請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/95134完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 謝尚賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Shang-Hsien Hsieh | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李庭儀 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Ting-Yi Li | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-29T16:14:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-30 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2024-08-29 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2024-08-16 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | [1] S. Abdelnabi, A. Gomaa, S. Sivaprasad, L. Schönherr, and M. Fritz. LLMDeliberation:Evaluating LLMs with Interactive Multi-Agent Negotiation Games.arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.17234, Sept. 2023.
[2] H. Abdirad and C. S. Dossick. Restructuration of architectural practice in integratedproject delivery (IPD): Two case studies. Engineering, Construction andArchitectural Management, 26(1):104–117, Jan. 2019. [3] S. Agashe, Y. Fan, A. Reyna, and X. E. Wang. LLM-Coordination: Evaluating andAnalyzing Multi-agent Coordination Abilities in Large Language Models. arXivpreprint arXiv:2310.03903, Apr. 2024. [4] G. Aher, R. I. Arriaga, and A. T. Kalai. Using Large Language Models to SimulateMultiple Humans and Replicate Human Subject Studies. arXiv preprintarXiv:2208.10264, July 2023. [5] E. Akata, L. Schulz, J. Coda-Forno, S. J. Oh, M. Bethge, and E. Schulz. Playingrepeated games with Large Language Models. 2023. [6] C. Anumba, O. Ugwu, L. Newnham, and A. Thorpe. A multi-agent system for distributedcollaborative design. Logistics Information Management, 14(5/6):355–367,Jan. 2001. [7] Arshinder, A. Kanda, and S. G. Deshmukh. A framework for evaluation of coordinationby contracts: A case of two-level supply chains. Computers & IndustrialEngineering, 56(4):1177–1191, May 2009. [8] G. Boella and L. van der Torre. A game theoretic approach to contracts in multiagentsystems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C (Applicationsand Reviews), 36(1):68–79, Jan. 2006. [9] A. A. Bubshait and S. A. Almohawis. Evaluating the general conditions of a constructioncontract. International Journal of Project Management, 12(3):133–136,Aug. 1994. [10] L. E. Bygballe, G. Dewulf, and R. E. Levitt. The interplay between formal andinformal contracting in integrated project delivery. Engineering Project OrganizationJournal, 5(1):22–35, Jan. 2015. [11] I. C. William and D. B. Ashley. Impact of Various Construction Contract Clauses.Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 113(3):501–521, Sept. 1987. [12] R. G. G. Caiado, G. B. A. Lima, D. L. D. M. Nascimento, J. Vieira Neto, andR. A. M. De Oliveira. GUIDELINES TO RISK MANAGEMENT MATURITYIN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. Brazilian Journal of Operations & ProductionManagement, 13(3):372, Sept. 2016. [13] M. Choi, J. Pei, S. Kumar, C. Shu, and D. Jurgens. Do LLMs Understand Social Knowledge? Evaluating the Sociability of Large Language Models with SocKETBenchmark. In H. Bouamor, J. Pino, and K. Bali, editors, Proceedings of the 2023Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages 11370–11403, Singapore, Feb. 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics. [14] P.-S. Chow, Y. Wang, T.-M. Choi, and B. Shen. An experimental study on the effectsof minimum profit share on supply chains with markdown contract: Risk and profitanalysis. Omega, 57:85–97, Dec. 2015. [15] R. Domínguez, S. Cannella, and J. M. Framinan. SCOPE: A Multi-Agentsystem tool for supply chain network analysis. In IEEE EUROCON 2015 -International Conference on Computer as a Tool (EUROCON), pages 1–5, Sept.2015. [16] D. H. Dorrah and B. McCabe. Integrated Agent-Based Simulation and Game TheoryDecision Support Framework for Cash Flow and Payment Management in ConstructionProjects. Sustainability, 16(1):244, Jan. 2024. [17] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, and R. Jurdak. Multi-Agent Systems: A Survey. IEEEAccess, 6:28573–28593, 2018. [18] C. S. Dossick, R. Azari, Y.