CEO的工作機會是否影響其外部董事職位？ 以自然實驗為例

Abstract

本文研究美國州法院駁回不可避免揭露原則（Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, IDD）與CEO擔任外部董事的因果關係，以檢視外部就業機會是否作為CEO提升聲譽的動機。儘管基線迴歸未能支持此關係，但當CEO較年輕或任期較短時，州法院駁回IDD對其外部董事席次有顯著的正面影響。這種效應在CEO為較小或較年輕的公司工作時也會成立，但需要較長的時間才會顯現。沒有證據表示公司或產業的成長機會影響CEO在IDD被駁回後的外部董事席次。總體而言，實證證據支持就業機會假設，顯示渴望向上流動與提升聲譽的CEO在IDD被駁回後，會增加更多外部董事席次。

This paper studies the causal relationship between the U.S. state court’s rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) and CEOs’ outside directorships to examine whether job opportunities affect CEOs’ incentives to elevate their reputation. Though the baseline regression fails to support this relation, the positive effect of IDD rejection on CEOs’ outside directorships is significant when they are younger or shorter-tenure. This effect also holds but takes longer to appear when CEOs work for smaller or younger firms. No evidence suggests that growth opportunities in firms or industries impact CEOs’ outside board seats after the IDD rejection. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the job opportunity hypothesis, showing that CEOs eager for upward mobility and reputation enhancement increase their outside directorships more following the IDD rejection.