生的自然與死的自由——莊子哲學論自殺

Abstract

這部論文以「莊子哲學如何看待結束自身生命這件事？」為問題意識，以論證「關於自殺的莊子式哲學思考」為目標。藉由跨學科與綜合性的研究歷史背景、文本分析及哲學論述，依序為這四種向度的哲學問題的提出見解：莊子哲學「究竟」、「想要」、「能夠」以及「應該」如何回應自殺問題？ 在「究竟」的向度，《莊子》書中不乏關於自殺者與自殺現象的討論，但並不足以推論出莊子哲學針對自殺行為的道德判斷，而莊子對自主選擇生活樣態卻死於自殺的隱逸者，有相當高的關注。 在「想要」的向度，莊子哲學之所以對部分生活樣態顯示出看似矛盾的態度，取決於對養生的立場（充分性或必要性）以及思維的傾向（規範性、反思性，或基於二者的反身覺察）。這些立場與傾向可以為自殺問題提供一致但潛藏衝突的回應。 在「能夠」的向度，透過人稱視角的轉換、自我疆界的轉變、人格境界的轉化，莊子哲學具有順應不同脈絡、提供關於生命意義的各式回應以及呈現多樣生活樣態的可能性。加上時間的維度，則理想的生命型態在身後方能證成，而一個人是否活得自然，在生命結束前沒有人有完全的掌握。 最後，在「應該」的向度，自由本身與決定自我疆界之自由，是莊子哲學在回應自殺問題時的首要考量。我們不應為了自然而壓迫個人合理的自由，也不應為了自由卻傷害個人合適的自然。在共同體認自然之整全性意義與實踐自由之價值的前提下，對話中的主體對生命型態的追求，以及如何走向生命結束的抉擇，皆應相互予以尊重。

The dissertation aims to demonstrate “the Zhuangzian philosophical ways of thinking about suicide,” based on questioning “how Zhuangzian philosophy regards ending one’s own life.” Through the interdisciplinary and comprehensive research on the historical background, analysis of text, and philosophical discussions, answers are provided by four dimensions of philosophical inquiry: How “does,” “would,” “could,” and “should” Zhuangzian philosophy respond to the question on suicide? In the dimension of “do,” there is no lack of discussions about suicide persons and phenomena in the Zhuangzi, but insufficient to deduce the moral judgments of Zhuangzian philosophy on suicide. Meanwhile, Zhuangzi gave heightened attention to hermits who independently chose their lifestyles but died by suicide. In the “would” dimension, why Zhuangzian philosophy shows seemingly contradictory attitudes toward some lifestyles depends on the position on nourishing life (sufficiency or necessity), and the thinking tendency (normative, reflective, or reflexive awareness based on each). These positions and tendencies provide consistent but also potentially conflicting responses to concerns about suicide. In the dimension of “could,” through the transition of personal viewpoints, the transformation of the boundaries of the self, and the conversion of personality states, Zhuangzian philosophy is capable of adapting to different contexts, providing various responses to the meaning of life and presenting diverse lifestyles. Adding the dimension of time, the ideal life form can only be justified after death. Before the end of life, no one can assure whether one is living “naturally”. Finally, in the dimension of “should,” when responding to concerns about suicide, the freedom itself and the freedom to determine the boundaries of the self is the primary consideration in Zhuangzian philosophy. We should not oppress individuals' reasonable freedom for the sake of nature, nor should we harm individuals' appropriate nature for the sake of freedom. On the premise of recognizing the integral meaning of nature and practicing the value of freedom, agents in the dialogue should respect each other's pursuit of life forms and the choice of the way to the end of life.