管理階層繼續經營疑慮揭露行為之探討

Abstract

美國財務會計準則委員會（Financial Accounting Standards Board，FASB）於2014年發布ASU 2014-15，對於管理階層如何評估及揭露企業的繼續經營疑慮提供了明確指引。然而，基於文獻指出管理階層具有隱匿負面消息的動機，本研究預期該強制性揭露規定可能無法改變管理者的行為，公司仍待財務狀況嚴重惡化時，才揭露繼續經營疑慮。本研究以公司公開繼續經營疑慮前後的財務績效變化進行驗證，研究結果發現，具ASU 2014-15管理階層繼續經營疑慮揭露之公司於揭露後財務績效明顯持續惡化，顯示具ASU 2014-15管理階層繼續經營疑慮揭露之公司，可能係等到財務困難情況較嚴重時才揭露。此外，本研究進一步以裁決性應計項目對樣本公司進行分組，發現前述公司財務績效的持續惡化情形，僅出現在盈餘品質較低的組別，另一組別則無，顯示管理階層可能利用資訊不對稱進行盈餘管理及降低資訊透明度，以隱匿繼續經營疑慮此一負面消息，並藉此規避相關主管機關之偵查。

In 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2014-15, which provides explicit guidance on how management should assess and disclose the going concern uncertainty of a company. Based on previous literature suggesting that management may have incentives to withhold negative information, this study expects that firms with management going concern disclosures may postpone revealing this information until their financial condition becomes severely poor. By analyzing changes in financial performance before and after the going concern announcement, this study finds that firms with ASU 2014-15 management going concern disclosure experience more significant performance deterioration after disclosure. These results suggest that managers may hesitate to disclose going concern issues until they observe that the financial situation has already deteriorated markedly. Therefore, the mandatory disclosure requirement may not effectively fulfill its purpose of prompting managers to reveal going concern information earlier. Additionally, a cross-sectional analysis reveals that this decline in performance occurs primarily among firms with low earnings quality. This suggests that management may exploit information asymmetry and engage in earnings management to defer unfavorable disclosures, thereby obscuring information transparency to avoid detection by authorities.