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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 法律學院
  3. 法律學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94542
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor蔡英欣zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorYing-Hsin Tsaien
dc.contributor.author黃士庭zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorShih-Ting Huangen
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-16T16:38:36Z-
dc.date.available2024-08-17-
dc.date.copyright2024-08-16-
dc.date.issued2024-
dc.date.submitted2024-08-09-
dc.identifier.citation中文文獻
(一)中文專書
1. 王文宇(2019),《公司法論》,台北:元照。
2. 劉連煜(2020),《現代公司法》,新北:新學林。
3. 賴英照(2020),《最新證券交易法解析》,台北:賴英照出版。
(二)期刊論文
1. 王文宇、謝孟珊(2017),〈從樂陞案檢討我國公開收購制度〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,第267期。
2. 方順逸、黃郁涵(2020),〈失誤個案檢討──現金消失的康友〉,《貨幣觀測與信用評等》。
3. 方嘉麟(2018),〈從永豐金案看獨立董事制度〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,第272期。
4. 公司法全盤修正重要議題研討會(2018),〈探討資訊揭露與法人犯罪防制、經營權爭奪及董事會功能〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,第276期。
5. 郭大維(2023),〈我國獨立董事與審計委員會制度之變革──從近年公司經營權爭奪事件談起〉,《月旦會計實務研究》第69期。
6. 黃銘傑(2019),〈政府部門介入公司治理之型態及其利弊分析──笨蛋!問題在政府!〉,《月旦會計實務研究》,第18期。
7. 蔡英欣(2018),論股份有限公司監督機關之設計──比較日本與臺灣的繼受法制談起,臺北大學法學論叢,第107期。
(三)網路資料
1. ETtoday新聞雲(2021),〈康和證涉「非常規交易」掏空16億 董座父子遭約談〉,https://www.ettoday.net/news/20211202/2137211.htm。
2. ETtoday新聞雲(2021),〈友達銷售處長神鬼搬運「7年靈魂式鯨吞」!直逼AUO一整年淨利〉,https://www.ettoday.net/news/20211224/2153883.htm。
3. 中央社(2024),〈新板傑仕堡案涉背信 吳東進移送新北檢複訊〉,https://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/202406120008.aspx。
4. 公視新聞網(2023),〈日本大發汽車爆測試造假 豐田股價蒸發千億元〉,https://news.pts.org.tw/article/672540。
5. 自由時報(2021),〈號稱打造台版特斯拉! 淳紳爆掏空4.8億 董座沈瑋聲押〉,https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/3456883。
6. 自由時報(2021),〈「淘帝-KY」爆財報造假!檢調搜索約談董事及會計師等5人〉,https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/3414676。
7. 東森財經(2024),〈台灣颳起「仁來瘋」!黃仁勳掀巨星炫風 輝達高層也訝異〉,https://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news/%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E9%A2%B3%E8%B5%B7-%E4%BB%81%E4%BE%86%E7%98%8B-%E9%BB%83%E4%BB%81%E5%8B%B3%E6%8E%80%E5%B7%A8%E6%98%9F%E7%82%AB%E9%A2%A8-%E8%BC%9D%E9%81%94%E9%AB%98%E5%B1%A4%E4%B9%9F%E8%A8%9D%E7%95%B0-020600408.html。
8.聯合報(2024),〈台中銀董座王貴鋒 涉挪用公款10億〉,https://udn.com/news/story/7321/7746912。
9. 證券期貨局(2023),〈111及110年公開發行公司獨立董事性別分析〉,https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=577&parentpath=0,7,446,571&mcustomize=sextarget_view.jsp&dataserno=202305010002&dtable=SexTarget。
英文文獻
(一)專書
1. Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), The Limits of Organization.
2. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2012), Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis.
3. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
4. Harold J. Berman (1983), Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal. Tradition.
5. Antony Black (1984), Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present.
6. Lujo Brentano (1870), On the History and Development of Gilds and the Origin of Trade-unions.
7. C. T. Carr (1913), Select Charters of Trading Companies, 1530-1707.
8. George Cawston & A.H. Keane (1896), The Early Chartered Companies.
9. William Cunningham (1910), The Growth of English Industry and Commerce during the early and Middle Ages.
10. John P. Davis (1905), Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great Business Combinations and of Their Relation to Authority of the State.
11. Melvin A. Eisenberg (1976), The Structure of The Corporation.
12. Michael A.R. Graves (2001), The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe.
13. Sir Percival Griffiths (1974), A License to Trade: The History of English Chartered Companies.
14. Charles Gross (1890), The Gild Merchant.
15. Myles Mace (1971), Directors: Myth and Reality.
16. Antonio Marongiu (1968), Medieval Parliaments: A Comparative Study.
17. John B. Morrall (1962), Political Thought in Medieval Times.
18. John H. Mundy & Peter Riesenberg (1958), The Medieval Town.
19. Francis Oakley (2012), The Mortgage of the Past: Reshaping the Ancient Political Inheritance (1050-1300).
20. D. Pasquet (1925), An Essay on The Origins of the House of Commons (R.G.D. Laffan Trans.).
21. Colin Platt (1976), The English Medieval Town.
22. Susan Reynolds (1984), Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300.
23. Susan Reynolds (1995), Ideas and Solidarities of Medieval Laity.
24. Fritz Rorig (1967), The Medieval Town.
25. Simon Schama (2000), 2 A History of Britain: The Wars of the British 1603-1776.
26. William Robert Scott (1912), The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720.
27. Toulmin Smith (1870), English Gilds.
28. Edgcumbe Staley (1906), The Guilds of Florence.
29. Carl Stephenson (1933), Borough and Town, A Study of Urban Origins in England.
30. William Stubbs (1913), Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History: From the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First.
31. Heather Swanson (1999), Medieval British Towns.
32. Brian Tierney (1955), Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists From Gratian to the Great Schism.
33. Brian Tierney (1982), Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650.
(二)書之篇章
1. Ronald J. Gilson (2018), From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance. in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe ed., 2018).
2. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner (2003), The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. in John T. Jost & Jim Sidanius (Eds.), Political psychology: Key readings in Social Psychology, Routledge, Ed. 1.
(三)期刊論文
1. ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws (1978), Corporate Director’s Guidebook, The Business Lawyer, 33.
2. Stephen M. Bainbridge (1993), Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, George Washington Law Review, 61.
3. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2002), Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate. Governance, Northwestern University Law Review, 97.
4. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2002), A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 02-15, 2002, 1-2. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=317121.
5. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2011), Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, Minnesota Law Review, 95.
6. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al. (2002), Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review, 69.
7. Adolf A. Berle Jr. (1931), Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Harvard Law Review, 44.
8. James R. Bettman et al. (1998), Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, Journal of Consumer Research, 25.
9. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black (1999), The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, The Business Lawyer, 54.
10. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black (2002), The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, 27.
11. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout (1999), A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Virginia Law Review, 85.
12. Phillip I. Blumberg (1973), Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, Boston University Law Review, 53.
13. Irwin Borowski (1984), Corporate Accountability: The Role of the Independent Director, Journal of Corporation Law, 9, 455-456.
14. Christopher M. Bruner (2011), Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, Journal of Corporation Law, 36.
15. Business Roundtable (1978), The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, The Business Lawyer, 33.
16. Business Roundtable (1990), Statement of the Business Roundtable (1990), Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, The Business Lawyer, 46.
17. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin (1994), Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, American Business Law Journal, 32.
18. Brian R. Cheffins (2009), Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, The Business Lawyer, 65.
19. Brian R. Cheffins (2012), The History of Corporate Governance, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, No. 184, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404.
20. Brian R. Cheffins (2015), Corporate Governance since the Managerial Capitalism Era, Business History Review, 89 (4).
21. Robert Charles Clark (2005), Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, Georgia State University Law Review, 22.
22. R.H. Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4 (16).
23. Robert D. Cooter (1996), Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144.
24. James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz (1983), The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination of Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, The North Carolina Law Review, 61.
25. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger (1985), Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, Law & Contemporary Problems, 48.
26. Lynne L. Dallas (2003), The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, San Diego Law Review, 40.
27. Merrick Dodd (1932), For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, Harvard Law Review, 45.
28. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey (1989), The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, The Business Lawyer, 44.
29. Charles M. Elson (1996), Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board─The History of a Symptom and a Cure, Southern Methodist University Law Review, 50.
30. Olubunmi Faleye , RaniHoitash , UdiHoitash (2011), The costs of intense board monitoring, Journal of Financial Economics, 101.
31. Eugene F. Fama (1970), Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, The Journal of Finance, 25.
32. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen (1983), Separation of Ownership and Control, The Journal of Law and Economics, 26.
33. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen (1983), Agency Problems and Residual Claims, The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2).
34. Eugene F. Fama (1991), Efficient Capital Market II, The Journal of Finance, 46.
35. James A. Fanto (2001), Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, Ohio State Law Journal, 62.
36. James Fanto (2004), Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, Oregon Law Review, 83.
37. Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, and A.C. Pritchard (2003), Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments, THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, VOL. LVIII.
38. Jill E. Fisch (1997), Taking Boards Seriously, Cardozo Law Review, 19.
39. Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken (1999), Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, Academy of Management Review, 24.
40. Tamar Frankel (2008), Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 77.
41. R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed (1983), Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, California Management Review, 25.
42. Franklin A. Gevurtz (2004), The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, Hofstra Law Review, 33.
43. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman (1991), Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, Stanford Law Review, 43.
44. Jeffrey N. Gordon (2007), The Rise of Independent Directors in The United States, 1950-2005: of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, Stanford Law Review, 59.
45. Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung Kim (2009), It Pays to Have Friends, Journal of Financial Economics, 93.
46. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3.
47. Roberta S. Karmel (1984), Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End, George Washington Law Review, 52.
48. Meir Kohn (2003), Business Organization in Pre-Industrial Europe, SSRN, Working Paper No. 03-09.
49. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen (2000), Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, California Law Review, 88.
50. John M. Levine & Lauren B. Resnick (1993), Social Foundations of Cognition, Annual Review of Psychology, 44.
51. Yu-Hsin Lin (2013), Do Social Ties Matter in Corporate Governance The Missing Factor in Chinese Corporate Governance Reform, George Mason Journal of International Commercial Law, 5.
52. Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch (1992), A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, The Business Lawyer, 48.
53. Henry G. Manne (1965), Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 73.
54. Bayless Manning (1962), The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, The Yale Law Journal, 72.
55. Bayless Manning (1984), The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, The Business Lawyer, 39.
56. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld (2010), Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 33.
57. Jørgen Møller (2018), The Ecclesiastical Roots of Representation and Consent, Perspectives on Politics, 16(4).
58. Jørgen Møller (2017), Medieval origins of the rule of law: The Gregorian reforms as critical juncture?, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 9(2).
59. Cyril O'Donnell (1952), Origins of the Corporate Executive, Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, 26, 63.
60. A. H. Oosterhoff (1977), The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review, University of Toronto Law Journal, 27.
61. Troy A. Paredes (2005), Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOS, and Corporate Governance, Florida State University Law Review, 32.
62. Gaines Post (1943), Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies: A Study in Romano-canonical Procedure and the Rise of Representation, 1150-1325, Traditio, 1943.
63. Gaines Post (1950), A Roman Legal Theory of Consent, Quod Omnes Tangit, in Medieval Representation, Wisconsin Law Review, 1950.
64. Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler (2003), A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, Cornell Law Review, 88.
65. Roberta Romano (2001), Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance, Yale Journal on Regulation, 18.
66. Roberta Romano (2005), The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, The Yale Law Journal,114.
67. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser (1988), Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1.
68. M. Schmitthoff (1939), The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, University of Toronto Law Journal, 3.
