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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 法律學院
  3. 法律學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件： http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/93944
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor李素華zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorSu-Hua Leeen
dc.contributor.author黃婉婷zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorWan-Ting Huangen
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-09T16:35:48Z-
dc.date.available2024-08-10-
dc.date.copyright2024-08-09-
dc.date.issued2024-
dc.date.submitted2024-07-30-
dc.identifier.citation一、中文文獻（按筆劃排列）
（一）專書論著
1. Tim Wu（吳修銘）（著），王怡棻（譯）（2020），《巨頭的詛咒》，一版，天下雜誌。
2. 公平交易委員會（2023），《數位經濟競爭政策白皮書》，初版，自版。
3. 胡祖舜（2019），《競爭法之經濟分析》，初版，元照。
4. 廖義男（2021），《公平交易法》，初版，元照。
（二）期刊論文
1. 王志誠（2023），〈事業結合之典範變遷、執法檢討及展望〉，《公平交易季刊》，31卷3期，頁1-58。
2. 王明禮、蔡明芳、莊弘鈺（2023），〈數位平臺經濟之結合管制〉，《公平交易季刊》，31卷2期，頁41-80。
3. 甘琳、王立達（2017），〈共享經濟有問題？—探討Uber所面臨的競爭法挑戰〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，270期，頁187-211。
4. 印永翔、陳思遐（2012），〈創新與研發、 知識外溢之因果分析 — 以 G20 國家集團為例〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，40卷4期，頁515-538。
5. 吳秀明、沈麗玉（2015），〈結合管制規範的新里程碑〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，238期，頁199-222。
6. 沈麗玉（2003），〈事業結合之管制與變革—兼論公平交易法之最新修正—〉，《公平交易季刊》，11卷1期，頁43-94。
7. 林廷機、陳凱娟（2012），〈結合補救制度—從美國法的認知對公平交易法適用上之探討與啟示〉，《公平交易季刊》，20卷1期，頁33-76。
8. 林依仁（2023），〈結合管制之附加附款〉，《教育暨資訊科技法學評論》，十一期，頁49-63。
9. 林家暘（2023），〈德國限制競爭防制法（GWB）強化數位平臺管理之路—兼論公平會數位經濟競爭政策白皮書〉，《公平交易季刊》，31卷3期，頁109-164。
10. 邱映曦（2021），〈大數據發展下之資料驅動事業結合與競爭法制政策〉，《公平交易季刊》，29卷2期，頁。
11. 胡海豐（2011），〈從Pareto效率到Marshall效率：論制度的經濟效率性評析〉，《社會科學論叢》，5卷2期，頁34-58。
12. 胡勝正（2006），〈我國經濟發展現況及展望〉，《台灣經濟論衡》，4卷7期，頁1-9。
13. 翁章傑（2022），〈我國結合申報義務之反思—比較美國法之規範與實務〉，《公平交易季刊》，30卷1期，頁97-164。
14. 馬泰成（2018），〈結合管制：效率與公平間之取捨〉，《臺大管理論叢》，28卷3期，頁1-28。
15. 張長樹（1993），〈公平交易法立法體例及目的之研究〉，《公平交易季刊》，1卷4期，頁91-123。
16. 張媛筑（2018），〈競爭法上使用者數據之應有定位與可能造成之衝擊〉，《公平交易季刊》，26卷4期，頁125-164。
17. 張澤平（1996），〈公平交易法之回顧與展望〉，《律師通訊》，203期，頁3-4。
18. 許淑幸（2020），〈競爭法水平結合規範下UPPI、CPPI及DEA之運用〉，《公平交易季刊》，28卷2期，頁149-192。
19. 陳志民、陳和全（2013），〈「結合矯正措施」制度之一項功能性導向的理解架構〉，《公平交易季刊》，21卷1期，頁1-66。
20. 陳琪（1993），〈美國反托拉斯法之簡介〉，《公平交易季刊》，1卷4期，頁45-67。
21. 曾文港（2011），〈專利強制授權「關鍵設施理論」之應用——以中國大陸德先訴索尼案為論證〉，《專利師》，7期，頁77-97。
22. 黃美瑛、黃翰彬（2016），〈事業結合之單方效果評估：兼論UPP之應用〉，《公平交易季刊》，24卷4期，頁1-32。
23. 黃銘傑（1998），〈中小企業保護與競爭政策—憲法增修「中小企業保障條款」的問題提起〉，《臺大法學論叢》，27卷3期，頁47-78。
24. 黃銘傑（2017），〈公平交易法結合管制之問題點與盲點—以結合類型與實體規範要件為中心—〉，《公平交易季刊》，25卷2期，頁29-54。
25. 楊忠霖（2018），〈競爭法與經濟管制〉，《公平交易季刊》，26卷1期，頁1-48。
26. 詹鎮榮（2011），〈行政處分附款法制之傳統與革新—從公平交易法上之結合管制出發〉，《公平交易季刊》，19卷4期，頁1-58。
27. 廖義男（1992），〈公平交易法之立法目的與保護之法益—第一條之詮釋—〉，《公平交易季刊》，創刊號，頁1-10。
28. 劉孔中（1995），〈公平交易法與消費者保護法之比較研究〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，7卷2期，頁1-19。
