請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/95690完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 葉國俊 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Kuo-chun Yeh | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 房滿新 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Matthew V. Fryer | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-09-15T16:49:18Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-09-16 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2024-09-15 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2024-08-14 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Works Cited
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/95690 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 台灣的戰鬥意志是什麼？我們如何衡量它？
目前到2039年為止，對其他國家的分析已經不再需要。了解台灣的戰鬥意志對於評估其抵抗中國人民解放軍（PLA）可能攻擊的能力至關重要。如果台灣的決心堅定，那麼它可能會通過配備必要的軍事能力和裝備來抵禦侵略。烏克蘭已經證明，強大的戰鬥意志，結合強大的盟友、低技術武器和分散的單位，即使在面對核武器威脅時，也能抵抗強大的對手。相反地，如果台灣的戰鬥意志較低，領導人必須找到方法來增強國家的決心。 為了衡量公眾是否願意與中國發生衝突，許多人依賴於民意調查。然而，這一方法的可靠性取決於準確性以及受訪者對賭注的理解。民意調查提供了一個公眾情緒的快照，但往往會得出相互矛盾的結果，使得這種方法在單獨使用時具有潛在的危險性。根據蘭德公司（RAND）和其他專家的說法，衡量一個國家戰鬥意志的最可靠指標是行動，尤其是通過有效的政策和切實的改變來應對潛在的威脅。蘭德公司的《國家戰鬥意志模型》（2019）通過檢視政治措施所賦予的實際能力來評估這一意志。該模型強調政治變革在應對可信威脅中的重要性。 本研究應用並調整蘭德模型，以提供對台灣實際立場的見解，而不僅僅是防禦性主張。通過分析蘭德專家識別的14個變數（因素、背景和機制）並與台灣政策的領先專家進行訪談，我們旨在確定台灣是否準備好防禦技術先進的對手。報告的研究結果表明，儘管台灣擁有顯著的優勢，但仍需要政策措施來實施增強國家復原力的協調行動。為了實現台灣的“以實力換取和平”，需要進行重大變革，包括更大的凝聚力、領導力和對存在性威脅的統一承認。這些變革必須在台灣充滿活力的民主制度內通過增加信息共享和對賭注的認識來實現，同時採用民防和低技術武器。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | What is Taiwan’s will to fight and how we do we measure it? No more important analysis is needed about any other country right now and through 2039. Understanding Taiwan's will to fight is crucial in assessing its ability to withstand a potential attack from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). If Taiwan's resolve is strong, it may withstand aggression by equipping itself with the necessary military capabilities and hardware. Ukraine has demonstrated that a strong will to fight, combined with strong allies, low-tech weaponry, and decentralized units, can enable resistance even against formidable adversaries, even when facing the threat of nuclear weapons. Conversely, if Taiwan's will to fight is low, leaders must find ways to bolster national resolve.
To gauge the public's willingness to engage in conflict with China, many rely on opinion polling. However, the reliability of this method depends on accuracy and the respondents' understanding of the stakes. Polls provide a snapshot of public sentiment but often yield conflicting results, making this method potentially hazardous if used in isolation. According to RAND and other experts, the most reliable indicator of a nation's will to fight is action, particularly through effective policies and tangible changes to meet potential threats. RAND’s National Will to Fight Model (2019) assesses this will by examining tangible capabilities enabled by political measures. This model emphasizes the importance of political change in addressing credible threats. This research applies and adapts the RAND model to offer insights into Taiwan's actual stance, beyond rhetorical claims of defense. By analyzing 14 variables (factors, contexts, and mechanisms) identified by RAND experts and conducting interviews with leading experts on Taiwanese policy, I aim to determine Taiwan's readiness to defend itself against technologically advanced adversaries. This report’s findings reveal that while Taiwan possesses significant strengths, and requires policy measures to implement cohesive actions that enhance national resilience. Achieving "Peace through Strength" for Taiwan necessitates substantial changes, including greater cohesion, leadership, and a unified acknowledgment of existential threats. These changes must be achieved within Taiwan's vibrant democracy through increased information sharing and recognition of the stakes involved, while adopting civil-military defense options and lower-tech weaponry. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-09-15T16:49:18Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-09-15T16:49:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Table of Contents