69. Joel Seligman (1987), A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, The George Washington Law Review, 55.
70. Nicola Faith Sharpe (2013), Informational Autonomy in the Boardroom, University of Illinois Law Review, 2013.
71. Herbert A. Simon (1956), Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, Psychological Review, 63.
72. Chamu Sundaramurthy & Marianne Lewis (2003), Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Governance, Academy of Management Review, 28.
73. Cass R. Sunstein (1997), Behavioral Analysis of Law, The University of Chicago Law Review, 64.
74. Brian Tierney (1966), Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, The Catholic Historical Review, 52.
75. E. Norman Veasey (1997), The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 The Business Lawyer, 52.
76. Julian Velasco (2004), Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, Washington University Law Quarterly, 82.
77. C. E. Walker (1931), The History of the Joint Stock Company, The Accounting Review, 6.
78. Carl Watner (2005), Quod Omnes Tangit: Consent Theory in the Radical Libertarian Tradition in the Middle Ages, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 19(2).
79. Neil D. Weinstein (1980), Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 814.
80. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac (1995), Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity and New Director Selection, Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 62.
81. James D. Westphal (1999), Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral and Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, Academy of Management Journal, 42, 7, 18.
(四)判決判例
1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
2. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
3. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
4. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch, 1986).
5. Canal Capital Corp. v. French (Del. Ch. 1992)
6. In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 852 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
7. In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
8. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002).
9. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
10. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
11. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
12. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
13. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2014).
14. In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014).
(五)其他
1. Business Roundtable (2002), Principles of Corporate Governance.
2. Business Roundtable (2005), Principles of Corporate Governance 2005.
3. Business Roundtable (1997), Statement on corporate governance.
4. OECD (2023), G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2023.
5. Harold M. Williams (1979), Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power (a paper presented at the Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania).
6. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976
7. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE (June 6, 2002).
(六)網路資料
1. Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller (2008), At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html .
2. Timeline: Libor-fixing scandal, BBC News, 6 Feb 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255 .
3. Russell Hotten (2015), Volkswagen: The scandal explained, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 .
4. Emily Flitter (2020), The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal Grows by $3 Billion, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html .
5. Ben Taub (2023), How the Biggest Fraud in German History Unravelled, The New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/how-the-biggest-fraud-in-german-history-unravelled .
6. Prarthana Prakash (2023), Silicon Valley Bank had no official chief risk officer for 8 months while the VC market was spiraling, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/2023/03/10/silicon-valley-bank-chief-risk-officer/ .
7. Milton Friedman (1970), The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html .
8. The Economist, The A to Z of economics, https://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z .
9. ADAM SMITH (1776), AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen and Co. 1904), Book V, Chapter I, available at https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html?chapter_num=35#book-reader.
10. Thom Gobbitt (2022), Poisoning in The Early Medieval Laws Of Liutprand, https://www.oeaw.ac.at/imafo/read/poisoning-in-the-early-medieval-laws-of-liutprand .
11. Justinian's Codex C. 5, 59, 5, https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/CJ5.htm#59.
12. Justinian's Codex C. 2, 12, 10, https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/CJ2.htm#12 .
13. Charles Elson (2003), What's Wrong with Executive Compensation? A Roundtable Moderated, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan. 2003. https://hbr.org/2003/01/whats-wrong-with-executive-compensation .
14. CII's corporate governance policies, https://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies , March 6, 2023.
15. Roderick M. Kramer (2003), The Harder They Fall, HARV. Bus. REV., Oct. 2003. https://hbr.org/2003/10/the-harder-they-fall .