29. 劉孔中（1995），〈美國聯邦交易委員會法第五條之研究〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，第7卷第1期，頁159-190。
30. 劉孔中（2003），〈公平交易法之目的、適用與執行〉，《全國律師》，7卷10期，頁100-117。
31. 劉姿汝（2009），〈消費爭議與公平交易法〉，《第16屆競爭政策與公平交易法學術研討會論文集》，頁261-294。
32. 薛健吾（2014），〈全球化了台灣的什麼？國際化與台灣的政治經濟變遷〉，《台灣政治學刊》，18卷2期，頁139-215。
33. 謝長江（2021），〈初論非經濟效率因素作為競爭法之目的：從秩序自由主義及新布蘭迪斯學派的發展談起〉，《公平交易季刊》，29卷3期，頁119-156。
34. 顏雅倫（2016），〈雙邊／多邊市場之競爭與創新〉，《科技法律評論》，13卷1期，頁219-266。
（三）研究計畫報告
1. 江雅綺、郭迺鋒、程法彰、黃子恬、楊宗翰（2020），《行為反托拉斯與消費者權益之探討》，公平交易委員會109年委託研究報告（PG10905-0039）。
2. 邱敬淵、陳嘉雯、李素華（2022）、《競爭法多邊平台經濟分析之研究》，公平交易委員會111年委託研究報告（PG11106-0010）。
3. 戴貝宜、邱佳芸、陳惠君（2019），《我國結合申報門檻之檢討》，公平交易委員會108年度研究發展報告。
（四）研討會論文
1. 莊春發（2001年4月），〈競爭政策與產業政策的替代與互補〉，發表於：《第八屆競爭政策與公平交易法學術研討會》，公平交易委員會（主辦），臺北。
2. 蘇永欽、范建得（2000年10月），〈公平交易法第四十六條修正後的適用問題〉，發表於：《第七屆競爭政策與公平交易法學術研討會》，公平交易委員會（主辦），臺北。
（五）學位論文
1. 張建隆（2014），《企業結合效率抗辯之法律經濟分析-以水平結合為中心》，國立政治大學法律科際整合研究所碩士論文。
（六）案例
1. 公平交易委員會公結字第102001號結合案件決定書。
2. 公平交易委員會公結字第103002號結合案件決定書。
3. 公平交易委員會公結字第104001號結合案件決定書。
4. 公平交易委員會公結字第104003號結合案件決定書。
5. 公平交易委員會公結字第107001號結合案件決定書。
6. 公平交易委員會公結字第108001號結合案件決定書。
7. 公平交易委員會公結字第111001號結合案件決定書。
8. 公平交易委員會公結字第112001號結合案件決定書。
9. 公平交易委員會公結字第112003號結合案件決定書。
10. 行政院公平交易委員會2005年11月18日結合案件決定書。
11. 行政院公平交易委員會2006年2月23日結合案件決定書。
12. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第092003號結合案件決定書。
13. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第092004號結合案件決定書。
14. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第096003號結合案件決定書。
15. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第096004號結合案件決定書。
16. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第096005號結合案件決定書。
17. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第097004號結合案件決定書。
18. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第097005號結合案件決定書。
19. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第098004號結合案件決定書。
20. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第099003號結合案件決定書。
21. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第099004號結合案件決定書。
22. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第０九一００三號結合案件決定書。
23. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第０九二００一號結合案件決定書。
24. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第０九二００二號結合案件決定書。
25. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第100001號結合案件決定書。
26. 行政院公平交易委員會公結字第100003號結合案件決定書。
27. 最高行政法院102年度判字第500號判決。
28. 臺北高等行政法院100年度訴字第1226號判決。
（七）網路文獻
1. 〈《通信網路》以債權持有，遠傳、中嘉終於對上了〉，《yahoo!新聞》，2015年7月30日，https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E9%80%9A%E4%BF%A1%E7%B6%B2%E8%B7%AF-%E4%BB%A5%E5%82%B5%E6%AC%8A%E6%8C%81%E6%9C%89-%E9%81%A0%E5%82%B3-%E4%B8%AD%E5%98%89%E7%B5%82%E6%96%BC%E5%B0%8D%E4%B8%8A%E4%BA%86-083427787.html。
2. 〈SQUARE傳收購Credit Karma報稅業務〉，《B-GO BIZ併購情報》，2020年11月3日，https://www.bgo.business/news_page.php?uuid=09197f82-e701-11eb-9eb0-56000176fdd3。