-W. Kim, and O. El-Anwar. IPD in Practice: SustainingCollaboration in Healthcare Design and Construction. pages 377–386, Apr. 2013. [19] Y. Du, S. Li, A. Torralba, J. B. Tenenbaum, and I. Mordatch. Improving Factualityand Reasoning in Language Models through Multiagent Debate. arXiv preprintarXiv:2305.14325, May 2023. [20] Y. Du, H. Zhou, Y. Yuan, and X. Liu. Explore Knowledge-Sharing Strategy andEvolutionary Mechanism for Integrated Project Team Based on Evolutionary GameModel. Advances in Civil Engineering, 2019(1):4365358, 2019. [21] J. M. Epstein. Why Model? Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,vol. 11,(no. 4):12, Oct. 2008. [22] A. Falk and U. Fischbacher. A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior,54(2):293–315, Feb. 2006. [23] C. Fan, J. Chen, Y. Jin, and H. He. Can Large Language Models Serve as RationalPlayers in Game Theory? A Systematic Analysis. 2023. [24] P. Faratin, M. Klein, H. Sayama, and Y. Bar-Yam. Simple Negotiating Agents inComplex Games: Emergent Equilibria and Dominance of Strategies. In J.-J. C.Meyer and M. Tambe, editors, Intelligent Agents VIII, pages 367–376, Berlin, Heidelberg,2002. Springer. [25] X. Feng, Z.-Y. Chen, Y. Qin, Y. Lin, X. Chen, Z. Liu, and J.-R. Wen. Large LanguageModel-based Human-Agent Collaboration for Complex Task Solving. 2024. [26] Y. Fu, H. Peng, T. Khot, and M. Lapata. Improving Language Model Negotiationwith Self-Play and In-Context Learning from AI Feedback. arXiv preprintarXiv:2305.10142, May 2023. [27] C. Gao, X. Lan, Z. Lu, J. Mao, J. Piao, H. Wang, D. Jin, and Y. Li. S3: Social-networkSimulation System with Large Language Model-Empowered Agents. arXiv preprintarXiv:2307.14984, Oct. 2023. [28] I. Gemp, Y. Bachrach, M. Lanctot, R. Patel, V. Dasagi, L. Marris, G. Piliouras, S. Liu,and K. Tuyls. States as Strings as Strategies: Steering Language Models with Game-Theoretic Solvers. 2024. [29] M. Guévremont and A. Hammad. Visualization of Delay Claim Analysis Using 4DSimulation. Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering andConstruction, 10(3):05018002, Aug. 2018. [30] T. Guo, X. Chen, Y. Wang, R. Chang, S. Pei, N. V. Chawla, O. Wiest, and X. Zhang.Large Language Model based Multi-Agents: A Survey of Progress and Challenges.arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.01680, Apr. 2024. [31] W. Güth, R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze. An experimental analysis of ultimatumbargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4):367–388, Dec.1982. [32] A. Hafezalkotob, E. Hoseinpour, and K. Khalili Damghani. A game theory approachfor competition and cooperation among project’s subcontractors with interaction activities.In Journal of Project Management, pages 71–86, 2017. [33] O. D. Hart and B. Holmstrm. The theory of contracts. Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. ofEconomics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. [34] D. Houser and K. McCabe. Chapter 2 - Experimental Economics and ExperimentalGame Theory. In P. W. Glimcher and E. Fehr, editors, Neuroeconomics(Second Edition), pages 19–34. Academic Press, San Diego, Jan. 2014. [35] IDPA. INTEGRATED PROJECT DELIVERY : An Action Guide for Leaders.2019. [36] A. K. Jallow, P. Demian, A. Baldwin, and C. J. Anumba. Development ofan Innovative Framework for Clients’ Requirements Information Management inConstruction Projects. Loughborough University, Jan. 2010. [37] S. Jinxin, Z. Jiabao, W. Yilei, W. Xingjiao, L. Jiawen, and H. Liang. CGMI:Configurable General Multi-Agent Interaction Framework. arXiv preprintarXiv:2308.12503, Aug. 2023. [38] W. Jung, G. Ballard, Y.-W. Kim, S. H. Han, and Han. Understanding of Target ValueDesign for Integrated Project Delivery with the Context of Game Theory. May 2012. [39] R. Khalef, I. H. El-adaway, R. Assaad, and N. Kieta. Contract Risk Management:A Comparative Study of Risk Allocation in Exculpatory Clauses and Their Construction, 13(1):04520036, Feb. 2021. [40] P. R. Kleindorfer and G. H. Saad. Managing Disruption Risks in Supply Chains.Production and Operations Management, 14(1):53–68, Mar. 2005. [41] S. Knapp, D. Long, and G. Howell. THE ROLE OF THE OWNER’S REPRESENTATIVEON IPD PROJECTS. 