭露圍繞其哲學方法的神秘面紗。 筆者首先將於第一章概述維根斯坦的後設哲學觀點為詮釋帶來的兩難，隨後，於第二章和第三章分別呈現兩種對立的詮釋路線，一邊以克里普克 (Saul Aaron Kripke) 為首，其主張維根斯坦確實提供了有關語意的特定哲學理論；另一邊則以哈金森 (Phil Hutchinson) 和貝克 (Gordon Park Baker) 為代表，其主張維根斯坦僅僅提供了一幅沒有真假可言的、關於語言的圖像。最後，筆者將於第四章對貝克的詮釋做進一步的擴充與修正，以嘗試說明這些沒有真假可言的語言觀點在什麼意義下是正確的。 筆者希望透過本文化解在詮釋《哲學研究》時所遭遇的張力，這意味著顯示我們能夠在尊重維根斯坦後設哲學觀點的同時，展現他的哲學方法是可以理解且可靠的。

This thesis aims to clarify Wittgenstein's philosophical method for addressing philosophical problems in Philosophical Investigations. Building on the therapeutic interpretation, I will further explore how Wittgenstein resolves his philosophical problems through grammatical clarification of linguistic expressions. The mainstream view within the therapeutic interpretation holds that we should avoid treating Wittgenstein’s remarks on language as a linguistic philosophical theory. However, I argue that, while Wittgenstein does not provide a general philosophical theory in Philosophical Investigations, his philosophical method is nevertheless grounded in certain linguistic perspectives. Therefore, we must attempt to explore in what sense these perspectives are valid in order to demystify the foundations of his philosophical method. In Chapter One, I will begin by outlining the interpretive dilemma posed by Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophical stance. Following this, Chapters Two and Three will present two opposing interpretive approaches: one, represented by Saul Aaron Kripke, contends that Wittgenstein offers a specific philosophical theory concerning semantics; the other, represented by Phil Hutchinson and Gordon Park Baker, argues that Wittgenstein merely provides a non-factual depiction of language as a kind of picture. Finally, in Chapter Four, I will further expand and revise Baker’s interpretation in an attempt to explain in what sense these non-factual linguistic perspectives can be considered valid. Through this article, I aim to dissolve the interpretive tension surrounding Philosophical Investigations. This effort involves demonstrating how we can respect Wittgenstein's meta-philosophical stance while showing that his philosophical method is both comprehensible and reliable.