3. 〈Uber Eats擬併foodpanda 公平會接獲申請聚焦4大面向審查〉，《中央社》，2024年5月22日，https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202405220244.aspx。
4. 〈什麼是工業 4.0？〉，《思愛普SAP》，https://www.sap.com/taiwan/products/scm/industry-4-0/what-is-industry-4-0.html。
5. 〈公平交易法立法背景及修法沿革〉，《公平交易委員會》，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=1396&docid=166&mid=1396。
6. 〈公平交易法所稱的事業結合是什麼？和公司法所稱「合併」是否相同？〉，《公平交易委員會》，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=1206&docid=14283&mid=1201。
7. 〈公開資訊觀測站〉，https://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/index。
8. 〈本會行政決定〉，《公平交易委員會》，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/decision/decisionList.aspx。
9. 〈商業房地產及建築施工貸款指南〉，《Cathay Bank》，https://www.cathaybank.com/zh-hant/about-us/insights-by-cathay/your-guide-commercial-real-estate-and-construction-loans。
10. 〈經濟效率〉，《國立臺灣大學經濟學系》，https://econ.ntu.edu.tw/archives/5316。
11. 〈點鑽公司個資絕無外洩之虞 增資過程合理公開〉，《悠遊卡EASYCARD》，2014年3月28日，https://www.easycard.com.tw/new?cls=1&id=1508381749。
12. 江雅綺（2017），〈共享經濟的商業模式與法規挑戰〉，《科學月刊》，432期，https://www.scimonth.com.tw/archives/1696。
13. 何韻亭（2014），〈Uber不是亂哄抬價格的混蛋，而是靠演算法從你身上掏金的經濟學家〉，《TechOrange科技報橘》，https://buzzorange.com/techorange/2014/08/28/in-praise-of-efficient-price-gouging-uber/。
14. 張翔一、黃昭勇，〈行動支付開跑！不可不知５大生活變革〉，《天下雜誌》，2013年1月24日，https://www.cw.com.tw/article/5046912。
15. 陳淑芳（2023），〈歐盟執委會首次指定「超大型數位平臺」與「超大型線上搜尋引擎」〉，《公平交易委員會電子報》，223期，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/1120719-1.pdf。
16. 傅沁怡，〈統一併家樂福 八條件放行〉，《工商時報》，2023年5月6日，https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20230506700051-430503。
17. 黃晶琳，〈學者：有線TV法規應檢討 清大教授呼籲公平會順應數位匯流發展〉，《經濟日報》，2024年3月27日，https://money.udn.com/money/story/5603/7858047。
18. 楊志弘（2020），〈大數據—以參進障礙角度評估〉，《公平交易委員會電子報》，151期，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/1090715-1.pdf。
19. 潘姿羽，〈公平會憂全面漲價 統一併維力三度闖關失敗〉，《中央社》，2018年11月1日，https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201811010050.aspx。
20. 蕭子新，〈砸7億？！　Yahoo!奇摩併購無名小站〉，《TVBS新聞網》，2006年12月14日，https://news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/341238。
（八）其他文獻
1. 〈悠遊卡投資控股股份有限公司書面業務報告〉，《臺北市議會公報》，107卷4期，2016年10月6日。
二、英文文獻
（一）專書
1. BORK, ROBERT (1978), THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1st edition).
2. HOVENKAMP, HERBERT (2017), PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST.
3. LANDSBURG, STEVEN E. (2011), PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS (8th edition).
4. NIELS, GUNNAR ET AL. (2011), ECONOMICS FOR COMPETITION LAWYERS (1st edition).
5. PARKIN, MICHAEL (2012), ECONOMICS (Donna Battista et al. eds., 10th edition).
6. ¬SZERB, LÁSZLÓ ET AL., THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY INDEX 2020 (2022).