16. LinkedIn, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), https://www.linkedin.com/company/pcaob .
日文文獻
(一)日文專書
1. 江頭憲治郎(2015),《株式會社法》,6版,東京:有斐閣。
2. 結城智里(2018),《企業不祥事事典II──ケーススタディ2007-2017》,東京:日外アソシエーツ。
3. 武井一浩(2013),《対談集・企業法制改革論II──コーポレートガバナンス編》,東京:中央経済社。
(二)期刊論文
1. 吳曉青(2011),〈独立取締役とコーポレート・ガバナンス〉,《一橋法学》第10巻第2号。
(三)其他
1. 有限責任監査法人トーマツ(2017),〈経済産業省平成28年度産業経済研究委託事業──「取締役会の機能向上等に関するコーポレートガバナンス実態調査報告書」。
2. 東京証券取引所有価証券上場規程・別添・コーポレートガバナンス・コード。
3. 株式会社東京証券取引所(2023),《東証上場会社コーポレート・ガバナンス白書2023》。
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94542-
dc.description.abstract公司治理規制,不論在內國或國際層面,亦不論係法律或是軟性的規則,經過數十年的改革與修整,其方向與作法在今天已大局底定了下來──一個仰賴獨立董事運作的監控模式──,並給人們已瑧完美的印象。然而,公司的醜聞與失敗在世界各地仍層出不窮、未曾止歇,這樣理想與現實之間的落差卻未必使許多監管者與論者對今制失去信心或產生懷疑。筆者自此觀察出發,試圖從中窺探是否有如何隱微的脆弱之處,並以兩個主軸──歷史脈絡與心理困境──進行探索。就歷史脈絡的觀察而言,董事之制度來源於中世紀教會對羅馬法理──代表與同意──的發展,而自中世紀至航海時代,相等於董事之人,均係相等於執行長之人的助手,明顯顯示出董事作為監控者並非來自長遠的歷史淵源。就心理困境的觀察而言,人類並非以冷靜且理性地計算得失的方式行事,而受到諸多心理局限性的影響。並且,心理困境不單存在於每個人的內在之中,在人聚成團體時亦會產生團體層面的心理困境。此外,人作為社會的動物,亦受到廣泛的社會規範的制約。更甚者,身為菁英的同質性亦有如鬆軟的地基,暗示著建築於上的堂皇穩固的制度可能的危殆。最後,本文建議設立一個讓獨董歸屬的公背景的機關,得賦予其一種使命感與心理支援來對抗心理困境,而發揮其「直言力」。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractAfter decades of reform and refinement, the direction and approach of corporate governance regulation, whether at the domestic or international level, and whether it is a law or a soft rule, has been settled today, that is, a monitoring model that relies on independent directors, and has given the impression that it has been perfected. However, the gap between ideals and reality does not necessarily make regulators and commentators lose their confidence or doubt about the current system. Starting from this observation, the author tries to get a glimpse of whether there is a subtle vulnerability, and explores it with two main axes: historical context and psychological dilemma. In terms of historical context, the institution of directors originated from the development of Roman jurisprudence by the medieval church, namely representation and consent, and from the Middle Ages to the Age of Navigation, the equivalent of directors was the assistant of the equivalent of the chief executive, which clearly shows that the directors as supervisors did not come from a long-term historical origin. In terms of psychological dilemma, human beings do not act calmly and rationally in the way of calculating gains and losses, but are affected by many psychological limitations. Moreover, psychological dilemmas not only exist within each individual, but also arise at the group level when people gather in groups. In addition, human beings, as social animals, are also subject to a wide range of social norms. Besides, the homogeneity of elites is like a soft foundation, implying that the grand and stable system built on it may be in danger. Finally, this article proposes to set up an institution with a public background to which independent directors belong, giving them a sense of mission and psychological support to combat against psychological dilemmas and exert their "outspoken power".en