2014. [42] K. C. Lam, D. Wang, P. T. K. Lee, and Y. T. Tsang. Modelling risk allocation decisionin construction contracts. International Journal of Project Management, 25(5):485–493, July 2007. [43] H. Li, D. Arditi, and Z. Wang. Factors That Affect Transaction Costs in ConstructionProjects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 139(1):60–68, Jan.2013. [44] Y. Li and Y.-q. Li. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Subjects’Information-Sharing from the Perspective of Building Industrialization.InInternational Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management2018, pages 531–541, Singapore, 2019. Springer. [45] J. Lin, H. Zhao, A. Zhang, Y. Wu, H. Ping, and Q. Chen. AgentSims: AnOpen-Source Sandbox for Large Language Model Evaluation. arXiv preprintarXiv:2308.04026, Aug. 2023. [46] M. Loosemore and C. S. McCarthy. Perceptions of Contractual Risk Allocationin Construction Supply Chains. Journal of Professional Issues in EngineeringEducation and Practice, 134(1):95–105, Jan. 2008. [47] M. Loosemore and C. S. McCarthy. Perceptions of Contractual Risk Allocationin Construction Supply Chains. Journal of Professional Issues in EngineeringEducation and Practice, 134(1):95–105, Jan. 2008. [48] R. Loui and D. Moore. Dialogue and Deliberation. All Computer Science andEngineering Research, Jan. 1997. [49] R. D. R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions : Introduction and CriticalSurvey. New York : Wiley, 1957. [50] T. Mei, Q. Wang, Y. Xiao, and M. Yang. Rent-seeking behavior of BIM- and IPDbasedconstruction project in China. Engineering, Construction and ArchitecturalManagement, 24(3):514–536, Jan. 2017. [51] X. Meng, M. Sun, and M. Jones. Maturity Model for Supply Chain Relationships inConstruction. Journal of Management in Engineering, 27(2):97–105, Apr. 2011. [52] G. Mukobi, H. Erlebach, N. Lauffer, L. Hammond, A. Chan, and J. Clifton. WelfareDiplomacy: Benchmarking Language Model Cooperation. arXiv preprintarXiv:2310.08901, Oct. 2023. [53] A. M. Mustapha, O. T. Arogundade, S. Misra, R. Damasevicius, and R. Maskeliunas.A systematic literature review on compliance requirements management of businessprocesses. International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management,11(3):561–576, June 2020. [54] F. Nasirzadeh, M. Khanzadi, and M. Mir. A hybrid simulation framework for modellingconstruction projects using agent-based modelling and system dynamics: Anapplication to model construction workers’ safety behavior. International Journal ofConstruction Management, 18(2):132–143, Mar. 2018. [55] OpenAI. GPT-4 Technical Report. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774, Mar. 2024. [56] J. S. Park, J. O’Brien, C. J. Cai, M. R. Morris, P. Liang, and M. S. Bernstein. GenerativeAgents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior. In Proceedings of the 36thAnnual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology, pages 1–22,San Francisco CA USA, Oct. 2023. ACM. [57] N. Parrod, C. Thierry, H. Fargier, and J. B. Cavaille. Cooperative subcontractingrelationship within a project supply chain: A simulation approach. SimulationModelling Practice and Theory, 15(2):137–152, Feb. 2007. [58] J. C. Paz, D. Rozenboim, A. Cuadros, S. Cano, and J. W. Escobar. A Simulation-Based Scheduling Methodology for Construction Projects Considering the PotentialImpacts of Delay Risks. Construction Economics and Building, 18(2):41–69, Aug.2020. [59] P. Pishdad-Bozorgi and D. Srivastava. Assessment of Integrated Project Delivery(IPD) Risk and Reward Sharing Strategies from the Standpoint of Collaboration: AGame Theory Approach. pages 196–206, Mar. 2018. [60] J.-P. Rivera, G. Mukobi, A. Reuel, M. Lamparth, C. Smith, and J. Schneider. Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making.arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.03408, Jan. 2024. [61] N. Shinn, F. Cassano, A. Gopinath, K. R. Narasimhan, and S. Yao. Reflexion: Neural Information Processing Systems, Nov. 2023. [62] N. Smith. Roles and responsibilities in project contract management. In Contractingfor Project Management. Routledge, 2003. [63] Student, Maritime and Technology Faculty, Southampton Solent University,H. White, R. Marasini, and Associate Professor, Maritime and Technology Faculty,and subcontractors during procurement and construction stages for successfulproject implementation. In Proceedings of the 2012 (3rd) International Conferenceon Engineering, Project, and Production Management, pages 51–62. Association ofEngineering, Project, and Production Management, Sept. 2012. [64] L. Susskind and J. Corburn. Using Simulations to Teach Negotiation: PedagogicalTheory and Practice. [65] L. E. Susskind. Scorable Games: A Better Way to Teach Negotiation? NegotiationJournal, 1(3):205–209, July 1985. [66] R. Suzuki and T. Arita. An evolutionary model of personality traits related to cooperativebehavior using a large language model. Scientific Reports, 14(1):5989, Mar.2024. [67] C. Szabo, J. Groot, T. McAtee, and C. Pyromallis. Who Did This: Identifying Causes of Emergent Behavior in Complex Systems. In 2019 IEEE Symposium Series onComputational Intelligence (SSCI), pages 262–270, Feb. 2019. [68] J. TAH and V. CARR. Information modelling for a construction project risk managementsystem. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 7(2):107–119, Jan. 2000. [69] C. S. Tang. Perspectives in supply chain risk management. International Journal ofProduction Economics, 103(2):451–488, Oct. 2006. [70] G. Team. Gemini: A Family of Highly Capable Multimodal Models. [71] Y. Teng, X. Li, P. Wu, and X. Wang. Using cooperative game theory to determineprofit distribution in IPD projects. International Journal of ConstructionManagement, 19(1):32–45, Jan. 2019. [72] H. Touvron, L. Martin, K. Stone, P. Albert, A. Almahairi, Y. Babaei, N. Bashlykov,S. Batra, P. Bhargava, S. Bhosale, D. Bikel, L. Blecher, C. C. Ferrer, M. Chen,G.N. Goyal, A. Hartshorn, S. Hosseini, R. Hou, H. Inan, M. Kardas, V. Kerkez,D. Liskovich, Y. Lu, Y. Mao, X. Martinet, T. Mihaylov, P. Mishra, I. Molybog,Y. Nie, A. Poulton, J. Reizenstein, R. Rungta, K. Saladi, A. Schelten, R. Silva, E. M.Smith, R. Subramanian, X. E. Tan, B. Tang, R. Taylor, A. Williams, J. X. Kuan,P. Xu, Z. Yan, I. Zarov, Y. Zhang, A. Fan, M. Kambadur, S. Narang, A. Rodriguez,R. Stojnic, S. Edunov, and T. Scialom. Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-TunedChat Models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288, July 2023. [73] N. Vilasini, T. R. Neitzert, and J. O. Rotimi. Correlation between Construction Procurement Methods and Lean Principles. International Journal of Construction Management, 11(4):65–78, Jan. 2011. [74] C. Wang, B. Dai, H. Liu, and B. Wang. Towards Objectively Benchmarking SocialIntelligence for Language Agents at Action Level. arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.05337,Apr. 2024. [75] L. Wang, C. Ma, X. Feng, Z. Zhang, H. Yang, J. Zhang, Z. Chen, J. Tang, X. Chen,Y. Lin, W. X. Zhao, Z. Wei, and J.-R. Wen. A Survey on Large Language Modelbased Autonomous Agents. Frontiers of Computer Science, 18(6):186345, Dec.2024. [76] S. Wang, C. Liu, Z. Zheng, S. Qi, S. Chen, Q. Yang, A. Zhao, C. Wang, S. Song, andG. Huang. Avalon’s Game of Thoughts: Battle Against Deception through RecursiveContemplation. arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.01320, Oct. 2023. [77] Y. Wang and H. Li. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing in the IndustrialChain of Construction Industrialization. pages 543–553, Aug. 2019. [78] D. William and H. Chris. Simulation Game for Contract Negotiations. Journal ofManagement in Engineering, 4(2):75–175, 1988. [79] S. Wong, C. Zheng, X. Su, and Y. Tang. Construction contract risk identificationbased on knowledge-augmented language models. Computers in Industry, 157–158:104082, May 2024. [80] W. K. Wong, S. O. Cheung, T. W. Yiu, and H. Y. Pang. A framework for trust inconstruction contracting. International Journal of Project Management, 26(8):821–829, Nov. 2008. [81] Q. Wu, G. Bansal, J. Zhang, Y. Wu, B. Li, E. Zhu, L. Jiang, X. Zhang, S. Zhang,J.Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation. arXiv preprint [82] L. Xu, Z. Hu, D. Zhou, H. Ren, Z. Dong, K. Keutzer, S. K. Ng, and J. Feng. MAgIC:Investigation of Large Language Model Powered Multi-Agent in Cognition, Adaptability,Rationality and Collaboration. arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.08562, Nov. 2023. [83] Y. Xu, S. Wang, P. Li, F. Luo, X. Wang, W. Liu, and Y. Liu. Exploring Large LanguageModels for Communication Games: An Empirical Study on Werewolf. arXivpreprint arXiv:2309.04658, May 2024. [84] X. Xue, X. Li, Q. Shen, and Y. Wang. An agent-based framework for supply 2005. [85] X. Xue and Z. Ren. An Agent-Based Negotiation Platform for editors, Knowledge Processing and Decision Making in Agent-Based Systems, volume170, pages 123–145, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. [86] S. Yao, J. Zhao, D. Yu, I. Shafran, K. R. Narasimhan, and Y. Cao. ReAct: SynergizingReasoning and Acting in Language Models. In NeurIPS 2022 Foundation Modelsfor Decision Making Workshop, Nov. 2022. [87] S. Yousefi, K. W. Hipel, and T. Hegazy. Attitude-Based Strategic Negotiationfor Conflict Management in Construction Projects. Project Management Journal,41(4):99–107, Sept. 2010. [88] R. Zeckhauser. Strategy and Choice. The MIT Press, 1991. [89] J. Zhang, S. P. Sethi, T.-M. Choi, and T. Cheng. Pareto optimality and contractdependence in supply chain coordination with risk-averse agents. Production andOperations Management, 31(6):2557–2570, June 2022. [90] J. Zhang, X. Xu, N. Zhang, R. Liu, B. Hooi, and S. Deng. Exploring CollaborationMechanisms for LLM Agents: A Social Psychology View. arXiv preprintarXiv:2310.02124, May 2024. [91] L. Zhang, J. He, and S. Zhou. Sharing Tacit Knowledge for Integrated Project TeamFlexibility: Case Study of Integrated Project Delivery. Journal of ConstructionEngineering and Management, 139(7):795–804, July 2013. [92] H. Zhao, C. Ma, G. Wang, J. Su, L. Kong, J. Xu, Z.-H. Deng, and H. Yang. EmpoweringLarge Language Model Agents through Action Learning. 2024. [93] Q. Zhao, J. Wang, Y. Zhang, Y. Jin, K. Zhu, H. Chen, and X. Xie. CompeteAI:Understanding the Competition Dynamics in Large Language Model-based Agents.arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.17512, June 2024. [94] W. X. Zhao, K. Zhou, J. Li, T. Tang, X. Wang, Y. Hou, Y. Min, B. Zhang, J. Zhang,Z. Dong, Y. Du, C. Yang, Y. Chen, Z. Chen, J. Jiang, R. Ren, Y. Li, X. Tang, Z. Liu,P. Liu, J.-Y. Nie, and J.-R. Wen. A Survey of Large Language Models. arXiv preprintarXiv:2303.18223, Nov. 2023. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/95134 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 營建專案中複雜的分包商結構與交互行為，形成了工作定義模糊的營建生態，進而使工程相關利益者面臨工程遲延、成本超支或其他不可歸責之風險。目前藉由大型語言模型的開發，我們可透過自然語言指導大型語言模型(LLM) 完成目標明確之任務，並且亦能建立大型語言模型(LLM) 代理人系統來拆解模糊定義之任務以達到更好的成果。本研究旨在通過開發一個基於大型語言模型的多代理系統（LLM-MA）框架模擬營建專案中利益相關者的行為，從而加深對營建專案中契約關係的理解。本研究利用賽局理論整合於大型語言模型多代理（LLM-MA），建立了架構地圖去描繪如欲建立大型語言模型多代理系統建築專案(LLM-MA) 所需要的元素，並透過角色扮演遊戲測試LLM 代理的能力。實驗過程允許觀察微觀行為，例如模擬角色決定接受或協商提案，以及專案的宏觀狀態，包括利害關係人關係與合約付款。結果證明，LLM 代理產生的類似利益關係人的行為，可以符合賽局中的策略行為，此實驗架構也展現未來潛力於增強建築專案中合約風險分析技術。