（二）書之篇章
1. Kenney, Martin & John Zysman (2016), The Rise of the Platform Economy, in ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: SUMMIT ON HUMAN GENE EDITING 61 (David Baltimore et al. eds.).
2. Cavanillas, Jose´ Marı´a et al.(2016), The Big Data Value Opportunity, in NEW HORIZONS FOR A DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY: A ROADMAP FOR USAGE AND EXPLOITATION OF BIG DATA IN EUROPE 3 (Jose´ Marı´a Cavanillas et al. eds.).
3. Curry, Edward (2016), The Big Data Value Chain: Definitions, Concepts, and Theoretical Approaches, in NEW HORIZONS FOR A DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY: A ROADMAP FOR USAGE AND EXPLOITATION OF BIG DATA IN EUROPE 29 (Jose´ Marı´a Cavanillas et al. eds.).
4. Varian, Hal R. (1989), Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds.).
5. Krämer, Jan et al. (2020), The Role of Data for Digital Markets Contestability: Case Studies and Data Access Remedies, in DIGITAL MARKETS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW 74 (Jan Krämer ed.).
6. Krämer, Jan (2020), Introduction, in DIGITAL MARKETS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW 12 (Jan Krämer ed.).
7. Segall, Margaret T. & Nicole M. Peles (2023), Merger Remedies in Dynamic Industries, in MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE 103 (5th ed. Ronan P. Harty et al. eds.).
8. Harty, Ronan P. et al. (2023), Overview, in MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE 1 (5th ed. Ronan P. Harty et al. eds.).
9. Samuelson, Martha et al. (2023), Economic Analysis of Merger Remedies, in MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE 31 (5th ed. Ronan P. Harty et al. eds.).
10. Zhou, Fay et al. (2023), Non-Structural Remedies and Their Key Strengths, in MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE 86 (5th ed. Ronan P. Harty et al. eds.).
11. Greenfield, Leon B. et al. (2023), Why Identifying a Suitable Divestiture Buyer Is Key to Deal Planning, in MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE 136 (5th ed. Ronan P. Harty et al. eds.).
12. Yun, John M., The Role of Big Data in Antitrust, in THE GAI REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 220 (Matt Lein ed., 2020).
（三）期刊文獻
1. Acs, Zoltan J. et al. (2021), The Evolution of the Global Digital Platform Economy: 1971–2021, 57 SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS 1629.
2. Adam, Harold J. (1960), Anti-Trust (Anti-Monopoly) Policy and Application 1920-1929, 4(2) THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST 9.
3. Anderson, Mark & Max Huffman (2017), The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, Or Something in Between, 2017 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 859.
4. Armstrong, Mark (2006), Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37(3) THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 668.
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（四）案例
1. General Motors Corporation, et al., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
2. Cargill v. Monfort, 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
3. Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
4. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
5. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
6. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 294 (1949).
7. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
9. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
10. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
11. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
12. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (2017).
13. Illumina, Inc. v. FTC, 88 F.4th 1036 (5th Cir. 2023).
14. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. - Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
15. United States v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7509 , __ F.Supp.3d __.
16. FTC v. Tenet Health Care, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
17. F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
18. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
19. Final Judgment, United States v. Google Inc. (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00688 (RLW)).
20. CoStar / LoopNet: Decision and Order, FTC, CoStar Group, Inc., Longstar Acquisition Sub, Inc., and LoopNet, Inc. (August 29, 2012) (Docket No. C-4368). Complaint, FTC, CoStar Group, Inc., Longstar Acquisition Sub, Inc., and LoopNet, Inc. (August 29, 2012) (Docket No. C-4368).
21. PepsiCo et al.: Decision and Order, FTC, PepsiCo, Inc. (September 27, 2010) (Docket No. C-4301). Complaint, FTC, PepsiCo, Inc. (September 27, 2010) (Docket No. C-4301).
22. CVS / Aetna: Final Judgment, United States v. CVS Health Corp. (September 4, 2019) (Civil Case No. 18-2340 (RJL)). Complaint, United States v. CVS Health Corp. (October 10, 2018) (Case 1:18-cv-02340).