Master’s Thesis Acceptance Certificate i Acknowledgements ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Background and Problem Statement 1 1.1.1 Research Background 1 1.1.2 Problem Statement 2 1.2 Research Objectives and Main Questions 2 1.2.1 Research Objectives 2 1.2.2 Main Research Questions 3 Chapter 2 Review of Research Concepts 4 2.1 Review of Relevant Concepts 4 2.1.1 Public Opinion Polling and the Use of Military Force 4 2.1.2 Balancing Capacity to Fight with Will to Fight 4 2.1.3 Cross-National Threat Perception Disparity 4 2.2 Review of Related Theories 4 2.2.1 Deterrence Theory 4 2.2.2 Rational Actor Theory 4 2.2.3 Offensive Realism 5 2.2.4 Balance of Threat Theory 5 2.2.5 Collective Action 5 2.2.6 Social Identity Theory 5 2.2.7 Cognitive Warfare 5 2.2.8 Clausewitz Theory of War 5 2.3 Review of Domestic and International Research 5 2.3.1 Study A: Taiwan Will to Fight 5 2.3.2 Study B: US Will to Send Troops 6 Chapter 3 Research Design 6 3.1 Research Approach, Key Definitions, and Methods 6 3.1.1 Assessing Will to Fight, Research Approach and Methodology 6 3.2 Research Framework and Hypotheses 13 3.2.1 Hypotheses: 13 Chapter 4 Definition of Concepts, Operational Definitions, and Measurement of Will to Fight 13 4.1 Definitions Will to Fight 13 4.1 US doctrine inclusion of “Will to Fight” 14 4.1.1 Summary Will to Fight Definitions 16 4.2 Will to Fight: Polling the Public, A Starting Point 17 4.2.1. Demographics and Will 19 4.2.2.Ukraine War and Taiwanese Threat Perception 19 4.2.3. Few Taiwanese fear a Chinese Threat 20 4.2.4 Taiwanese Identity is now a Large Majority 21 4.2.5. What else makes Taiwanese distinct from Chinese? Politics. 25 4.2.6 Maintaining the Status Quo 28 4.2.7 Perceived Collective Action (You fight, I fight) 29 4.3 Civil-Military Relations 30 Chapter 5 US and Taiwan 33 5.1 US Basing Options in the Pacific 36 5.1.2 Experts and Taiwanese Public Alike Have Limited Confidence in US Allies and Partners to Defend Taiwan 37 5.2. The US doesn’t have to Defend Taiwan? The Problem with US Policy 38 5.2.1 US Perception of the China Threat 39 5.2.2 Is this a type of conditioning? 40 5.2.3 US Will to Fight and Send Troops to Taiwan 40 5.2.4 Historical Findings about US Will to Fight: 40 5.2.5 Other Lessons Learned from Iraq 41 5.2.6 Americans approval Ratings of Zelensky’s Leadership 42 5.2.7 Republicans have grown more skeptical 42 5.3 Americans Want to Take a Seat from the World Stage 43 5.3.1 Public View of US support for Taiwan 43 Chapter 6 Results 44 6.1 Polling Limitations 44 6.2 Summary of Polling Data 45 6.3 Results – Applying the National Will to Fight Model 48 Chapter 7: Conclusion 55 Works Cited 57 Appendix B – Opinion Polling Taiwan 76 Appendix C - Clarifying Terms on National Identity in Taiwan 84 Appendix D – Opinion Polling US 86 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.title | 評估戰鬥意志：台灣案例研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Assessing the Will to Fight: A Case Study of Taiwan | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 112-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉靜怡;蘇翊豪;林雅淇 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Ching-Yi Liu ;Yi-Hao Su;Ya-Chi Lin | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 意志力,臺灣,韌性,凝聚力,認同感,領導力,認知差距,美國派兵意願,公共輿論,民意調查, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | will to fight,Taiwan,resilience,cohesion,identity,national will to fight,leadership,perception disparity,US will to send troops,public opinion,polling, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 90 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202404289 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2024-08-14 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國家發展研究所 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國家發展研究所 | |
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