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Construction projects involve complex cooperation structures due to contracting, and ambiguous job definitions can lead to delays and unforeseen risks. Recent advancements in natural language processing enable the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide task decomposition and create LLM-based agent systems capable of handling complex tasks. This study aims to enhance our understanding of contracting relationships in construction projects through developing a Multi-Agent System (MAS) framework that utilizes LLM-based agents to simulate stakeholder behaviors. By integrating game theory into Large Language Model based Multi-Agents (LLM-MA), this work identify a roadmap for building LLM-MA of construction project and test the abilities of LLM agent by roleplaying game. The experiment process allows for observing micro-behaviors, such as simulated roles deciding to accept or negotiate proposals, as well as macro-states of a project, including stakeholder relationships and contract payments. The results demonstrate that human-like behaviors generated by LLM agents can align with strategic approaches to cooperative problems. Furthermore, this experimental framework shows potential for enhancing contractual risk analysis techniques in construction projects. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-08-29T16:14:33Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-08-29T16:14:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii Contents v List of Figures viii List of Tables ix Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backgrounds 1 1.2 Objectives 3 1.3 Research Structure 4 Chapter 2 Literature Review 6 2.1 Contractual Risks 6 2.1.1 Attributes of Contract 7 2.1.2 Risk Mitigation when sharing risk 8 2.2 Modeling of Construction Management and Cooperation 10 2.2.1 Simulation on Construction Management 10 2.2.2 Game Theory on Construction Cooperation 11 2.3 Large Language Model on Human Simulacra 13 2.3.1 Improving Abilities of LLMs 13 2.3.2 LLM-MA for World Simulation 15 2.4 Summary 16 Chapter 3 Methodology 17 3.1 Road map to LLM-MA Construction Simulation 18 3.1.1 Game Rules 23 3.1.2 Scoring System 26 3.1.3 Agent Framework 30 3.2 Testing the Agent Framework 32 3.2.1 Rationality Abilities 33 3.2.2 Risk Reflection Abilities 37 3.2.3 Bargaining Abilities 41 Chapter 4 Results and Discussion 45 4.1 Rationality Performance 45 4.2 Risk Reflection Performance 47 4.3 Bargaining Ability Performance 50 4.4 Discussion 51 4.4.1 LLM abilities in simulation 51 4.4.2 Practical implications of LLM-MA 53 4.4.3 Limitation and Future Work 54 Chapter 5 Conclusion 57 References 59 Appendix A — Additional Experimental Details 72 A.1 Prompt forming agent personalities 72 A.2 Prompt guiding agent thinking pattern 73 Appendix B — Additional Experimental Results 77 B.1 Generated data example of RFI game 77 B.2 Generated data example of Negotiation game 78 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 大型語言模型 (LLM) | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 多代理系統 (MAS) | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 行為經濟 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 賽局理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 利益相關者行為 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Multi-Agent System (MAS) | en |
| dc.subject | Game Theory | en |
| dc.subject | Large Language Models (LLM) | en |
| dc.subject | Stakeholder Behavior | en |
| dc.subject | Behavioral Economics | en |
| dc.title | 應用大型語言模型多代理人模擬建築專案風險之初探 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Enhancing Understanding of Construction Project Risks through Large Language Model Multi-Agent Simulation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 112-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林祐正;林之謙 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Yu-Cheng Lin;Je-Chian Lin | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 多代理系統 (MAS),大型語言模型 (LLM),賽局理論,行為經濟,利益相關者行為, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Multi-Agent System (MAS),Large Language Models (LLM),Game Theory,Behavioral Economics,Stakeholder Behavior, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 78 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202402121 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2024-08-16 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 土木工程學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 土木工程學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-112-2.pdf 授權僅限NTU校內IP使用（校園外請利用VPN校外連線服務） | 746.39 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。