23. Exxon / Mobil: Decision and Order, FTC, Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation (January 26, 2001) (Docket No. C-3907) (FTC Doc. 9910077). Complaint, FTC, Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation (November 13, 1999) (Docket No. C-3907).
24. Meta / Within: FTC v. Meta Platforms Inc., 654 F. Supp. 3d 892 (N.D. Cal., January 31, 2023). Order Returning Matter to Adjudication and Dismissing Complaint, FTC Docket No. 9411 (February 24, 2023). Meta Platforms, Inc., Doc. No. 605823 (Federal Trade Commission October 13, 2022) (Amended Complaint). Meta Platforms, Inc., Doc. No. 605823 (Federal Trade Commission October 12, 2022) (Complaint Counsel’s Unopposed Motion to Amend Complaint).
25. Intuit / Credit Karma: Complaint, United States v. Intuit Inc. (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-03441). Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Intuit Inc. (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-03441). Final Judgment, U.S. v. Intuit Inc. et al. (D.D.C. 2021) (Civil Action No. 20-3441 (ABJ)).
26. Microsoft / Activision Blizzard: FTC v. Microsoft Corp., 20223 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119001; __F.Supp.3d__. Reply Brief of the Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC v. Microsoft Corp. on Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 23-15992 (November 13, 2023).
（五）網路文獻
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12. FTC and DOJ Release Final Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED (August, 2010), https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/ftc-and-doj-release-final-revised-horizontal-merger-guidelines.
13. FTC Interprets “Unfair Competition” Broadly in New Section 5 Policy Statement, DAVIS POLK (November 15, 2022), https://www.davispolk.com/insights/client-update/ftc-interprets-unfair-competition-broadly-new-section-5-policy-statement.
14. FTC Places Conditions on CoStar's $860 Million Acquisition of LoopNet, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (April 26, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2012/04/ftc-places-conditions-costars-860-million-acquisition-loopnet.
15. Gidley, J. Mark et al., U.S. Antitrust Agencies Finalize Changes to the U.S. Merger Guidelines – Formalizing a Shift Toward a Very Aggressive Merger Enforcement Policy, WHITE & CASE (December 19, 2023), https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/us-antitrust-agencies-finalize-changes-us-merger-guidelines-formalizing-shift-toward.
16. Gordon, Leonard L. & Lisa Jose Fales, FTC Approves LoopNet – CoStar Merger With Conditions, VENABLE LLP (April 27, 2012), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2012/04/ftc-approves-loopnet-costar-merger-with-condition.
17. Greene, Jenna, Microsoft-Activision Is a Done Deal – But What If the FTC Still Wins? Ask Whole Foods., REUTERS (October 20, 2023, 12:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/column-microsoft-activision-is-done-deal-what-if-ftc-still-wins-ask-whole-foods-2023-10-19/.
18. Heller, C.-Philipp et al., Is Lax Enforcement of Antitrust Policy to Blame for an Increase in Market Power?, CONCURRENCES (May, 2023), https://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/_04.concurrences_2-2023_law_economics_mellsop-biblio_v2-2.pdf?122260/3bf170243812171042b74f0e37aa3d0f6780aea7c8baac52408c17aa4dd418af.
19. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY (2002), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AWG_AdvocacyReport2002.pdf.
20. Judge Blocks JetBlue’s $3.8B Buyout of Spirit Airlines, Massachusetts Lawyers WEEKLY (January 17, 2024), https://masslawyersweekly.com/2024/01/17/judge-blocks-jetblues-3-8b-buyout-of-spirit-airlines/.
21. Justice Department Issues Modernized Merger Remedies Manual, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (September 3, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-modernized-merger-remedies-manual.
22. Justice Department Requires CVS and Aetna to Divest Aetna’s Medicare Individual Part D Prescription Drug Plan Business to Proceed with Merger, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (October 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-cvs-and-aetna-divest-aetna-s-medicare-individual-part-d.
23. Kertesz, Anna et al., United States: Merger Control, LEGAL 500, https://www.legal500.com/guides/chapter/united-states-merger-control/.
24. Leary, Thomas B., Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (November 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/efficiencies-antitrust-story-ongoing-evolution.
25. Levine, Jay L. & Porter Wright, 1990s to the Present: The Chicago School and Antitrust Enforcement, ANTITRUST LAW SOURCE (June 1, 2021), https://www.antitrustlawsource.com/2021/06/1990s-to-the-present-the-chicago-school-and-antitrust-enforcement/.