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dc.description.tableofcontents謝辭 i
摘要 ii
ABSTRACT iii
目錄 v
圖目錄 x
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究方法 5
第三節 研究範圍 6
第四節 研究目標 6
第五節 本文架構 6
第二章 公司治理的內涵與監控意義的思考 8
第一節 公司治理為何 8
第一項 前言 8
第二項 定義 10
第二節 公司治理之目的與手段 15
第一項 股東優位(shareholder primacy) 16
第二項 經營者主義(managerialism) 17
第三項 契約論(Contractarians) 19
第四項 董事優位(director primacy) 23
第五項 利害關係人優位(stakeholder primacy) 26
第六項 團隊生產(team production theory) 29
第七項 市場效率(market efficiency) 31
第八項 小結 33
第三節 監控模式的主導地位──兼論監控、建言、經營之糾葛 35
第一項 代理成本和經營與所有分離 36
第二項 經營者支配 39
第三項 監控模式與建言模式 43
第四項 監控董事會與經營董事會 49
第五項 監控、建言與經營──概念之再整理 52
第六項 小結 61
第四節 結語 62
第三章 董事會之概念上起源與發展 64
第一節 概念上起源──代表與同意 65
第一項 教會的發明 65
第一款 羅馬─教會法公式 68
第一目 「同意」:Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus a pprobetur:影響眾人之事應經眾人同意 70
第二目 「代表」:Plena Potestas:代表人的完全權力 76
第二款 小結 80
第二項 向世俗擴散 82
第一款 國會大會 82
第一目 國會大會的成長 82
第二目 國會大會與董事會 87
第三目 小結 90
第二款 城鎮議會 91
第一目 城鎮議會的成長 91
第二目 城鎮議會與董事會 94
第三目 城鎮議會的動機 100
第二節 公會與合股公司 104
第一項 社會公會到商業公會 104
第二項 商人公會 108
第三項 管制公司 111
第四項 合股公司 113
第五項 公會與貿易公司之董事會治理 120
第三節 美國董事會之近代發展 126
第一項 1930年代 127
第二項 1950年代 130
第三項 1970年代 132
第四項 1980年代 137
第五項 1990年代 140
第六項 2000年代 144
第五節 結語 150
第四章 獨立性的脆弱性 154
第一節 向來對於醜聞的反應 154
第二節 現行獨立性定義的局限性 162
第一項 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.案 164
第二項 結構性偏見 173
第一款 隱性陰謀 174
第二款 關係的影響力 176
第三款 群體內偏見 179
第四款 小結 181
第三項 精英的本質 183
第四項 小結 190
第三節 兼職又兼任導致本質上的時間缺乏 192
第四節 對經營者尊重的現實 199
第五節 核心圈子 201
第六節 心理困境的力量 204
第一項 個人層面 206
第一款 理性選擇理論 206
第二款 有限理性和啟發式方法 208
第一目 複雜性與模糊性 209
第二目 啟發式方法與偏見 211
一、啟發式方法──代表性與可用性 211
二、過度自信/過度樂觀與自私偏見 213
三、後見之明偏見 215
四、錨定與調整偏見 215
第三款 脈絡的重要性 216
第一目 框架效應與極端厭惡 217
第二目 不對稱偏見 219
第三目 習慣、傳統、權威與從眾 221
第四目 沈沒成本 223
第四款 社會規範 224
第五款 小結 226
第二項 團體層面──「團體思維」 227
第三項 進化生物學 232
第四項 心理困境在危機中的角色 235
第七節 結語 239
第五章 結論 247
參考文獻 258
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject監控模式zh_TW
dc.subject獨立董事zh_TW
dc.subject代表zh_TW
dc.subject同意zh_TW
dc.subject心理困境zh_TW
dc.subject行為科學zh_TW
dc.subjectmonitoring modelen
dc.subjectbehavioral scienceen
dc.subjectpsychological dilemmaen
dc.subjectconsenten
dc.subjectrepresentationen
dc.subjectindependent directoren
dc.subjectcorporate governanceen
dc.title獨立董事之脆弱性──從歷史脈絡與心理困境探討zh_TW
dc.titleThe Vulnerability of Independent Directors: A Discussion on Historical Context and Psychological Dilemmasen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear112-2-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee邵慶平;郭大維zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeChing-Ping Shao;Ta-Wei Kuoen
dc.subject.keyword公司治理,監控模式,獨立董事,代表,同意,心理困境,行為科學,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governance,monitoring model,independent director,representation,consent,psychological dilemma,behavioral science,en
dc.relation.page273-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202402475-
dc.rights.note未授權-
dc.date.accepted2024-08-12-
dc.contributor.author-college法律學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept法律學系-
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