分歧的知識論：以宗教議題為例

Abstract

本論文研究的是關於分歧的知識論問題。我在文中探討了世界範圍內廣泛的宗教分歧是否決定性地表明，一個人的有神論信念或無神論信念在認識論上是不合理的，因此應當被放棄。對此問題，我的回答是「不」。我的核心論證策略如下：「「獨立性原則」是支撐我們在面對廣泛宗教分歧時應當放棄宗教信仰的這一結論的支柱性命題。然而，我認為「獨立性原則」是不可接受的。如果我的論證是正確的，那麼這一結論可以推廣到許多其他領域的、以分歧為基礎的懷疑論，使這些懷疑論均無法成立。以下是各章節的安排：在第一章中，我提供了調和主義與反調和主義之間的辯論，作為必要的認識論背景；在第二章中，我論證了「獨立性原則」對於論述以分歧為基礎的宗教懷疑論是必要的；在第三章中，我論證了「獨立性原則」是不可接受的，因為它為全局性懷疑論留下了空間，而且，當這個原則被應用於——關於其自身正確與否的分歧——的時候，它會變得有問題。既然這一原則是不可接受的，那麼以分歧為基礎的宗教懷疑論也無法成立。

This thesis is a study on the epistemology of disagreement. It explores whether widespread religious disagreement in this world decisively indicates that one’s theist belief or atheist belief is epistemically unjustified and, therefore, should be withheld. My answer to this question is ‘no’. My central argumentative strategy is as follows: the Independence Principle is a pillar thesis underpinning the conclusion that we should withhold our religious beliefs in the face of the widespread religious disagreement. However, I argue that the Independence Principle is unacceptable. If my arguments are correct, this result can be extended to disagreement-based skepticisms in many other fields, rendering them untenable. The following is my arrangement of each chapter. In Chp.1, I provide the debate between Conciliationism and Anti-conciliationism as a necessary epistemological background. In Chp.2, I argue that the Independence Principle is essential in formulating disagreement-based religious skepticism. In Chp.3, I argue that the Independence Principle is unacceptable as it leaves room for wholesale skepticism and becomes questionable when applied to the disagreement about its own truth value. Given that the principle is unacceptable, the disagreement-based religious skepticism cannot be established.