26. Merger Control Laws and Regulations USA 2024, ICLG.COM, https://iclg.com/practice-areas/merger-control-laws-and-regulations/usa.
27. Mergers, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers.
28. Mitchell, Cory, GAFAM Stocks: What They Are, How They Work, INVESTOPEDIA (September 15, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gafam-stocks.asp.
29. Moss, Diana L., The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech, AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE (July 8, 2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Merger-Enforcement_Big-Tech_7.8.19.pdf.
30. National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the New Deal: A Resource Guide: Introduction, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: RESEARCH GUIDES, https://guides.loc.gov/national-recovery-administration/introduction.
31. National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the New Deal: A Resource Guide: NRA History of Codes / Codes of Fair Competition, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: RESEARCH GUIDES, https://guides.loc.gov/national-recovery-administration/history.
32. New HSR Form Will Transform the US Merger Review Process, MORGAN LEWIS (June 30, 2023), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2023/06/new-hsr-form-will-transform-the-us-merger-review-process.
33. New HSR Thresholds and Filing Fees for 2024, FTC (February 5, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/competition-matters/2024/02/new-hsr-thresholds-filing-fees-2024.
34. Nyman, Sara & Rodrigo Barajas Aparicio (2021), Antitrust and Digital Platforms: An Analysis of Global Patterns and Approaches by Competition Authorities, WORLD BANK, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/893381632736476155/pdf/Antitrust-and-Digital-Platforms-An-Analysis-of-Global-Patterns-and-Approaches-by-Competition-Authorities.pdf.
35. Partial Equilibrium, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (5 EDITION) (2017), https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780198759430.001.0001/acref-9780198759430-e-2277?rskey=3w5Nln&result=1.
36. Paul, George L. et al., United States: Tech Mergers, GCR (November 25, 2022), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/digital-markets-guide/second-edition/article/united-states-tech-mergers#footnote-011-backlink.
37. Portuese, Aurelien, Reforming Merger Reviews to Preserve Creative Destruction, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (September, 2021), https://www2.itif.org/2021-merger-reviews.pdf.
38. PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2009), WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM?: AN OVERVIEW, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf.
39. Robinson-Patman Act and What It Means for Today, THOMSON REUTERS (July 27, 2022), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/robinson-patman-act-and-what-it-means-for-today/.
40. Teh, Tat-How & Julian Wright (2024), Competitive Bottlenecks and Platform Spillovers, SSRN, https://ap5.fas.nus.edu.sg/fass/ecsjkdw/competitive_bottleneck_20240227.pdf.
41. The Rise of Digital Platforms and Why They Are Important, SOLVEO, https://solveo.co/the-rise-of-digital-platforms-and-why-they-are-important/.
42. The Robinson-Patman Act: Annual Update, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (April 2, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/robinson-patman-act-annual-update.
43. Trisha Torrey, Differences Between Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, and Quaternary Care: Levels of Care, VERYWELLHEALTH (February 24, 2024), https://www.verywellhealth.com/primary-secondary-tertiary-and-quaternary-care-2615354.
44. US Federal Judge: Efficiencies Analysis Inadmissible in Antitrust Merger Trial, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (September 20, 2022), https://www.lw.com/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/Alert%203009.pdf.
45. Viki, Tendayi, Innovation Versus R&D Spending, STRATEGYZER (May 20, 2019), https://www.strategyzer.com/library/innovation-versus-rd-spending.
46. What's Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.
（六）其他文獻
1. Argentesi, Elena et al. (2019), Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment (CESifo Working Paper No. 7985).
2. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (2011).
3. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER REMEDIES MANUAL (2020).
4. Farrell, Joseph, Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems (Competition Policy Center, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No. CPC03-41, August 21, 2003).
5. First, Harry, Antitrust Remedies and the Big Tech Platform Cases (New York University School of Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23-33, May, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4324570.
6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999).
7. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES (2012).
8. Glick, Mark et al., The Horizontal Merger Efficiency Fallacy (Inst. of New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 212, August 24, 2023), https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_212-Glick-et-al-Efficiency-final.pdf.
9. Hovenkamp, Herbert (2024), The 2023 Merger Guidelines: Law, Fact, and Method (University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 24-09), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4684465.
10. Kamepalli, Sai Krishna et al. (2022), Kill Zone (NBER Working Paper 27146), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27146/w27146.pdf.
11. Kerber, Wolfgang (2007), Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law (Marburg Papers on Econ. No. 09-2007), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29851/1/606249095.pdf.
12. OECD, Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases: Note by the United States, Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2016)23 (June 2, 2016).
13. Parker, Geoffrey et al. (2020), Digital Platforms and Antitrust (Bruegel Working Paper, No. 06/2020).
14. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES (1992).
15. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1997 MERGER GUIDELINES (1997).
16. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010).
17. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 2023 MERGER GUIDELINES (2023).
18. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES (1968).
19. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES (1982).
20. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984).		-
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/93944-
dc.description.abstract隨著數位技術的發展，人們將經濟與社會的活動場域，由現實生活世界轉移至數位世界。數位平台也在此背景下得以蓬勃發展，並對我們的生活造成了深遠的影響，其所帶來的改變更及於市場競爭的內容與樣貌，因而激發了許多競爭法在應對數位平台的新興競爭議題時的討論，數為平台的結合案件，即為重要的討論標的之一。
數位平台的結合，一方面可能導致市場力量的集中，而有限制競爭疑慮，另一方面卻也可能帶來一定程度的效率。在採取嚴格執法的情形下，將會降低結合所可能產生的效率的實現可能性，故本文旨在探討數位平台結合案件中，效率抗辯對於數位平台結合的影響、效率抗辯目前的定位，以及是否在因應數位平台結合案件而有調整的必要。
本論文首先回顧美國和臺灣的競爭法及其結合規範至今為止的沿革，並從競爭法的歷史背景與競爭法經濟學理論，了解競爭法的目的、競爭法所追求的效率究竟為何，乃至於效率抗辯的存立基礎，再透過分析採納效率抗辯的案例，探討目前效率抗辯在結合管制中的地位與適用狀況，並指出效率抗辯適用上的困境以及提出改進建議，包括強化效率抗辯的程序設計、論理與舉證，以及利用結合矯正措施來實現效率提升。
進而，本論文從數位平台之特性，指出效率抗辯在數位平台結合案件中能夠提供數位平台創新誘因並改善消費者福利的重要性。透過美國與臺灣數位平台結合案例之分析，提出目前實務上效率抗辯的適用問題。
最後，本論文建議應正視效率抗辯在結合管制中的地位、增加矯正措施與效率抗辯的連結性，並持續關注、吸收各國在數位平台案件中的執法經驗，以確保競爭法在面對數位平台結合案件時，能夠更有效地平衡避免限制競爭效果與追求經濟效率的目標。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstractExperiencing a rising of digital technology, the economic and the social activities in our everyday life have shifted from the brick-and-mortar world to the digital realm. Digital platforms have flourished, thereby changing our lives as well as the nature and dynamics of market competition. This fundamental shift has sparked heated discussions within competition law on digital-platforms-related issues, including merger control on digital platform cases.
The mergers of digital platforms can lead to a concentration of market power and raise competition concerns; on the other hand, such mergers can also produce efficiencies. There is a potential risk that strict merger control may reduce these efficiencies in digital platform’s merger cases. Therefore, this thesis aims to explore the role and the practical issues of efficiency defenses in digital platform mergers to determine whether adjustments to the current situation are necessary.
This thesis begins by reviewing the development of competition law and merger regulations in the United States and Taiwan, including the historical background and antitrust economic theories, to understand the goals of antitrust law and the nature of efficiencies it seeks to promote. Through case studies, this thesis examines the application status of efficiency defenses in the current merger control, identifying existing challenges and proposing improvements. These include a reform in procedural design, court and authorities reasoning, and evidence for efficiency defenses. Furthermore, the thesis proposes that employing merger remedies is helpful to realize alleged efficiency defenses.
This thesis also highlights the importance of efficiency defenses in digital platform mergers, emphasizing their role in providing incentives for innovation and improving consumer welfare. By analyzing digital platform merger cases in the United States and Taiwan, the thesis identifies some practical issues in the application of efficiency defenses.
Finally, this thesis suggest that courts and antitrust authorities recognize the critical role of efficiency defenses in merger control and strengthen the linkage between remedies and efficiency defenses. Continuously following and integrating enforcement experiences from various countries would be helpful. These steps are proposed to ensure that competition law effectively balances the goals of preventing anti-competitive effects and pursuing efficiency in digital platform mergers.		en
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dc.description.tableofcontents謝辭 i
摘要 ii
ABSTRACT iii
簡目 v
詳目 viii
表目錄 xviii
圖目錄 xviii
第一章、 緒論 1
第一節、 研究動機 1
第二節、 研究方法與範圍 3
第三節、 本文架構 4
第二章、 競爭法與結合規範 5
第一節、 美國 5
第一項、 美國競爭法沿革 5
第二項、 美國競爭法經濟學介紹 12
第三項、 美國結合法規 20
第二節、 臺灣 36
第一項、 臺灣公平交易法沿革 36
第二項、 臺灣結合法規 40
第三項、 小結 45
第三章、 結合案件中的效率抗辯 47
第一節、 競爭法的目的 47
第一項、 決定競爭法目的的重要性 47
第二項、 競爭法目的種類 48
第三項、 從《公平法》探討競爭法目的 53
第二節、 競爭法追求的效率 58
第一項、 經濟學中的效率 58
第二項、 總體福利效果或個體福利效果？ 59
第三節、 結合效率抗辯的要素：以美國結合案件為例 63
第一項、 早期：不採效率抗辯 63
第二項、 效率進入結合案件限制競爭分析與效率抗辯的接納 64
第四節、 效率抗辯的困境 74
第一項、 效率難以證明 74
第二項、 再探效率抗辯 77
第五節、 臺灣實務效率抗辯的適用情形 80
第一項、 效率抗辯之法規 80
第二項、 結合案件中的效率抗辯 81
第三項、 小結 86
第六節、 效率抗辯的實現：結合的矯正措施 87
第一項、 矯正措施的目的與原則 87
第二項、 結合矯正措施規範 88
第三項、 矯正措施之類型與內容 91
第四項、 小結：結合矯正措施與效率 117
第四章、 數位平台與結合效率抗辯 121
第一節、 何謂「數位平台」？ 121
第一項、 數位平台的發展：資訊技術與數位產業的沿革 121
第二項、 數位平台的定義與特性 122
第二節、 數位平台的競爭法問題 131
第一項、 大型平台的限制競爭之虞 131
第二項、 資料特性造成的限制競爭疑慮 135
第三節、 數位平台結合案件中的效率抗辯 139
第一項、 數位平台結合案件的限制競爭效果 139
第二項、 符合數位平台特性的效率抗辯與矯正措施 141
第四節、 小結 149
第五章、 數位平台之結合案例 150
第一節、 美國 150
第一項、 Google / ITA (2011) 150
第二項、 Intuit / Credit Karma (2020) 155
第三項、 Meta / Within (2022) 160
第四項、 Microsoft / Activision Blizzard (2023) 164
第二節、 臺灣 170
第一項、 雅虎 / 無名小站（公結字第096003號） 170
第二項、 點鑽整合行銷股份有限公司結合案 (公結字第100001號、公結字第103002號) 174
第三節、 小結：綜合分析 179
第一項、 美國 179
第二項、 臺灣 180
第六章、 結論 183
第一節、 效率抗辯在結合審查中的程序地位 184
第二節、 增加矯正措施與效率抗辯的連結性 185
第三節、 持續關注並吸收各國數位平台案件的執法經驗 185
參考文獻 186		-
dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject效率抗辯zh_TW
dc.subject數位平台zh_TW
dc.subject競爭法zh_TW
dc.subject矯正措施zh_TW
dc.subject結合管制zh_TW
dc.subjectantitrusten
dc.subjectmerger remediesen
dc.subjectefficiency defenseen
dc.subjectmerger controlen
dc.subjectcompetition lawen
dc.subjectdigital platformen
dc.title競爭法結合管制之研究——以數位平台結合案件之效率抗辯為中心zh_TW
dc.titleA Study on Merger Control under Competition Law: Focusing on the Efficiency Defense in Digital Platform Merger Casesen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear112-2-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee黃銘傑;顏雅倫zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeMing-Jye Huang;Ya-Lun Yenen
dc.subject.keyword數位平台,競爭法,結合管制,效率抗辯,矯正措施,zh_TW
dc.subject.keyworddigital platform,competition law,antitrust,merger control,efficiency defense,merger remedies,en
dc.relation.page209-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202402530-
dc.rights.note未授權-
dc.date.accepted2024-07-31-
dc.contributor.author-college法律學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept法律學系-
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